851.01/9–1544: Telegram
The Acting American Representative to the French Committee of National Liberation at Paris (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 16—7:05 p.m.]
16. The recent course of events in France notably the completion September 10th of the new Council of Ministers and the program set forth by de Gaulle in his speech of September 12th before Council of Resistance64 poses question whether we should not give new consideration to extending recognition to Provisional Government.
A formal request of establishment of a zone of the interior including Paris and most of France exclusive of military areas will undoubtedly be pressed by French authorities (Major Desmond Morton of Churchill’s staff told me yesterday he understood that such a request had already been formulated and while Minister of Interior Tixier yesterday in response to my direct question would not officially confirm this he let me understand some steps had been taken in this direction).
The new administration has given firm public promises of its intention to follow liberal and legal republican principles and has already implemented these declarations with such positive steps as rescinding of press agency monopoly decree, my 9, September 13, 5 p.m.65 There is little doubt de Gaulle has been accepted universally in metropolitan France as French political leader. In fact there is no other person outstanding on political horizon although it is of course possible that as months pass some of the new men who have emerged from resistance movement may attain national eminence. All existing parties and sections of resistance including the Communists have signified willingness to cooperate in present “government” and to eschew petty party squabbles in order to speed reconstruction.
The present French administration gives proof of a sincere desire to maintain public order and to provide all the essential services of government. Its popular acceptance gives every indication of a potential ability to do so when afforded means and opportunity on establishment of the zone of the interior.
I have been impressed with tolerance and restraint so far displayed not only in political but in economic and social matters. This is also true as respects treatment of collaborationists.
French people form a proud nation and withholding of recognition from the administration they have accepted would be interpreted as a lack of confidence in their ability to form a free government and to participate in the war. Of equal importance would be feeling that they were put in a decidedly inferior position with regard to participation [Page 734] in postwar readjustment and regulations particularly as affects Germany despite all assurances which we may give to the contrary.
The mass of the people of metropolitan France deprived as they have been of news of outside world have little or no knowledge of the sometimes uneven course of Franco-American relations. It would be impossible to explain to the French the shades of meaning implied by the appointment of a “representative of USA to the French Committee of National Liberation” when that Committee has in eyes of all Frenchmen been completely absorbed in the “Provisional Government”. We must bear in mind that the FCNL as distinct from de Gaulle or resistance movement had little political meaning to vast majority of people of France. Withholding of recognition would probably at an early date require endless explanations and would even then result in a good deal of misunderstanding. We might well find a revival of the subtle campaign of anti-Americanism which was current in North Africa and which has since been completely dissipated.
Continued withholding of recognition would be construed in some quarters as encouragement on our part of such unimportant irreconcilable factions including elements which have bordered on collaborationism and raise hope that door was still open for their activities.
Recognition would unquestionably strengthen standing of the Provisional Government with the populace and assist materially in its control over elements subversive of public order. It would thus facilitate the task of the Provisional Government in holding the solemnly pledged elections which will enable the French people to give free expression of their will an aim which I take to be one of the cardinal tenets of our French policy.
It is clear that there is some point when we shall have to extend recognition and it is suggested that no more appropriate moment could be chosen than the present when enthusiasm for USA is at the crest.
Months will elapse before the millions of deportees and prisoners can participate in free elections which de Gaulle has promised will be deferred until their return. During this period as far as can be foreseen little change in essential composition of the French administration is to be anticipated although of course some ministers will be discarded and others substituted in an effort to achieve a strong council.
Since it is a provisional government which is at issue our recognition would seem not to constitute any permanent commitment and any substantial form [change?] of that government would automatically rescind such recognition unless we specifically chose to continue it.
[Page 735]While recognition might take various forms I most respectfully suggest that the most appropriate one would be the immediate appointment of an Ambassador.
Before making the above recommendation to the Department it seemed desirable to ascertain the views of the Supreme Commander and to this end I communicated my opinion to Reber. I now have heard from him that a telegram somewhat along the same lines as my recommendations went forward from SHAEF on September 13th to the War and State Departments.66