Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

865.01/2283a: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)

Washington, March 24, 1944—6 p.m.

883. For Reinhardt. On March 6 the British Embassy presented an Aide-Mémoire based on a telegram from Mr. Eden (1783), outlining the British position with respect to the present Italian political situation.

[Here follows substance of the aide-mémoire printed on page 1037.]

In reply, the Department’s note¹¹ may be summarized briefly as follows:

The British understanding that the American Government has agreed to preserve the status of the present Italian Government and King until after the liberation of Rome is incorrect. In early February the President directed the Department to make no effort to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at that time and until the military situation in Italy was improved. This decision was influenced by the military situation existing at that time and the military considerations advanced by the Allied Commander-in-Chief. After a visit to Italy and a review of the political situation there, General Wilson, however, decided that political developments would not wait until Rome was reached and recommended in Naf 622, 624, and 628 that he be authorized to support the program presented by the Executive Junta.¹² On March 13 the President sent a letter to the Prime Minister¹³ in which he said in part, “I did not at any time intend to convey to you my agreement that we postpone all political decisions until after Rome had been taken.”

This Government favors the proposal presented by the Junta involving the abdication of the King and the delegation of all or some of the powers of his successor to a lieutenant. It desires an immediate solution along these lines. However, in view of the recent decisions of the British War Cabinet, the President has agreed that the two Governments should not permit their divergent views to become public knowledge. The American note points out that the mere policy of preserving the status quo until after the liberation of Rome is in fact favoring the position of one group of Italians, and that the weight of Allied authority in Italy is such that we cannot avoid the responsibility of supporting one of the various solutions. Furthermore, we are opposed to a policy, in those areas of Italy restored to Italian administration, calculated to suppress normal political activity.

Because of the divergence of views between the two Governments and the major political considerations involved, the American note proposes that a solution should be worked out in the Advisory Council. It is held that the Advisory Council is the appropriate place for these considerations and decisions, and the note concludes by informing the British Embassy that the Department will instruct its representative on the Council to initiate discussion in an early meeting of the Council.

You are accordingly instructed to have placed on the agenda for the next meeting of the Council a general discussion of the solutions presented by the various Italian groups with a view to obtaining an agreed recommendation to the Allied Commander-in-Chief for a solution satisfactory to all members of the Council. You should support the proposal of the Executive Junta described in Naf 622, 624, and 628, using the affirmative arguments outlined therein. The Department would like to see a recommendation to the Commander-in-Chief somewhat along the following lines: It is recommended that the Allied Commander-in-Chief secure from the Combined Chiefs of Staff, providing it will not prove harmful to current military operations, authority to notify the six opposition parties that their program as presented by the Executive Junta has his support and that of the interested United Nations. The representatives of the six opposition parties should then inform Victor Emmanuel of their program and they would be free to inform him that it had the support of the Allied military authorities and the United Nations represented on the Advisory Council. The Allied Commander-in-Chief should confirm, if necessary, his support of the opposition program to the King. Undertakings from the opposition parties would have to be secured that they subscribed severally and collectively to all the engagements by the Badoglio Government.

Sent to Algiers. Repeated to London.¹⁴

Hull

11. Aide-mémoire to the British Embassy, March 25, not printed.
12. The Executive Junta’s program involved the abdication of King Victor Emmanuel and the delegation of all or some of the powers of his successor to a “Lieutenant” (see memorandum by the Executive Junta, p. 1024).
13. See telegram 783, March 15, 9 p.m., to Algiers, p. 1053.
14. As telegram 2255.