Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

865.01/2229: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

Algiers, March 21, 1944—5 p.m.
[Received 7:55 p.m.]

925. From Reinhardt. General MacFarlane reports that on Sunday² Prunas warned the political section of the Control Commission that Bogomolov had told him in strict confidence that the Soviet decision to exchange diplomatic representatives was not to be regarded as isolated act but would be followed by other Soviet proposals based on a policy of closer relations between Italy and the Soviet Union. Bogomolov frankly admitted, according to Prunas, that the Soviets intend to exploit their privileged position in Italy where there was no Soviet army of occupation and where in the minds of the Italian people they were not directly associated with the restrictions imposed by Allies military control.

Although Bogomolov did not indicate the nature of any new proposals, Prunas surmised that they [might] take the form of an agreement along the lines of the Soviet-Czech accord.³ Prunas also felt that the Soviets might put forward some guarantee of Italy’s eastern frontier where, on account of their relations with Tito, their influence is becoming predominant. He thought it might even be that the Soviet Union was considering a change in its relations with the Italian Government which would eliminate the present paradox of the armistice on one side and co-belligerency and the exchange of diplomatic representatives on the other.

(3) According to Prunas the Soviet move was very well received by the Italian people, particularly in the north insofar as could be determined from the limited information available from that area. He emphasized that for this reason it would not be possible for any Italian Government to decline any further offer of Soviet friendship even though the Government did not wish for such a one-sided development of Italy’s international position. Quite on the contrary the Italian Government wished to base the rehabilitation of the country upon a closer association with the United States and Great Britain but it felt, however, that it was being pushed in the opposite direction.

(4) Prunas stated that it was the earnest desire of the Italian Government that something should be done to neutralize the present trend but he himself realized that the moment had not yet come for Italy to be acceptable as an ally. Yet be believed that something might be done to regularize the present position whereby Italy was both a defeated enemy and a co-belligerent. In his opinion many of the armistice clauses which had already been carried out were no longer applicable. Finally he asked whether the time had not now come when the American and British Governments could consider a substitute agreement which would retain all the military requirements of the armistice and leave over questions that could not be decided now but which would give Italy some of the formal and legal benefits that it might expect to derive from the fact of co-belligerency.

(5) On Rumbold’s⁴ and my recommendation AFHQ is instructing MacFarlane to point out to the Italian Government that it is not in a position to enter into agreements with any foreign country without the consent of the Supreme Allied Commander which must be sought through Control Commission. MacFarlane is being told that he will be kept informed of the two Governments’ reaction to Prunas’ statement.

We felt this was necessary in order to preclude Badoglio from again confronting the American and British Governments with a fait accompli. As reported in my 918, March 20, 8 p.m.,⁵ Bogomolov plans to return to Naples on Thursday.

General Wilson and Macmillan who are both in Cairo are being informed of the foregoing. [Reinhardt.]

Chapin

2. March 19.
3. Treaty of friendship, mutual assistance and post-war collaboration between the Soviet Union and the Czechoslovak Republic, signed December 12, 1943. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxlv, p. 238.
4. Sir Horace Anthony Rumbold, Assistant to the British Minister Resident at Allied Force Headquarters, Mediterranean Command.
5. Not printed.