Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, Europe, Volume IV

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt ⁶⁹

Moscow, 12 October 1944.

Personal for the President. In a series of conversations during and after dinner lasting in all 6½ hours the following were the principal matters discussed:

1. Poland. Stalin explained why Warsaw could not have been taken. In the first drive he had hoped that the Red Army could overrun Warsaw by the impetus of their rapid advance. In this they had failed because the Germans put up strong opposition and the Red Army naturally run ahead of their supplies. Warsaw was on higher ground than Praga⁷⁰ and this made a frontal attack across the Vistula impossible or unjustifiably costly. To outflank the city will require 50 divisions and it thus became necessary to clean the Germans out of the Baltic States to protect the right flank and to release the necessary forces. He showed his resentment of the “scribblers” in England and the United States who had doubted Russia’s good faith. After some remarks of the Prime Minister regarding the aid to Warsaw from the air the question of Mikolajczyk’s visit was discussed. It was agreed that the British and Russians would put the maximum pressure on both Mikolajczyk and the leaders of the Polish Committee to come to an agreement. If however agreement was not reached as the result of discussions between the Poles, the Russians and British should agree between themselves or [on] an equitable solution. Both of them would then attempt to force the Poles to accept this solution.

2. There was a long discussion about the Balkan countries particularly Yugoslavia. The Prime Minister took Stalin to task for receiving Tito without informing him. The only explanation that Stalin gave was that Tito had asked him to keep his visit secret. Stalin explained that he had never seen Tito before although he had lived in Russia during 1917 and 1918. At Tito’s request he had promised to give him arms principally captured German but also some Russian. It was agreed between Stalin and the Prime Minister that they should work together in attempting to bring the Yugoslav peoples together for the establishment of a strong federation but that if it was found that such a federation was impracticable without continued internal strife Serbia should be established as an independent country. Both agreed that the former was far more desirable and the latter was only the last resort. This led to an interesting statement by Stalin on the subject of Pan-Slavism which he said he considered as an unrealistic conception. What the different Slavic peoples wanted was their independence. Pan-Slavism if pursued meant domination of the Slavic countries by Russia. This was against Russia’s interests and would never satisfy the smaller Slavic nations. He said he felt he would have to make a public statement before long to make this clear. In connection with Yugoslavia, Churchill explained that England had no “sordid interests” but wished to see her moral obligations to the Yugoslavs fulfilled. Stalin brushed this aside saying that he did not consider Britain’s [interests] in Yugoslavia as sordid. They were very real interests, both in mineral concessions but principally because Yugoslavia had a long stretch of Mediterranean coast. Protection of the Mediterranean was vital to Great Britain’s world communications. Stalin recognized and approved these interests. This turned the conversation to Italy and its future. Both men agreed that the Italians should be forced to work out their own existence within the Isthmus [sic].

3. The battle in Italy turned attention to the war in general. Stalin developed in considerable detail the conception that it was unnecessarily costly to attempt to break the German lines in Italy and the Siegfried Line.⁷² A plan of encirclement should be adopted. Fifteen of the 25 Allied divisions in Italy could hold the present line and 10 might be sent through Austria to outflank the Germans and assist the Red Army’s advance through Hungary into Austria. The Siegfried Line’s left flank rested on Switzerland. Switzerland should be forced to allow transit of Allied troops through her territory to outflank the Germans strong position. When Churchill protested Stalin said Switzerland had played a false role in the war and should not [now] be made to cooperate. He said that your intervention with Switzerland would obtain her agreement. It was agreed that the military matters should be talked out at another meeting. Churchill explained that not only did he and Brooke wish to exchange information and views regarding the European war with Marshal Stalin and his staff but also General [Antonov] would present at the same meeting the situation in the Pacific.

4. This is of course a brief report of many hours of conversation. To give an accurate picture I should explain that frequently both men were talking at the same time and not always on the same subject. When you appreciate also that the two interpreters were attempting to translate what was being said you will realize that a conclusion was not always reached on each point. In general I should add that Stalin shows clearly that he is genuinely glad to have the Prime Minister in Moscow and is using the occasion to attempt to come [to] a meeting of minds with Churchill on as many subjects as possible.

5. During the evening Eden had a good talk with Molotov about the Poles at which time I had an opportunity to explain how important it was in our relations with Russia for the American people to be satisfied that the Russians were being generous to and patient with the Poles in their difficulties and that in the United States the Polish question was looked upon as the first real test of collaboration in dealing with world problems. Eden and I both got the impression that for the first time Molotov was really interested in understanding the public reaction in England and the United States to the Polish question.

69. Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A paraphrase of this telegram is in the Department files under 741.6111/10–1344.
70. A suburb on the right bank of the Vistula River captured by the Red Army on September 14, 1944.
72. The heavily fortified German line constructed on the western European front.