740.00119 E.W./10–2244: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received October 22—11 p.m.]
9077. Many thanks for Department’s 8735 (October 21, 3 p.m.), with its helpful comments and authorization to settle the text of the Bulgarian draft armistice. At this evening’s meeting of the European Advisory Commission the three delegations reviewed the texts of the draft armistice and protocol carefully, and approved the drafts for submission to the three Governments in a signed minute of the EAC.
With respect to article XI, I strongly advocated insertion of the words “and now located in Bulgaria”. The Russian delegate objected that such property might be concealed in the territory outside of Bulgaria, for example, in a bank in a neutral country, and that power should be reserved to oblige Bulgaria to take all steps in its power to restore it to its rightful owners. The British delegation felt that the fact that this power is to be administered by the Allied Control Commission (not by the Soviet Command) was sufficient assurance that no unreasonable interpretation of this article would be insisted on. In the end, after maintaining our position, I felt it would be better not to insist on this point, especially since the Russian delegate would otherwise have had to wire his Government for fresh instructions on this one point which would have caused considerable delay before we could approve the document for submission to the three Governments.
With regard to the former provision in article IX for safeguarding Bulgarian assets, I felt it would be fruitless to press for its reinclusion now. I had had several long and exhaustive discussions with Gousev concerning it in the EAC. In addition this particular point was put up by Eden direct to Molotov in Moscow, without any success. Obviously, Gousev’s substitute was unable to reopen a decision made in the Kremlin, however reasonable our own view even from the angle of safeguarding Russia’s own interests. Eden and Molotov [Page 473] agreed that this question should be taken up direct in the Allied Control Commission in case it became clear that Bulgaria was trying to hide her foreign assets.
The provision of article IV of the protocol is so drafted as to prevent Bulgaria from refusing to rent buildings, provide access to food and fuel, or to change dollars into leva, for the use of our missions. Its range is satisfactorily restricted in that it applies only for the benefit of United States and United Kingdom missions. Since the British delegation had set great store on some such precaution and Eden had gone to considerable trouble to obtain its insertion in Moscow, I did not feel that I should delay the negotiation over this point.
With respect to article XVIII, I handed to Strang and Rosh, Gousev’s substitute, the following identic letters, before I consented to approve the draft armistice for transmission.
“In view of the presence of the Bulgarian delegation in Moscow, where it is awaiting presentation of armistice terms by the representatives of the three Allied Governments, in view also of the approaching expiration of the time limit set for the withdrawal of Bulgarian forces and officials from the territories of Greece and Yugoslavia, and in view of my Government’s desire to make every contribution in its power towards expediting the completion of the armistice terms in the EAC, I am empowered to join with you and our Soviet (British) colleague in approving the present draft armistice terms for submission to the three Governments. In so doing I am also directed to inform my colleagues that my Government continues to feel that article XVIII of the armistice should properly contain an additional provision to the effect that ‘upon the conclusion of hostilities against Germany and until the conclusion of peace with Bulgaria, the Allied Control Commission will regulate and supervise the execution of the armistice according to the instructions of the Governments of the United States of America, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom’. I wish, therefore, at this time to inform you and our Soviet (British) colleague that my Government may find it necessary at a later date to discuss with the two Allied Governments the detailed manner in which article XVIII should be implemented during the period subsequent to the conclusion of hostilities against Germany. I am writing similarly to Mr. Rosh (Sir William Strang).”
I believe that this communication safeguards fully our position in the matter and goes as far as we can now without reopening the whole negotiation. It maintains our preference for the third sentence of our original draft, and without referring to the Molotov–Eden exchange of letters, it rejects all part and parcel of the idea which lies behind Molotov’s letter. In this respect it puts us in a clear position. I felt that, in view of the fact that we have approved in writing of the draft armistice, our reservation concerning article XVIII should [Page 474] also be in writing, and yet in a form which would not uselessly prolong the controversy at this time. I believe our efforts have resulted in several improvements in the armistice arrangements and may have slowed down somewhat the tendency to harden Europe into spheres of exclusive influence. Full texts of draft armistice and protocol follows in my 9078 (October 22, midnight).21
- Not printed.↩