740.00119 E.W./9–2444: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)

2278. Kirk98 has reported an interview yesterday at Caserta between SACMED and General Naday,99 a Hungarian who arrived in a Hungarian plane at AFHQ with authority to speak for the Regent and the present Hungarian Government, and to seek an armistice.

From this conversation and a slightly different account given by Lt. Colonel Howie, a South African officer who had been living in Hungary as an escaped POW and who accompanied General Naday, [Page 890] the Hungarians appear now to realize that there can be no negotiation, and suppose that Soviet occupation is inevitable, but want some assurance that “Allied troops” will participate, so that the country will not be left entirely to Soviet control. Otherwise, according to Colonel Howie’s account of Horthy’s statement to him, the Hungarians would go on fighting, since German occupation of the country and Gestapo control are so complete that only with the assistance of Allied forces could they hope to crystallize Hungarian action against the Germans.

Kirk adds that the substance of this interview has been reported also to the British Foreign Office. In the circumstances the British Government will probably desire to take the initiative in apprising the Soviet Government of this approach. The foregoing is therefore for your information in the event that conversations on this matter take place in Moscow.

Meanwhile the Department is inquiring what progress may have been made in the EAC on the Hungarian terms of surrender papers, and is also requesting the comment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military aspect of the matter.

Our immediate reaction is that the Hungarians even now do not expect to undertake any serious action against the Germans, but at this late hour, with Soviet armies drawing ever closer to Budapest, they hope (1) to establish what credit they can if a break with Germany can be made; and (2) to induce, if possible, Anglo-American troops to enter the country in order to have them on hand, for political purposes, as a counter-balance to the Soviet army arriving from the east. Though this approach thus still fails to reflect the realities of the situation, it is evident that the Hungarians are ready to consider whatever terms the Allies wish to present to them.

Sent to Moscow; repeated to London.1

Hull
  1. Alexander C. Kirk, U.S. Political Adviser, Staff of the Supreme Allied Commander, Mediterranean Theater, from September 1944 to October 1946.
  2. Col. Gen. Istvan Naday, former Commander of the Hungarian 1st Army.
  3. As telegram 7792.