740.00112 European War 1939/7–1144: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:39 p.m.]
2568. For Department only. As stated in my 2211, June 20, 1 p.m.,91 if there were free access to Swedish ports or access to Sweden across Norway or Finland we could ask Swedish Government for immediate complete stoppage of trade with enemy territory in return for support of the Swedish economy at least on restricted wartime basis. But as stated in my 2566, July 11, 6 p.m., Legation now believes in view of rapid military developments that by means of informal conversations with the Foreign Minister and his senior assistants it may be possible to obtain as a result of Swedish initiative, without making any formal request, a voluntary assurance from the Swedish Government that it will not permit any export of any commodity to Germany and its satellites in 1945. This may be hopeful thinking but it is an approach which in my view should be tried.
Legation moreover is not convinced that having the British and the (Soviet Governments join us in making a formal request of the Swedes to secure elimination of Swedish aid to the enemy and maximum assistance to the United Nations (Department’s 1356, July 8, 10 a.m.91) would be as effective as the informal approach suggested. The Swedes are stubborn and slow moving and get their backs up when formally subjected to pressure particularly if it is attended with publicity. Our experience has been that reasonable suggestions planted in the right quarters frequently have been productive of satisfactory results. The [Page 577] procedure has enabled intelligent farseeing officials to prepare the ground and to save the Government’s face through getting the Government to take voluntary action apparently on its own initiative. We would be free, of course, at any time to resort to formal and all-out pressure in the event that the informal approach should prove unproductive.
However, if the making of a formal request by the three Governments is decided upon, I assume consideration would have been given to the possible conflict of interest between the British and the Russians and the fact that the latter, who wish to buy substantial quantities of merchandise on credit from Sweden and therefore may regard maintenance of Sweden’s economy and good will as outweighing importance of Sweden’s present trade with the enemy, might feel entitled by reason of their major interests to take the lead in formulating the approach to the Swedish Government and in the development of later policies toward Swedish trade.
At present the Russians appear amiably disposed towards the Swedes. If we should deliberately stir them up emotionally against the Swedes we might start a forest fire and the Russians might in the end go further than we would find convenient.
My 678, July 11, 8 p.m. and 4, July 11, 8 p.m. repeats this to London and Moscow respectively.