740.0011 PW/7–444: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 4—11:55 a.m.]
1159. During their conversation Sun Fo asked Atcheson (our 1158, July 4) if latter thought present developments would alter the course of the war and Atcheson pointed out that loss of Hengyang and Kweilin would mean loss of all southeastern air fields and such loss could not help but prolong the war; he did not, of course, know the Allied plan of strategy but it was obvious that a landing on Formosa or on the China coast at some future time would be more difficult with our southeastern China air bases in enemy hands; meantime the United States would, of course, continue to do what it could to aid China and our air force was now exerting itself to the utmost to support such Chinese troops as were resisting the Japs advancing to slow up the Japs by attacking their supply lines. Atcheson went on to say that he understood that the Japs advance around Hengyang was apparently not requiring very large enemy units, that the enemy was finding his way much easier than he expected, and lack of strong resistance might tempt him to go further than he had originally planned with available forces and supplies and perhaps consider that conditions were favorable for planning an eventual attack upon Kunming which, again lacking effective resistance, would have obvious results as regards the furnishing of aid to China including the aid given by our Air Force. An easy advance from northern Honan through Sian toward Chengtu would also have obvious results.
Sun’s aid there gives question [sic] as to the seriousness of the implications in the situation and he had mentioned to the Generalissimo the danger of awaiting full equipment of the Chinese armies a year or so hence (which would depend in large part upon reopening Burma Road which in turn could not be done this year). He said he thought Chiang would try to do something and in response to Atcheson’s query whether there were any fundamental political difficulties in the way of getting the southeastern generals together in wholehearted cooperation against the enemy, he said that there was very little difficulty as far as Li Chi-shen and Chang Fa-kwei were concerned but there were others who hesitated to use the Red troops for fear of losing them and consequently losing their own influence and power. Atcheson then put forward an idea I had mentioned in our discussions in the Embassy by “wondering” whether it would be helpful for the Generalissimo to call all factions (including the Communists) and himself into a military council or high command and appeal to them to accept with him joint responsibility for effective [Page 117] military operations to save what remains of the country, giving them the fullest assurances that he wished to eliminate from the military scene all internal political maneuvers and calling upon them to participate with him in working out and carrying out a plan of joint operations, at same time appealing to people for revival of resistance and a united front. Atcheson said that he thought this would be a statesmanlike step for the Generalissimo to take and one which could not help but enhance his prestige at home and abroad as China’s leader. Sun received this suggestion with apparent enthusiasm.
Now that some time has elapsed since the Vice President and [had?] talks with Chiang (see our 1092, June 24), I have it in mind to seek an early opportunity to have a general discussion of the situation with the Foreign Minister and also to talk with the Generalissimo with a view to indicating that we feel concern over recent and current developments and to ascertaining, perhaps, the attitude Chiang is assuming and what plans he might have in mind looking to possible remedies.