871.01/12–144: Telegram

The American Representative in Bulgaria ( Barnes ) to the Secretary of State

2. During the past 10 days I have had conversations with the Bulgarian Ministers for Foreign Affairs and War,67 the Russian political representative68 and General Cherepanov, with most of the foreign diplomats here and with numerous prominent Bulgarians. From these conversations I have derived the following first impressions.

1.
The Government of the Fatherland Front continues a prisoner of the Bulgarian Communists, the only well organized political group in the country. Ten years of Palace government have wiped out the organizations of the former legal parties. During this period the Communists continued underground to perfect their organization. And now they possess an armed “militia” of some 10,000 while all other elements of the population have been disarmed. In the towns and villages perquisitions and terroristic acts, even executions by the militia, are not unusual. Yet, the Government is divided within on the issue of disarming the militia (the Communist Ministers can hardly be expected to emasculate their own people) and are fearful of any action that might precipitate the issue of the Communists versus the army.
2.
The revolution of September, the about face of Bulgarian policy and occupation of the country by the Russians have demoralized the army. Discipline has suffered considerably. No one seems clear in his own mind as to where the army really stands, except that it does [Page 496] not understand the need for the “blood bath” inevitable in fighting the German Army in Yugoslavia and beyond. Certainly there is no enthusiasm either in the army or on the part of the populace for the decision of the Government, taken no doubt at the instance of the Russians, to send a new expeditionary force of five divisions to pursue the Germans “beyond the Danube and even to Berlin”. It is thought by the Government that such an expeditionary force may improve Bulgaria’s position with respect to final peace terms, facilitate Bulgarian efforts to obtain the status of co-belligerent, and have a stabilizing effect on morale, but no one (except a doleful and weak Government) is prepared for heavy sacrifices.
3.
The Agrarian Party, which all agree represents the bulk of the electorate, is bitter against the Communists, and therefore against the Government that has failed thus far to show sufficient courage to place the interests of the country as a whole above the need for compromise if the Communists are to be restrained from going into top position. The Agrarians, and such bourgeois elements as are able to give expression to an opinion, entertain a very natural doubt as to Russia’s ultimate aims in this country and the relationship of the occupying authorities to the Communists. The Russians appear to be exercising a restraining influence on the Communists, but many believe that this is primarily because Bulgarian communism, ideologically and with respect to methods, is still of the 1917 vintage. I have yet to hear of anyone who believes that if the Bulgarian Communists can relate their ideas and their methods to those of the 1944 variety of Russian communism there will not ultimately be a marriage of convenience between the occupying authorities and the Bulgarian Communists. All agree that the Bulgarian Communists are on the make and have every intention of gaining full control of the Government, if this can be accomplished in the period of Russian occupation.
4.
Russian popularity is said to have decreased rapidly since the initial stages of the occupation. Russia has always been to the Bulgarians “the liberator”. The Bulgarians are a simple people with a great desire for advancement. They yearn for education and admire polish and culture. They recall their liberators of the 19th century as a fine and cultured people. The Russian Army of today is rough and vigorous. Excesses have been committed by the Russian soldier—nothing astonishing, perhaps nothing beyond theft and the violation of person and property. The effect has been disillusioning. At the same time it is clear that the Russian High Command is here to protect Bulgaria from the “rapacity” of Britain’s friends, such as Greece. This has been said to us in so many words by high Russians.
5.
The economic and financial situation is equally depressing. The two east-west railway lines are engaged largely in transporting Russian [Page 497] troops. The railways also have suffered from the problem of upkeep in war time, degradations by the Germans and our bombing, and road transport has of course been greatly affected by military requirements and the deterioration of time and inadequate means of repair and upkeep. While crops have been good the movement thereof has been handicapped. Also, Bulgaria today has no foreign markets, even if transportation were not a problem. And she possesses no foreign exchange and virtually no gold cover. At the same time the currency circulation is about 20 times greater than it was in 1938, and the rate of issue is on the increase. The inner city of Sofia is a shambles from bombing. Perhaps 70% of it has been destroyed. As one observes the somewhat frantic effort now being made to remove these millions of tons of rubble with small horse drawn carts, one can only wonder at the faith that keeps the effort alive.

In summary it must be said in all honesty that all Bulgaria is in a hell of a state. What may result from these circumstances is almost anyone’s guess, but that the immediate future will be one of stresses and strains no one who has the vaguest knowledge of the country’s make-up and of existing circumstances can doubt for a moment.

Repeated to Moscow, Caserta, Athens.

Barnes
  1. Col. Damian Velchev, Bulgarian Minister of War.
  2. Alexander Audreyevieh Lavrishchev, formerly Minister of the Soviet Union in Bulgaria.