865.01/1030: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Chargé at Algiers (Chapin)
468. For Reinhardt and Reber. The British Ambassador44 called on the Secretary on February 9 to discuss our attitude toward the King of Italy.45 The Secretary said that when the Department had recommended that the King not be permitted to go to Rome and that other arrangements be considered in connection with the political situation it appeared that the Allied armies would be in Rome within a few days, whereas it now appeared that they would not be there for some time to come. The Secretary added that therefore the application of our attitude toward the King was not of the same urgency as formerly.
On February 11 Mr. Dunn46 discussed the same question with Michael Wright, First Secretary of the British Embassy.45 Mr. Dunn said that the Secretary had directed him to say that while the position of this Government with respect to the King remained as described in our telegram number 248, January 25, 4 p.m. to you we had no present intention of taking any steps which would cause any difficulties in the very critical present military situation in Italy. However, Mr. Dunn went on to say that it appeared desirable for our two governments (British and American) to arrive at an agreed position with respect to the King; that the discussion of this matter did not involve the constitutional question of the monarchy as an institution and form of government; that we felt very strongly that it would not be possible to make any progress with reconstruction, either economic [Page 1020] or political, in Italy under Victor Emmanuel and that it would be well to have a formula agreed upon between the two governments with a view to its being put into effect at the earliest possible date practicable. Mr. Dunn added that one phase of the whole problem on which we felt very strongly was that Victor Emmanuel should not be permitted to return to Rome as King even for a visit and that the question of the formation of a government without him should be solved if possible before the Allies arrive in Rome.
The President has seen Naf 61247 from General Wilson and has likewise received the following telegram from the Prime Minister:
“I am much concerned at any attempt at working with Sforza and the Italian Junta at this critical moment in the battle. If you read Sforza’s original letter to Berle48 you will see how completely he has broken his undertaking. I do beg that no decisions will be taken without our being consulted and without you and me trying to reach agreement. We are in for a very heavy struggle on the Italian front.”
In view of these messages the President has requested the Secretary to take the necessary action to ensure that “no effort is made by the United States Government to effect any change in the existing Government of Italy at the present time and until our military situation in the Italian campaign is sufficiently improved to warrant risking the disaffection of those Italians who are now assisting the Allied armies.” (Underlining is the President’s).
We also have seen Naf 612 and, while our policy remains as described to you in our 248, you should of course hold in abeyance any steps looking to the implementation of our position prior to a clearing up of the present critical military situation in Italy in order to avoid any action detrimental to our war effort. However, you should make it clear to your British colleagues that our position remains the same with respect to the King and the early reconstruction of the Italian Government on a broad political basis. Reinhardt should inform Massigli in utmost confidence of our position as described in this telegram and our 248 emphasizing that we do not intend to press this position on the Allied Commander-in-Chief at this time because of the present critical military situation. He should inform Macmillan of this action and say that we consider it important to have the French informed of our position.
We are grateful for Reber’s helpful comments repeated in Algiers’ 403 of February 8 and endorse his suggestion that the Allied authorities encourage the Executive Junta of the six parties to begin working [Page 1021] in earnest and endeavor to prepare an agreed program for adoption in Rome.
We consider that whatever the solution, the Americans and British should begin working toward an agreed policy immediately. It is suggested that the discussions might best be carried on at Algiers between Reinhardt and Macmillan with the cooperation of Reber and Caccia49 if available. Any agreed policy could then be made known to the Executive Junta which would be given assurances of our support within the framework of such a solution. This should inspire the parties, united in their desire to depose the present King, to adopt a more vigorous and positive attitude toward the solution of the problem than they are at present demonstrating.
- Lord Halifax.↩
- Memorandum of conversation not printed.↩
- James Clement Dunn, Director, Office of European Affairs.↩
- Memorandum of conversation not printed.↩
- Not printed.↩
- Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State; for letter, see telegram 1944, November 8, 1943, 5 p.m. from Algiers, Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. ii, p. 420.↩
- Harold Caccia, British Vice President of the Allied Control Commission.↩