865.01/2186: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received March 14—11:15 a.m.]
836. Department’s 556, March 11, 7 p.m.79 I called on Vyshinski this evening to ask about the press report of the Soviet intention to exchange ambassadors with the Badolgio government.
[Page 1047]In reply Vyshinski said there was no basis for the report; that there was no intention to exchange ambassadors. He said that the discussions had been initiated by Prunas and that there was need for the establishment of direct contact between the two Governments. He used the Russian word “faktisheski” contact (which literally translated means actual or practical) as distinguished from formal diplomatic relations.
In reply to my question as to what need there was for such contact he cited the question of Italian prisoners of war and property in the USSR and emphasized the desire of the Italian Government to terminate Japanese representation of Italian interests in the Soviet Union. He particularly stressed that the Soviet Government agreed to the latter point.
On further questioning from me he stated categorically that he did not consider the activities of the Advisory Council and the Control Commission would be affected in any way by this move and that those agencies would continue to supervise the armistice conditions and related subjects.
When I stated that it seemed to me unfortunate that my Government had learned of this matter through a press report he explained that Bogomolov had received instructions 3 days ago to inform the American and British representatives in the Advisory Council. I asked whether they would be advised prior to the discussions with the Italian Government and he said that he did not know whether the British and American representatives were in Algiers therefore he could not say whom he would talk to first. He did not know [how] Bogomolov had interpreted his instructions.
I expressed the personal hope that the views of the American and British Governments would be sought as to the contemplated step before any definite action was taken. Vyshinski contended that there was no need for consultation since in substance the situation remained, unchanged. He said there had always been contact by American and British representatives direct with Badoglio and through AMG80 and the Control Commission. I asked if I was right in assuming that the American and British representatives on the Advisory Council would be kept informed of the Soviet negotiations with the Badoglio Government to which he replied in the affirmative.
When I further pressed him for assurance that the Soviet Government would keep us informed of important matters in the future-upon the establishment of this new relationship Vyshinski replied, “I do not doubt it”.
[Page 1048]You will see from the above that in reply to my persistent direct questions Vyshinski did not give fully straightforward answers. At one point in the conversation I asked him to give me a memorandum explaining the Soviet point of view. He replied that he would be willing to reply to any written questions I submitted to him. I said that as this matter had been initiated by them I assumed they would want to inform us about it in their own manner. He then referred to the instructions which had been sent to Bogomolov.
The British Ambassador saw Vyshinski shortly before I did and left with him under instruction a memorandum81 which listed the objections the British Government had to the establishment by the Soviet Government of a diplomatic relationship with the Italian Government. Vyshinski told the British Ambassador that he would study the memorandum and submit a reply. In the conversation that followed some of the same points brought out in my talk were covered. Vyshinski’s only additional statement was that if it had been a question of establishing diplomatic relations the British and U.S. Governments would have been informed.