740.00112 European War 1939/7–1144: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:12 p.m.]
2566. Swedes generally believe that the war will be won by Allies and be over by end this year. Generally too they are uneasy as to what will be Sweden’s lot in the early postwar period. Most comfort themselves with wishful thinking that what Sweden has to offer in way of production and transportation facilities will be so important to Allies in their rehabilitation and reconstruction work that Sweden’s neutral course during the war will soon be forgotten. A few Government officials and some Swedish firms engaged in international trade, however, are not too optimistic. They are beginning to fear that the Anglo-American agencies will control the distribution of the supplies of all-important raw materials, food and coal which Sweden must import to maintain its economy and that if Sweden should be cut off from its present sources of supply in enemy Europe, which may happen before end of war as a result of Allies gaining control of Baltic area, and those agencies failed to allocate to Sweden shares in the allocation Sweden would shortly have to suffer a very marked and painful deterioration in its economy which deterioration would carry over well into postwar period.
We feel here that this last point should be pressed home at once. It should be made entirely clear to Swedish Government that if Swedish postwar import needs are not now recognized by our agencies and if Sweden’s actions from now until end of war do not permit us sympathetically to take into account Swedish needs when they make allocations, the Swedish Government can expect little consideration to be given in the postwar period to Sweden’s vital needs of materials in short supply.
I believe it would be timely for Department to instruct me to have an informal conversation with the Foreign Minister to suggest to him that the Swedish Government would be well-advised to anticipate the foregoing developments and to assure us now that it will not permit any export of any commodity to Germany and its satellites in 1945. We also think I should suggest to the Foreign Minister that it would be advisable for the Swedish Government to give us such assurances at an early date preferably prior to July 20 when German trade delegation is scheduled to commence negotiations with Swedes, since otherwise it might be too late for Sweden to gain much consideration of its 1945 and subsequent needs for materials under allocation. In my judgment furthermore it would be good policy to tell Foreign Minister frankly that we do not propose to negotiate any “trade agreement” with Sweden for 1945, that what will happen is simply this: If the [Page 576] assurance referred to is given us we will work out with Swedes what goods and in what quantities Allies will ship to Sweden in 1945 (Department’s 1216 June 17, 5 p.m.). Concerning prevention of disruption of Swedish economy should its exports to Germany and occupied countries be eliminated, I assume that we can advise Foreign Office that purchases by UNRRA and other Allied agencies will be used to counterbalance stoppage of exports to enemy.
I see no objection to presenting the formal démarche referred to in Embassy’s 5397, July 8, 5 p.m. provided the démarche is made within next few days, since it would not be inconsistent with the course herein suggested. But the time is ripe for a statement along the lines above set forth and I shall appreciate receiving telegraphic authorization to call on the Foreign Minister for that purpose.
My 677, July 11, 6 p.m. repeats this message to London.