893.00/7–444: Telegram
The Ambassador in China (Gauss) to the Secretary of State
[Received July 5—10:27 p.m.)
1158. Sun Fo invited Atcheson to his residence evening third for “private talk”. After preliminary discussion of present situation, especially military implications, Sun said that although he thought situation was not hopeless it was very grave and he had felt impelled to go to the Generalissimo and lay before latter his opinions and ideas in regard to it. From the ensuing statement it was apparent Sun had spoken with unusual frankness to Chiang—indeed with a frankness [Page 114] and courage that seems to be unknown to Generalissimo’s usual advisers. Sun said he had pointed out to Chiang that the military debacle in Honan—and debacle now developing in Hunan—had caused not only general and profound discouragement but also widespread defeatism (our 1038, June 15) and that action must be taken quickly to save the situation. In the first place, Sun told Chiang, the Chinese armies must be rehabilitated: Means must be taken to see that they are adequately fed and properly treated and, in addition, if they are to be made effective they must be removed from the command of old-fashioned and self-centered Chinese generals and placed under command of American officers who, as demonstrated in Burma, could lead Chinese forces to success against the Japs. He told Chiang that China had not only obligations to herself in the war but also to United States, her principal ally and best friend, and it was owing to United States to rehabilitate the Chinese armies and make them into something that could be counted on to do their part. He told Chiang that the United States wanted three things of China: Effective participation and cooperation in the war effort; democratization; and the maintenance of friendly relations, not only with United States itself but also with Britain and Russia. He said to Generalissimo that United States sincerely wanted China to be unified and strong as well as democratic; America wanted a strong China both for China’s sake and for the sake of the political future of Far East.
Sun pointed out to Chiang that one of the obstacles to China’s taking affirmative part in war against Japan was the Kmt-Communist difficulties which not only immobilized some 300,000 of the Central Government’s best troops but also immobilized large Chinese Communist forces which have fought well against the enemy and could do so again. This situation, he said to Chiang, was also an obstacle to good Sino-Soviet relations and the Soviets could not be expected to take up arms against Japan as long as it existed because Soviet attack upon Jap forces in Manchuria and North China would require Chinese Communist cooperation and this would raise complications with the National Government.
He told Chiang that he did not believe that the Communists wanted to communize or dominate China; it would in any case be impossible for them to do so; what they wanted was settlement which would enable them to cooperate with the Central Government in the war against Japan and still avoid their own elimination as a party.
Sun said that Chiang replied that the Communists had presented [proposals] unacceptable to the Government but that counter-proposals had nevertheless been made and he had subsequently sent the correspondence to Sun.
[Page 115]Sun told Atcheson that the Communist demands had been both political and military; as regards the political they demanded democratization and legalization of their own and other minority parties, representation in the Government, and for their border region the status of a special district under the Executive Yuan to be administered by officials chosen by the Central Government from their own nominees. In military field they wanted their claimed 470,000 men equipped and maintained as 18 divisions of the national armies to be commanded by their own officers and to operate in the “guerrilla areas” where they have been operating. The Central Government’s reply had been that political questions could not be discussed until the military questions were settled although it indicated that the question of legalization of the Communist Party and the reformation of the border government into a special district under the Executive Yuan would not be difficult. As to military the Central Government was willing to reorganize the Communist forces into 4 armies of 10 divisions (4 armies would nominally comprise 12 divisions) but they must be under complete central discipline and control and move and fight wherever ordered. Sun said these counter-proposals had been given the Communists on June 5 and there had not yet been a reply. He went on to say that the question was one that required immediate solution not only in the light of the military situation in Honan and Hunan but because of the future. Otherwise if the Soviet should take up arms against the Japs the Communist forces would have to turn to Russia for arms and equipment for themselves to enable them to renew their operations against the enemy and after the Japs had been driven from Manchuria and North China the Communist forces with perhaps 2,000,000 men under arms by then would be left in control of these areas. Sun went on to say that the Generalissimo was used to making decisions himself and not to taking advice and there was no one close to him with the temerity to talk frankly. He felt, however, that his remarks had had some effect and that Chiang was now persuaded at least in part that he should reorient some of his ideas and policies and was actually seeking in his own mind for means of doing so. Sun said that American opinion could be of great assistance in this process; it would not do of course to “bring pressure” on the Generalissimo because he would react unfavorably to pressure but if the American attitude and wishes could be made clearly known to Chiang it would have good effect.
Supplemental telegram follows.19
- Infra.↩