740.00112 European War 1939/10529: Telegram
The Minister in Sweden (Johnson) to the Secretary of State
[Received 11:50 p.m.]
1265. British Minister and I called by appointment this afternoon on Foreign Minister Günther. I handed Mr. Günther a communication in form of an aide-mémoire91 the text being substantially same as draft telegraphed by Department (Department’s 576, April 3, midnight92), with modifications directed by Department’s telegram 609, April 8, 4 p.m.,93 numbered section 2 paragraph (5) and 629, [Page 501] April 10, 10 p.m. [midnight?],94 numbered section 1. See also Department’s 651, April 12, 10 p.m. Mr. Günther read aide-mémoire carefully and his first remark was to ask what was meant by statement in penultimate paragraph of memorandum that “if its desires were not met United States would give serious consideration to using all measures at its disposal to bring about desired result”. I told Mr. Günther that I had been furnished no special interpretation of that section but that from comments I had been instructed to make orally I believed he would realize extreme seriousness with which the United States Government viewed question at issue and that paragraph which he queried might be considered in that light.
At this point British Minister handed Foreign Minister an aide-mémoire in which he stated that his Government was in complete agreement with views of United States Government regarding export from Sweden of ball bearings to Germany and her satellites and that his Government associated itself entirely with request contained in aide-mémoire which American Minister was presenting to Royal Swedish Government today.
Mr. Günther who preserved his usual calm and moderate manner throughout interview, said that we, that is United States and Great Britain, know as well as the Swedes what Sweden’s position is. He gave an outline of negotiations which had taken place during past year between representatives of U.S.A., Great Britain and Sweden which resulted in a trade agreement under which both sides assumed obligations and mentioned that following conclusion of this agreement Sweden had with greatest difficulty secured an agreement with Germany which was in every respect predicated upon Sweden’s obligations to U.S.A. and Great Britain under tripartite agreement. If Sweden now acquiesces in Anglo-American demands regarding ball bearings they will break a definite treaty obligation which they have with Germany, a procedure which Sweden does not wish to do. He said that Sweden in such an event must also count with the consequence. Her entire trade with Germany would cease which would be very serious; whole economic life of Sweden would be most injuriously affected. Furthermore, matter would not end with the economic consequences; Sweden would have to count not only with bad but with worst possible relations with Germany. He then paused to inquire what in face of such a situation Anglo-Saxon powers promise to Sweden.
He called attention to our promised undertaking to do everything within our power to offset Swedish economic losses, et cetera, resulting from possible German retaliation, and furnish of imports greatly [Page 502] needed by Swedish economy, et cetera even when in short supply in United States, and inquired how as a practical matter any agreement based on these promises could be attained and what we could do to implement them. Gothenburg traffic would certainly be closed by Germany and although a few commodities and products might be sent by air it is quite obvious that Allies under present conditions would not be able to send any coal to Sweden. He said that we do not take any account in our communication of the likely political consequences of Sweden’s acceding to our request. I intervened at this point with Mr. Günther’s permission to make the oral representations which Department had instructed in telegram 576, April 3, midnight, and implemented by Department’s 637, April 11, 5 p.m. Mr. Günther said that he fully understood Allied point of view regarding ball bearings and importance which we attach to them but he reiterated that we had an agreement with Sweden which Sweden for her part had made every endeavor to fulfill and that Sweden likewise had an agreement with Germany which took fully into account Swedish obligations to the Allies. I pointed out to Mr. Günther that no attempt was made in our note to base our request for cessation of ball-bearing exports on any right derived from tripartite trade agreement but that we were making an entirely new request based upon changed conditions and urgent necessities for reasons of vital importance to Allied war effort. Mr. Günther remarked that he realized importance of matter from our point of view but said that Sweden was obliged to her trade agreement with Germany also as a matter of vital importance. He said that he did not see how it would be possible for Sweden unilaterally to violate her obligations under that agreement and put a virtual embargo on the export of ball bearings and related products mentioned in our communication “this year”. Mr. Günther referred to my references to developing public opinion in United States regarding trade with Germany and said that he wondered if that public opinion would not see justice of Sweden’s position if entire correspondence should be published by Sweden in which it would appear that Sweden’s trade with Germany was upon a contractual basis known to Allied Governments and based upon prior agreements with those Governments. I told Mr. Günther that I could not hazard an authoritative view as to how public opinion generally might be affected by such a measure but that I felt sure a certain section of opinion would reach the conclusion that even if Sweden had not violated any legal obligation she was nevertheless completely within German orbit and unable to resist German pressures. I told him that I realized that this was not true but that there was a section of public opinion abroad which believed it and that certainly a large section of public opinion would not be inclined to look at matter from viewpoint of whether [Page 503] legal obligations were being fulfilled if at same time material aid for whatever reason was going from Sweden to Germany and contributing to destruction of lives of American soldiers.
Mr. Günther said that whole matter would have to be presented to the Government and would be very carefully considered. He said that he also wanted to emphasize that he was not arguing against our request on a basis of Swedish economic interests important as those were to Sweden.
From the general tenor of his remarks and from his constant returning to the subject it is evident that existence of a formal convention or treaty undertaking with Germany for trade during 1944 is considered to be an extremely difficult and a practically insuperable obstacle by Foreign Minister. It is to be expected that Government will take substantially same view. Added to this is obvious fact that Swedes must consider that consequences of meeting our demands would have extremely serious repercussions with Germany not necessarily solely of an economic nature. Although we feel that in meeting our new demands based on new conditions the Swedes no longer have to face danger of a German attack, Mr. Günther said that Swedish Government is by no means sure of this; that while it has been stated in the Secretary’s speech95 that we have no intention of coercing any neutral nation to entering the war on our side, nevertheless if Sweden accedes to the present requests she will be yielding to pressure which might as result bring war to Sweden; that by granting our demands Sweden would definitely have abandoned her position of neutrality and aligned herself on Allied side. Germans even in their last period of weakness and desperation might consider that as Sweden was another enemy she would have to be treated as all of Germany’s enemies and Sweden would thus be drawn into the conflict.
While I would not venture any prediction as to what Swedish reply to this démarche will be, I feel convinced that Swedish estimates and conceptions of their own national security will be the guiding principle in decision. That communication will make a profound impression on Government is undoubted; that it will be intensely resented in some quarters as an attempt to intimidate Sweden into assisting one belligerent side to injure the other in spite of treaty obligations freely entered into on all sides, is also apparent from remarks made by Mr. Günther. He said that Allies cannot claim of Sweden performance which would mean in effect that she would have to give up her basic policy of neutrality and face critical danger of being drawn into the war through an almost certain break with Germany.
[Page 504]I should add that when Mr. Günther made a remark that he did not see how any legal means could be found for putting an embargo on exports of ball bearings and related products, British Minister inquired if SKF itself could not find some practicable means of stopping exports particularly in view of fact that we are offering to purchase their production. Mr. Günther made no direct reply to this suggestion.
British Minister took a part throughout conversation and fully supported my representations.
My 274, April 13, 9 p.m. repeats this to London.
- Copy transmitted to the Department in despatch 3164, April 14, from Stockholm; neither printed.↩
- Same as telegram 2604 to London, p. 485.↩
- Same as telegram 2764 to London, p. 493.↩
- Same as telegram 2828 to London, p. 497.↩
- Radio address of April 9, 1944, Department of State Bulletin, April 15, 1944, p. 335.↩