Office of the Historian

865.01/1113: Telegram

The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State

Algiers, February 27, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received February 28—12:48 a.m.]

639. For the Acting Secretary from Reinhardt and Reber.

1.
As we understand it present position of U.S. Government with regard to the Italian political issue is that no changes will be permitted at present time which might adversely affect military situation. The Prime Minister’s statement to House of Commons would further indicate that U.S. has provisionally assured that the time when such .changes might be contemplated would be after capture of Rome.
2.
To implement such a policy and to minimize risk of disturbances behind the lines, it is essential however, that intervening period prior to Rome be utilized both by the King and by the opposition, with the encouragement of the Allies, to prepare a program for adoption in Rome. Otherwise Ave shall continue to be faced by the gap between the King and his people which might require imposition of radical solutions after Rome or even before if its liberation is greatly delayed. The maintenance of status quo without any assurance that a solution is under way would be likely to lead to pressure for direct action; therefore, not only must the parties be given some encouragement that a solution acceptable to them will be agreeable to Allied Governments but the King must also be encouraged to feel that the De Nicola proposal represents a step in the right direction.
3.
At the present the primary importance of King’s acceptance of this proposal is that it constitutes the first indication that Victor Emmanuel has begun to appreciate the depth of the feeling against him and to recognize that unless he does something to meet the wishes of the majority that feeling may easily turn against the institution of the monarchy itself. As at present conceived the proposal probably does not go far enough to secure a sufficient measure of acceptance to make possible collaboration of all parties. If after arrival in Rome a government of the Center alone can be formed a strong Left opposition would continue as a disturbing factor in the new Italian administration. Furthermore although King should retire for time [Page 1035] being to private life, he would always be in the background. His presence would complicate the issue between the monarchy and the republic. Sforza’s advocacy of the proposal must moreover be considered in the light of his personal ambitions to become Prime Minister.
4.
It is important to recognize that the King’s decision now means that he is, without pressure from the Allied Governments, prepared to abandon his previous position. Consequently, although his plan may not be entirely satisfactory he must be required to make it known that he is considering a step of this sort and is ready to enter into negotiations looking toward an agreed settlement.
5.
In the meanwhile the Junta’s memorandum66 is still under consideration by the Allied Governments. The opposition has been warned and has agreed that pending this consideration they must do nothing to aggravate political tension. The reply, therefore, should not be too long delayed. Should it be necessary in that reply to state that no final solution is possible until Rome the opposition must be admonished to keep the truce until such time; but in order to maintain the degree of tranquility required by the military situation they must at the same time be shown that their views are influencing the final solution and that similarly the King’s supporters will not be allowed on their side to take provocative action.
6.
Since both sides are now awaiting an indication of Allied policy it is important that some guidance be given them. For this purpose an early Allied agreement is essential. The program should further be agreed prior to Rome as this will inevitably be a period of confusion and in particular the Allied commander desires to be in a position to give a directive to the Allied military governor in advance.
7.
In answering the Junta memorandum or the King’s message it would not be sufficient simply to reiterate that the entire position will be discussed after entry in Rome. Both factions have indicated that agreement is possible with respect to Humbert either as Lieutenant or as King with little or no power until such a time as the Constituent Assembly can ultimately decide the institutional question. From the local point of view it would, therefore, be most desirable if we could now inform them that the principles of the King’s withdrawal in favor of Humbert has been approved by the Allies. The opposition could also be told that Victor Emmanuel had himself proposed the lieutenancy. We could then bring pressure to bear on both factions to negotiate the conditions of succession and of the formation of the new government. [Reinhardt and Reber.]
Chapin
  1. Dated February 18, p. 1024.↩