740.00112 European War 1939/10741: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9 p.m.]
1651. My 1506 April 28, 8 p.m., 344 to London, and 1507 April 28, 9 p.m., 345 to London.49 This morning, at Mr. Boheman’s request, Mr. Griffis and I had an informal conference with him. Mr. Boheman said he wished to meet with us for a frank off-the-record talk before making his report to the Government. He desired particularly to assure himself that we had a full and complete understanding of the Swedish point of view. He reiterated his belief, which he stated was held in high and low circles in Sweden, that the ball-bearing demands were designed to cover undisclosed sinister purposes, intimating that if they were as important as we represented, the bombing campaign had proved a failure and the war would be indefinitely prolonged. He said that the Swedish Government simply did not believe the statements of the American and British Governments and that our demands and methods of presenting them were brutal and unjustified. He asked if Sweden could have the slightest assurance in case these demands were met, that with a further change in the military situation we would not return and make similar demands regarding iron ore exports, thus recreating the present dangerous situation for Sweden. Our refusal to accept anything but complete cessation of shipments to all belligerents, he said, had put the decision squarely before the Swedish Government as to whether they should accept the consequences of our displeasure or risk more than a 50% chance of being [Page 538] involved in the war. He admitted that Germany derived certain advantages from Sweden’s neutral position but said that the moment Germany should believe that Sweden was deviating from the neutral line and passing into the other camp, the German attitude would be bound to change. It would not be a question for the Germans of how costly or even how foolish an undertaking to invade Sweden would be, but whether in the light of German defense of her northern frontier it was necessary. This defense, Boheman is convinced, would be carried out by Germany on the same general lines as govern the fortifications of her other frontiers and Sweden could not fail to be involved. He said the Swedish Government was determined to take no action which would invite an attack on Sweden; that Swedish neutrality would not be abandoned under any conditions unless Sweden were herself attacked. He emphasized the grave responsibility on the part of the Government for the protection of the independence of the country and the lives of the Swedish people; that Sweden had no intention or desire to undergo the unnameable horrors of a German occupation. It was quite apparent from Mr. Boheman’s remarks that the question of the fundamental security of Sweden is the crucial issue in this situation as far as Swedish Government is concerned.
Both Mr. Griffis and I emphasized strongly to Mr. Boheman that he was mistaken in attributing either a sinister motive to these demands or that they cloaked any other intention than the plain one of stopping ball-bearing exports to Germany. Our Government, we said, wishes to reach a satisfactory solution of this ball-bearing problem with a complete lack of any intent to involve Sweden in the war. Since SKF had categorically stated that their action would depend solely on the will of the Government, any suggestion of compromise less than complete embargo must come from the Government. We reiterated our judgment that a compromise would be a grave mistake from Swedish point of view and that greatly more satisfactory results would flow from an embargo of ball-bearing exports to all belligerents; that such a measure properly framed could be completely within the boundaries of Swedish neutrality and could even enhance the neutral position of Sweden. We expressed our willingness, should the Swedish Government desire and if our Governments approve, to recommend delivery of formal protests to Sweden from the American, British and Russian Governments, these protests being designed to show that the Swedish embargo materially injured our war position regardless of the results for Germany. We had the impression that Boheman felt this suggestion merited attention and study. He did not attack it and said that he would report fully all of the comments and suggestions we [Page 539] had made to his Government. (See my 1646, May 10, 5 p.m.50 repeated as 390 May 10, 5 p.m. to London.)
Please inform FEA.
My 391, May 10, 6 p.m. repeats this to London.