Office of the Historian

740.00119 EAC/9–2544: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, September 28, 1944—midnight.

7929. Reurtel 7991 September 25 midnight. The Department informed the British Embassy here on September 25 that it was agreeable to the Foreign Office proposal that armistice terms be presented as soon as possible to General Naday by the British, Soviet and American representatives in Italy. The Embassy was also reminded that the Department’s instruction to you of September 28 had expressed the hope that the Hungarian terms would be given urgent consideration in the EAC.

The Department has examined the text of the British draft of armistice terms for Hungary9 and believes that on the basis of it and of the American document (WS–222, “Proposed Terms of Surrender for Hungary”) transmitted to you by despatch no. 4433 of August 15, as well as of any proposals which may be presented by the Soviet representative, it should be possible to reach prompt agreement on a final text. There is given below for your guidance in the discussions the Department’s comment with respect to certain provisions of the British draft:

Preamble. The Department sees no good reason why the Allies should insist on a Hungarian pledge of withdrawal to the Trianon10 boundaries as a condition for opening discussions, rather than merely including it in the armistice as one of the terms. The proposal raises practical difficulties and might interfere with our main purpose of getting Hungary out of the war as quickly as possible.

Article 2. The Department believes the reference to “other enemy powers” should be eliminated. The question of Hungary’s breaking relations with Japan could be dealt with separately by the American, British and Hungarian Governments, as was done at Moscow in the case of Rumania. Slovakia and Croatia are not recognized as independent states by the United Nations and should not be mentioned.

Article 3. The provision for the withdrawal to the pre-1938 frontiers should not include Hungarian nationals. The term “nationals” is in this case subject to varying interpretations, and to include it in the armistice instrument would probably only serve to invite confusion.

Article 12. The Department considers the wording of this article as unnecessarily sweeping, particularly since Allied military requirements are provided for in Article 11. It is suggested that Hungary’s [Page 894] obligation “to furnish such further supplies, services of facilities as the Allies may require” be limited by the phrase “for the purpose of conducting military operations against Germany or for use in general relief and rehabilitation”. (In this connection see Department’s document WS–222, page 3, paragraph 811).

Article 13. The Department prefers a wording similar to that of Article 17 of the Rumanian terms, namely “Hungary undertakes to carry out, in the interests of the reestablishment of peace and security, instructions and orders of the Allied High Command issued for the purpose of securing the execution of these armistice terms”. We favor limiting Hungary’s obligation to matters connected with the execution of the armistice terms in preference to leaving it in the vague form it has in the British draft. The Department also takes the view that the functions of the Allied Control Commission should be stated to be the regulation of and control over the execution of the armistice terms, whereas the British draft describes its function merely as “communicating further instructions and requirements” to the Hungarian Government. With respect to the relationship between the Allied High Command and the Control Commission, the Department believes that the compromise formula suggested for Bulgaria (reurtel 7902 September 23)12 would properly be applicable also to Hungary.

The British draft makes no mention of Hungary entering the war on the side of the Allies. Since our military authorities have recently expressed the view, in the case of Rumania and Bulgaria, that the participation of the armed forces of former satellites in the war against Germany has definite military advantages, the Department has no objection to the inclusion in the armistice document of provision for Hungary’s waging war on Germany. There would then be no need to retain the clause on disarmament and demobilization (Article 5 of the British draft), although utilization of Hungarian troops in Allied territory should be subject to the consent of the Allied country concerned.

In regard to signatories, the Department is disposed to favor double signature of the armistice by the Soviet Commander and by SACMED. We realize, however, that there is less reason for such double signature in the case of Hungary than in the case of Bulgaria, unless land forces from the Mediterranean Theater actually take part in operations in Hungary or in the occupation of any part of that country.

The Department would like to see included in the armistice an article providing for the dissolution of fascist and pro-fascist organizations. This point was not mentioned in the British draft.

Hull
  1. Telegram 7124, p. 887.↩
  2. See supra. ↩
  3. For text of treaty of peace between the Allied and Associated Powers and Hungary, signed at Trianon, June 4, 1920, see Treaties, Conventions, etc., Between the United States of American and Other Powers, 1910–1923 (Washington, Government Printing Office, 1923), vol. iii, p. 3539.↩
  4. Paragraph numbered 8, p. 885.↩
  5. Ante, p. 435.↩