740.00112 European War 1939/10758: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
1668. See my 1651, May 10, 6 p.m. (391 to London). Mr. Boheman asked me to see him this afternoon to inform me of the following:
His conversations with Mr. Griffis and me have been fully reported in detail to the Cabinet at a special meeting early this afternoon. The Government’s decision is that our suggestion for a complete embargo on all exports of ball bearings from Sweden is impossible for it would involve a breach of Swedish trade agreement with Germany for the current year; no responsible Swedish Government could consider possibility of such action. A total embargo would be regarded by Germany as a deliberate act against Germany. Boheman pointed out that Russia was not receiving any ball bearings as all orders to Russian account are in storage in Sweden pending means for transportation. Much of the British buying is also pre-emptive and quantities which can be got out relatively small. Boheman said Government realizes that we consider Sweden overcautious and more frightened of Germany than present circumstances warrant. Swedish Government he said is unable to share this view. He said that the consequences of our reaction to this decision are fully realized here and were taken fully into account by Government. Those consequences in the Government’s view, deplorable as they are for Sweden, are less onerous than the extreme danger from Germany if Sweden meets our views. I told Mr. Boheman that I was confident that in his report to the Government he had faithfully rendered the views which had been expressed to him on behalf of the US Government by myself and informally by Mr. Griffis, but asked him if he felt certain all members of the Government genuinely realized that our demands were presented in all seriousness and that we meant what we said? He replied that he could not, of course, give an assured answer to such a question but that he believed the members of the Government did. He said that Government had given full authorization [Page 540] to SKF to explore with Mr. Griffis whatever possibilities may exist for meeting our demands within the letter of the German agreement.
I told him that I had no official instructions from my Government since I had transmitted Swedish reply51 to our original ball-bearing note, but that from my knowledge of the directives which Mr. Griffis brought with him I was confident that we would not be satisfied with any compromise solution that did not meet substance of our demands almost in entirety. He said that in that case he was afraid there was nothing further that could be done. I told him that I would report what he had said to the Department and that I would consult with Mr. Griffis regarding a further talk with Mr. Hamberg. I also said that next move was entirely up to Mr. Hamberg and that he should come with definite proposals and not with the suggestion that he and Mr. Griffis sit down to “explore” possibilities. I then asked him if there would be any objection on the part of Mr. Günther or himself to my seeing the Prime Minister and taking Mr. Griffis along with me. Mr. Boheman said that there would be no objection on the part of the Foreign Office and expressed the hope that I would do so. He remarked, however, that there was not the slightest possibility of my persuading the Prime Minister to take a different view. Mr. Boheman gave the impression that the Prime Minister is already mentally prepared for the consequences resulting from our side of the Government’s present decision.
In discussing the possible German reactions to an affirmative Swedish answer to our demands, Boheman made it sufficiently clear that whatever action might be taken by Germany against Sweden would not be because of the loss of a given amount of ball bearings but because such a decision by the Swedes would be regarded by the Germans as a definite pro-Allied move and the beginning of a breach of their northern counter-invasion defenses. Boheman has so emphasized this point in several meetings that it is difficult for me to avoid the suspicion that Swedes have been directly threatened by Germans against any further yielding to Allied pressure. Boheman said that his Government’s judgment of this situation vis-à-vis Germany is naturally its own estimate of the situation based on a very considerable amount of information, and he again reiterated that however insane a German attack on Sweden might appear in the Allied judgment, and however insane it might be in fact, that would be no deterrent to Germany making the attack as a strategic move in total defense.
This, he said, is the considered opinion of Swedish Government Military Command and General Staff. At the end of the discussion on this point he remarked that there is absolutely no material assistance [Page 541] which the Allies can bring to Sweden in such a situation that would be of any immediate effect; that Spain, Turkey and Portugal could receive assistance from US but that Sweden would depend only on her own resources.
After discussing my talk with Mr. Boheman with Mr. Griffis, we both agreed that he should under no circumstances make any further overtures to Hamberg. I then telephoned Mr. Boheman and suggested that the next move was up to Mr. Hamberg and that I thought he ought to make it immediately and come with concrete proposals. Mr. Boheman promised to get in touch with Mr. Hamberg at once.
While I do not doubt that Swedish Government has made this decision after the most serious consideration and weighing of all the consequences, I feel certain that it was made with an eye to the present military situation and with a desire to gain time until invasion is under way. The military situation in the West as it actually stands is, in my opinion, a major factor in this decision.
It is not my intention to seek an appointment with the Prime Minister until after Mr. Griffis and Mr. Waring of the British Legation have again talked with the head of SKF.
My 398, May 11, 7 p.m. repeats this message to London.