859.01/183: Airgram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

A–697. There is quoted below a letter (N 3397/23/G) dated June 5, 1944 just received from the Foreign Office with regard to the declaration on Denmark. In view of the fact that, as the letter states, the British Embassy in Washington has been fully informed and instructed to consult the Department, this has not been telegraphed but is merely forwarded for the Department’s information.

“We have now received from Moscow a reply to our telegram about the Danish declaration a copy of which I enclosed in my letter of the 3rd June.

“Sir A. Clark Kerr states that he has discussed the matter with the U. S. Ambassador. The latter was unwilling to express any opinion [Page 544] whether it would be worth while to ask the Soviet Government if they would join the declaration as modified but Sir A. Clark Kerr, for his part, thinks it might well be. Mr. Harriman shares his view that the Soviet Government would probably take it amiss if we and the Americans made a declaration in this form without their participation and that if we did so there would be wide spread suggestions in the press that we had again failed to secure solidarity with the Russians. Both Mr. Harriman and Sir A. Clark Kerr feel strongly that it would be essential to consult the Soviet Government whatever we decide to do.

“Sir A. Clark Kerr’s telegram has been repeated to our Embassy in Washington and we have followed it up with a telegram in which we say that we think it would be well worth while that Sir A. Clark Kerr should put the modified declaration to the Soviet Government and press them either to join in it or to agree to its issue by the U. S. Government and H. M. G. without Soviet participation. He could add that we should be prepared to consider further modifications of the text provided that the general tenor remained the same. It is suggested that, in doing so, he should emphasize the Anglo-American interest involved in increasing Danish resistance and assistance to the Allied Cause at this juncture and should imply that we should consider the Soviet Government pretty unhelpful if they did not agree to one of these alternatives. We have instructed our Ambassador in Washington to put this to the State Department urgently and, if they agree, to inform our Ambassador in Moscow direct by telegram in order that he may at once proceed accordingly. We have suggested that if the State Department agree they should instruct the U. S. Ambassador in Moscow to support Sir A. Clark Kerr.”

Winant