Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

851.01/4066: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State

London, June 26, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received June 26—5:20 p.m.]

5058. Personal for the Secretary. I have just received an informal and unofficial memorandum on the progress of civil affairs discussions with the French which I promised you last night in my No. 5045.³¹ I was asked that it be treated in confidence. These exchanges should be over the middle of the week. The conclusions are then to be sent up to Mr. Eden and the Prime Minister and simultaneously forwarded to you and the President. No decision is to be taken until after you and the President have had an opportunity to consider the proposed arrangement.

In a message to the President sent by the Prime Minister yesterday this procedure was outlined and agreed to by the Prime Minister and concurred in by Mr. Eden.

I thought you might also like to know that in discussions with Robert Sherwood,³² General McClure,³³ Bruce Lockhart,³⁴ and Mr. Eden and myself we are trying to bring about greater agreement and a common front on radio programs and other propaganda directed to France.

The text of the memorandum follows:

“The talks have gone well and in a very friendly atmosphere. The French have, however, shown themselves very suspicious of AMGOT³⁵ and have referred several times to their treatment in administrative matters, in particular control of broadcasting stations, in North Africa.

“To meet this state of mind we have made some departures from the model agreement with the Belgian³⁶ and other Allied Governments. We have also included in our negotiations questions (publicity, censorship, property, and relief supplies) which were not dealt with in the agreements with the Belgian and other Allied Governments.

“The present position is as follows, all discussions being of course on the official level and not committing Government.

• “(1) We have reached agreement upon clauses defining the respective powers of the Commander in Chief and the French authorities as regards civil administration proper. The basis of these arrangements is the division of France into ‘forward’ and ‘interior’ zones. This is necessitated by the large area which France covers as compared with the smaller Allied countries, but it is provided that the Commander in Chief’s requirements must be met in the ‘forward’ zone and his forces shall have all the facilities which they require in the ‘interior’ zone.
• “(2) Provisions on the complicated question of jurisdiction have been agreed subject to two points which it is hoped to settle today.
• “(3) In the matter of finance, discussions are proceeding on the basis that a ‘mutual aid agreement’ would be concluded by which we would give the French forces ‘Lend-Lease’ and the French would give us supplies, facilities, et cetera, within France free of charge as ‘mutual aid’.³⁷ The currency problem would be settled within this framework by a provision whereby the French are recognized as the issuing authority of the ‘supplementary francs’ and then proceed to put at our disposal all the currency required by the Allied forces. This arrangement, which would be an extension of the existing system in North Africa, would be retroactive to D–Day.
• “(4) Provisions regarding the restitution of French property in liberated France and the custodianship of enemy property, both matters to which the French delegation attach the highest importance, are being prepared.
• “(5) Certain other miscellaneous provisions—publicity and censorship, fiscal, immunities of Allied forces, civil claims, et cetera, are at an advance stage of negotiation.

“None of the texts drafted contains any mention of ‘The Provisional Government of the French Republic’. Our idea is that there should be four separate documents on (a) civil affairs and jurisdiction, (b) finance, (c) publicity, and (d) property, all of which could be turned into an agreement later by an exchange of letters. This would, on the British side, be the same procedure as was adopted in the case of Belgium. There would be no mention of the Provisional Government in the documents themselves or in the British note covering them. We contemplate that on the American side, if the arrangements on which we hope to agree with the French commend themselves to the United States Government, the agreement would take the form of a military agreement signed by General Eisenhower.”

Winant

31. Not printed.
32. Director of Overseas Operations, Office of War Information.
33. Gen. Robert A. McClure, Chief of Psychological Warfare Branch, Supreme Allied Command.
34. Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, British Deputy Under Secretary of State, Foreign Office; Director General of Political Warfare.
35. American Military Government, Occupied Territories.
36. For Memorandum of Agreement with Belgium dated May 16, see p. 296.
37. For correspondence regarding Lend-Lease negotiations between the United States and France, see pp. 748 ff.