861.51/3029: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

506. For the Secretary and the Under Secretary. Regarding your 246, February 8, 9 p.m. I have received a long cable from Hopkins regarding capital goods requirements of Soviets under lend-lease, and have replied. Certain aspects of these cables have an important bearing on the Soviet reconstruction program, as it would seem that lend-lease can properly be used to assist in this connection. It is impossible to draw a clear cut line between war and post-war capital requirements. Requirements for reconstruction of devastated areas, not only for industrial and agricultural production but also public services, etc., for the civilian population, and requirements for the expansion of production and transportation facilities elsewhere are certainly difficult to appraise as between war and post-war needs, especially as the length of the war is so uncertain. Moreover the general morale factor is one that cannot be calculated nor overlooked.

It seems clear however that, although lend-lease can properly plan an important role in taking care of the most pressing Russian requirements, it cannot be used to meet what the Soviet Government has in mind. Mikoyan tells me that they are now planning a 15 year reconstruction program. It would appear that a knowledge of what they can expect from us in the way of equipment and credits is an important element. It would also appear of great advantage in many directions to the US to have an opportunity to study their program with them now insofar as it relates to possible purchases from the US.

I am fearful that, unless we are able to offer a definite credit program, the Soviet Government will be unwilling to expose its hand. We would then lose a competitive advantage in obtaining business for the time when it is most needed for the readjustment of our war production program. Many months are required to develop plans and detailed designs. It may well prove of advantage to take some of this business even before the complete cessation of hostilities. It will certainly be of enormous value in cushioning the shock from war to peace if we are prepared to put into production Russian orders immediately upon cessation of hostilities.

I believe that an agreement on a reconstruction program will have a major effect on the successful prosecution of the war in Russia. It will permit the release in Russia of reserves of materials and manpower for the direct war effort. It will give new hope to people generally and in the devastated areas and enable the nation to continue [Page 1055] to give undivided attention to the war. We get into the habit of thinking that under Stalin and the Communist Party the Russian nation can be forced to take the road that leads to the goal desired. However there has been great loss of life and untold suffering, and every day we see evidence that it takes the most skillful leadership, the most ingenious political planning to keep the people at their maximum effectiveness for carrying on the war.

In addition, if aid for reconstruction is to be of real value in our over-all relations with the Soviets as a benefit which can be obtained from us if they work cooperatively with us on international problems in accordance with our standards, we must have a well forged instrument to offer them. Vague promises excite Soviet suspicions whereas a precise program offered to them (but always kept within our control thru the approval of each transaction) will, in my judgement, be of definite value.

I therefore recommend that lend-lease be used to the fullest extent possible for this reconstruction and, in addition, that the study you indicate is being made for financing projects which cannot properly be made under lend-lease be pursued energetically and expeditiously.

I have cabled so fully in the hope that the triple-barrelled advantages to us which I describe may furnish ammunition and ideas for dealing with political problems at home in obtaining effective legislation.

It would be most helpful if I could be kept informed of the progress of the study referred to and the developments of lend-lease policy as applied to this problem.

Harriman