865.01/2233: Telegram
The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received 9:22 p.m.]
937. From Reber. Upon receipt of the President’s letter to Marshal Badoglio8 I called upon him on March 19 to deliver the communication personally.
He said he would like to take the occasion to speak frankly in regard to the extremely difficult position in which the Italian Government found itself. On the one hand he and his Government had loyally endeavored not only to carry out the terms of the armistice, but to make the maximum contribution possible to the prosecution of the [Page 1072] common war against Germany. He was continually using his best efforts to galvanize the Italian people to this end. On the other hand he felt that the actions of the Allied Governments showed that they continued to regard the Italian people as a defeated nation in spite of “cobelligerency”. Soviet Russia had now openly extended the hand of friendship to the Italian people whereas he and his Government had hoped that by making common cause with the Allies they could pay their passage and earn a more favorable relationship with the United States and Great Britain. He was fully appreciative of the great assistance as regards food supplies for the Italian population but said that there were times when bread was not enough to rebuild a nation.
In discussing the lack of internal political unity we [which he?] insisted was more apparent than real he nevertheless admitted, in spite of his efforts to unify the country on the basis of the war effort, that the King’s position made the formation of a more representative government impossible at this time. In this connection however he said he would discuss the President’s letter with the King and would again emphasize to His Majesty the importance which the Allied Governments attached to the unification of the Italian people in the common cause.
In conclusion he said he deeply regretted what seemed to have been the decision of the United States Government to “pull out of” the Mediterranean both politically and militarily leaving to others the dominant role. [Reber.]