865.01/1030: Telegram
The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 9—2:30 a.m.]
403. From Reinhardt from Reber. I am in full accord with the general lines of the Department’s recommendations as regards the King contained in its telegram No. 248, January 25, and welcome this guidance. I do not believe however, that the longer the King’s abdication is postponed the more difficult it will become to facilitate, or that a visit to Rome will strengthen his position. His delay in abdicating and the weakness of his present Government have already greatly diminished what was left of his prestige; and there is evidence that he, himself, is conscious that his position has not been consolidated in recent months.
It is clear that in the face of the Bari Congress resolution and the continued inability of the Badoglio government as at present constituted to gain sufficient support to enable it to proceed more rapidly to the implementation of its program of action and “de-Fascisitization”, little substantial progress toward the rehabilitation of the country can be made. There is no doubt that the King must go. The question of “when” is, however, not so easy to answer. There is as yet no alternative coalition government in sight in southern Italy. As explained in Fargo telegram No. 701, February 3, (Algiers 375, February 6 [5], 9 p.m.41) no agreement as to what might follow the King’s abdication appears to have been achieved and the parties themselves seem to have no clear program. Whether one is possible prior to the liberation of Rome is open to doubt. The leaders of the parties themselves apparently prefer to defer action until Rome, unless its liberation is long postponed; and only a few such as Sforza are prepared to take decision before the national leaders are available. In this connection it is worth noting that Sforza’s position seems to have been weakened since his arrival. His speech at Bari did not help him and we are informed that selfish motives are now being generally attributed to him particularly by the Communists.
Our information as to the attitude of the Rome leaders is very meager. Their delegate to Bari brought a declaration to the effect that the six parties in Rome had agreed that the position of the parties in regard to “the appointment of an extraordinary Government of National Liberation, assuming all the constitutional powers of the state, without compromising national concord and without prejudice to the free expression of the popular will as regards the institutional form, represents the essential condition which will enable Italy to [Page 1017] conduct the war with the necessary strength and to insure its own future”. This, however, adds little in clarity to their October declaration and seems to reflect the same compromise as the Bari resolution.
In Fargo telegrams Nos. 498, January 25 and 701, February 3 (Algiers 281, January 27 and 374 [375], February 5, 9 p.m.42) we have endeavored to explain the difference between the two contrasting points of view; that of the Action Party group on the one hand and that of the liberal Christian Democrat group on the other. The solution envisaged by the first group, which provides for the assumption of all constitutional powers by a government of the six parties, with or without the consent of the monarchy, would mean that the balance was weighed in favor of the eventual republic. We are informed that regardless of the potential dangers inherent in the coexistence of two governments, members of this group look to the creation of such government in the capital even before Allied troops have arrived. The second alternative, which provides for specific delegation of powers by the monarchy and a continuity of authority, would leave a member of the House of Savoy or possibly a regency in a nominal position enabling either in the interval before the constituent assembly to influence the latter’s choice in favor of the continuance of the monarchy. It is difficult for these reasons to persuade either group to accept the proposals of the other. Although both have agreed to postpone the institutional question, neither wishes to adopt a compromise which in their opinion might later prejudice their position.
The King, with the knowledge that the opposition is divided and can only claim to represent a section of the country, is apparently not disposed now to take any action. He, like the parties, is waiting for Rome. He has, however, reiterated his promise to consult the leaders and form his representative government. It seems unlikely that he will be able, and the question of his abdication could then be pressed.
In the meanwhile it would be of little advantage to the Allied cause and to the military effort in Italy to insist upon the King’s abdication without a definite substitute government in view. It’s becoming increasingly evident that, unless the Allied Governments are prepared to put forward and support an alternative program, such a substitute government will not be achieved before Rome. In fact even then the Allies will probably have to decide which alternative to favor and use their influence to secure its general acceptance. An early decision as to Allied policy is, therefore, desirable. Prior to that time we might well encourage the Executive Junta of the six parties to go to work and endeavor to prepare an agreed program for adoption in Rome although its present composition does not inspire us with confidence [Page 1018] that it can succeed. Twenty years of fascism have so destroyed the fabric of the Italian state that its rapid recreation along democratic lines without outside help is difficult to envisage.
Before any other government can be permitted to assume office the Allied Governments must be guaranteed that the obligations under the armistice and those subsequently taken by Badoglio both in fulfillment of the armistice obligations and in connection with the transfer of territory will be loyally fulfilled and in the same spirit of cooperation as now evidenced, for example, by the Italian Air Force, Navy, and other technical services. In spite of the deficiencies of the present government and its political ineptitude we must recognize that up to the present it has carried out its obligations and has considerably facilitated the prosecution of the campaign. More effective collaboration is however possible. Whether or not this is attainable depends, upon the nature of the government to be created and the attitude of the Allied Governments in regard to it. [Reinhardt, Reber.]