850.01/139
The Counselor of the British Foreign Office (Warner) to the Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Cumming)
My Dear Cumming: Gallop,1 who brings this letter to you, was at our Legation in Copenhagen and we still avail ourselves of his knowledge of Denmark and Danish and of his advice on Danish affairs, with which he keeps in close touch. I have for some time past felt that I should much like a talk about Denmark with you, so I am taking the opportunity of Gallop’s visit to Washington on another matter to ask him to discuss this letter with you.
As you may have heard from Gallman,2 we have received numerous reports—and also messages from the Danish Committee of Liberation—to the effect that the Danes in Denmark, and particularly the active resistance movement, are much disappointed that the changed situation since the 29th August last3 has not led the Allies to regard Denmark as one of themselves. The Danish Minister in London4 and the Danish Council also press the same view upon us.
We have explained to Count Reventlow and the representative of the Council that His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government do not think it possible to recognise Denmark as an Ally or a member of the United Nations. But we have for some time considered whether we should not put to you a suggestion that a declaration might be issued that we regard Denmark as “associated with the United Nations” or some formula of this kind. It has seemed to me, however, that there are three possible objections. The first is that we should no doubt wish to be assured that responsible authorities in Denmark really desire this and that we do not risk, by issuing such a declaration some public repudiation being issued in Denmark under German pressure.
[Page 525]Secondly, there is the difficulty that the Danes still maintain a Legation in Berlin. When I pointed this out in a recent discussion with Reventlow, he appreciated the difficulty, but said that to withdraw the Legation might cause the Germans to close down the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs altogether, and that he had the impression that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs rather gave the lead to the other Departments in Copenhagen. Further, he said, the Germans would almost certainly insist on the withdrawal of the Swedish Minister from Copenhagen, and this would mean the loss of a valuable channel of communication with the outside world, which he thought the King particularly would feel deeply.
The third possible difficulty in declaring Denmark “associated with the United Nations” or some such formula, is that some of the Allies might be opposed to it. I think we should have to consult the Soviet Government before anything of the kind was done and I am not sure what their reaction would be. The Danish Minister here is in contact with the Soviet Ambassador4a and has been sending him information about Denmark, and the Soviet Ambassador has expressed appreciation and says he has forwarded it to the Soviet Government. As regards the other Allies, I have been waiting to see the result of a resolution proposing Danish admission, which has been before the Allied Information Bureau, recently established in London. Not quite all the replies are yet in, but it does not look as if there would be opposition from any of the European Allies. This is, of course, not a conclusive indication of the views of the Allies on the “association” of Denmark with the Allies, having regard to the admission of Denmark long ago to the corresponding body in Washington. Further, the Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs,5 who has discussed the matter with some of his Allied colleagues has expressed the view that the question of the representation of Denmark on inter-Allied bodies, either by an observer or as a full member, should be considered on its merits in each case. But my feeling is that if the United States Government, the Soviet Government and His Majesty’s Government agree to regard the Danes as “associated” or something of the kind we need not bother about possible objections from minor Allies …
As regards the other two difficulties, it has occurred to me that it might be a good plan to send a message to the King of Denmark explaining the situation. It would be for him then to consult whoever he thought fit in Denmark (I am assured that he is able to do so) and to let us know whether Denmark liked our proposal and would be prepared to withdraw the Danish Legation in Berlin. Even if the Danes felt they could not remove their Legation in Berlin, our message would have the advantage of explaining the position to the King [Page 526] and to other important Danes, and should help to remove any sense of grievance, and consequent discouragement in the resistance movement.
You will, no doubt, wish to discuss this suggestion with Kauffmann.6 It emerged in a personal conversation between myself and Count Reventlow. I have told the latter that I would let him know when I write to you in order that he could simultaneously write to Kauffmann.
I hope you will not think that the failure of the previous discussions between us on the subject of the issue of a declaration about Denmark need affect this matter. I personally feel that it was rather a pity that owing to their origin in Kauffmann’s proposal they were, from the start, involved with the question of who should be recognised as leaders or representatives of the Free Danes. I think you appreciate the difficulty for us of ignoring the Danish Council and I need not go over that ground again. Our feeling here is that there need be no real difficulty about leaving matters as they are. There is general agreement, I think, in deprecating the setting-up of any quasi-governmental body outside Denmark. I was able to arrange here that communication between the Free Danes and Kauffman should all be through Reventlow. Reventlow and Christmas Moeller7 are co-operating well together and Reventlow is only too anxious to keep in step with Kauffmann. I am glad to hear from Gallman that Kauffmann gave you copies of his correspondence with me. I should have liked to have sent you copies but did not feel that I could, since Kauffmann’s letter to me was of a personal character. I hope you will agree with me that I was right in indicating in reply that I thought it important to keep to the proper channels and that I should deal only with the Danes here and with you and not direct with Kauffmann.
Will you let me have your views through Gallop on the above proposal for sending a message to King Christian? If the State Department approve of it, I think we should then consult the Russians. They may feel it a difficulty that Denmark broke off relations with them, but we can leave them to raise that point. Perhaps you would let me have your views as to how we should consult the Russians. We have sent our Embassy in Moscow a long background despatch, which should be reaching them soon, so if it should be thought desirable to raise the matter in Moscow we could do it.
This letter has the approval of my seniors and you can treat the proposals in it as official. I am giving a copy to Gallman.
I hope you are very well and prosper in every way. I wish we could meet again soon.
Very sincerely,
- Rodney A. Gallop, British Foreign Office.↩
- Waldemar J. Gallman, Counselor of the American Embassy in the United Kingdom.↩
- On August 29, 1943, the Germans declared a state of military emergency in Denmark, and the Danish Government handed in its resignation.↩
- Count Eduard Reventlow.↩
- Feodor Tarasovitch Gousev.↩
- Trygve Lie.↩
- Henrik de Kauffmann, Danish Minister in the United States.↩
- Christmas Moeller, representative of Fighting Denmark in England.↩