865.01/2295

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

It is understood that as a result of the exchange of telegrams between the Prime Minister and the President68 the decision has been reached that there should be no change in the present Italian administration or in the position of King Victor Emmanuel until after the liberation of Rome. His Majesty’s Government have been considering the course of action which should be followed in Italy as a result of this decision, and have come to certain conclusions. These conclusions rest on the assumption that the capture of Rome will not be unduly delayed and will take place within a period not much exceeding three months. If it appears that this assumption will not be realised the policy proposed may require reconsideration.

2.
In the opinion of His Majesty’s Government it is necessary, in order to hold the position in Italy to the agreement reached between the Prime Minister and the President, that King Victor Emmanuel, Marshal Badoglio and the Opposition Leaders both in Southern Italy and in Rome should immediately receive a firm warning from the Allied Control Commission that while all their various plans and suggestions will be taken note of and used in arriving at a solution of the problem at the appropriate time, no agitation calculated to disturb the military situation will meanwhile be tolerated. His Majesty’s Government consider that the Advisory Council for Italy should be asked as a matter of urgency to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the best method of communicating this warning to the persons concerned. The Council should also be informed of the various proposals made by the King and by the Opposition affecting the former’s position and the formation of a new Government. But His Majesty’s Government feel that the Council, which is of an advisory and not of a policy-making character, should not embark on the discussion of these proposals until requested to do so. Meanwhile the use of the machinery of the Council in this way will have the effect of bringing the other Governments represented on it into the picture.
3.
The steps proposed in the preceding paragraph are designed for the immediate future. His Majesty’s Government have also considered the eventual solution which it would be in the common interest to see emerge when the liberation of Rome obliges the King and Marshal Badoglio to implement their respective pledges. In the view of His Majesty’s Government recent developments indicate that in all probability a compromise solution of this problem is likely to be built up round Crown Prince Umberto. This solution may take the form either of His Royal Highness’s being appointed Lieutenant of the Realm to perform the Royal functions without the formal abdication of King Victor Emmanuel, or of his becoming King with either full or restricted powers, following the abdication of his father. His Majesty’s Government feel that the present stage is too early for an attempt to estimate which of the above solutions is the more likely to be realised. But they feel that the negotiations to be undertaken after the fall of Rome should enable an agreement to be reached somewhere within the above framework and without revolutionary methods. Meanwhile it is undesirable for the Allied Governments to declare themselves for any of the possible variants of the above solutions, and their policy should be to watch the development of events.
4.
If the United States Government concur in the course of action outlined in paragraph 2 above, instructions on these lines should no doubt be sent to General Wilson through the Combined Chiefs of Staff, in addition to those which will be received through the diplomatic channel by the United Kingdom and United States representatives on the Advisory Council for Italy.69
  1. See telegram 468, February 12, 7 p.m., to Algiers, p. 1019.
  2. For Department’s reply to the British aide-mémoire, see telegram 883, March 24, 6 p.m., to Algiers, p. 1074.