740.00119 EAC/9–2544: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received September 25—10:55 p.m.]
7992. Comea 100. Armistice terms for Bulgaria were discussed at great length in today’s meeting of the European Advisory Commission. In accordance with Department’s 7749, September 22, 7 p.m.,92 I proposed a redraft of the last two sentences of the United Kingdom precondition; it was accepted by the United Kingdom delegation with the change of one word. The Soviet delegate then stated that his Government’s acceptance of the pre-condition providing for evacuation of Allied territory (my 7816, September 20, midnight) was conditional upon the three Powers agreeing to signature of the armistice by Soviet Marshal Tolbukhin as representative of all three. The United Kingdom delegation continued to urge signature by both a Soviet representative and a representative of SACMED. I believe the Russians mean to stand firm on a single signature. Much as the British dislike giving way on this issue, I think they would do so if [Page 437] they felt they could get recognition of more equal rights on the Control Commission. They realize as I do that with every day that passes the Russians are increasing their control of Bulgaria and consequently taking a firmer position in their insistence on Soviet provisions in the armistice terms. I would therefore urge immediate clearance from the Department of the pre-condition terms with the inclusion of the Russian condition of single Soviet signature of the armistice. It would also seem to me only just to support the British in a fairer representation of United States and United Kingdom on the Control Commission. The Russians fought a bloodless 5–hour war with the Bulgarians. We lost considerable life in bombing Bulgarian objectives and our crews that were forced to land there were badly mauled. The British suffered great loss of life in defending Greece and were largely responsible for Yugoslavia’s initial support of the Allied cause. These actions delayed German invasion of Russia and put winter on the side of the Red Army in 1941. Failure to give the British support on the Control Commission issue will be very deeply resented by them.
In discussing the preamble I presented my Government’s view (Department’s 7671, September 20, 8 p.m.) in strong support of the wording “on behalf of the United Nations at war with Bulgaria”. After a long and detailed discussion the Soviet delegate still insisted on the Soviet draft preamble. In an equally long consideration of Soviet article I, the Soviet delegate offered to accept parts 1, 2 and 3 of United Kingdom article I (my 7775, September 19, midnight). This would include provision for using Bulgarian forces on territory of an Ally only with prior consent of that Ally but would exclude any provision for disarmament and demobilization. The United Kingdom delegation offered to omit specific reference to disarmament provided such power could be acquired under a general clause binding Bulgaria to comply with further requirements; it was impossible, however, to arrive at an agreement for the insertion of a general powers clause because of Russian opposition.
In a discussion of articles II through XVII, several slight changes were made. In article XV the United Kingdom delegation urged strongly the inclusion of a protocol patterned on that attached to the corresponding article of the Finnish Armistice,93 concerning the ultimate disposition of United Nations ships transferred to Soviet control by the armistice. In respect to article XVI the United Kingdom delegation felt strongly that some expansion of the article was needed in order that Bulgarian goods and services might be used for the general prosecution of the war and not only for the discharge of its [Page 438] functions by the Soviet High Command. In article XVII, the British representative proposed that the addition of a sentence copied from the last part of Rumanian article X placing Bulgarian merchant shipping under Allied control. There was no discussion of article XVIII since I had to state that I was without instructions regarding it (my 7902, September 23, 1 p.m.). In general today’s discussion clarified a number of minor points but in the absence of further instructions to me it necessarily left unsettled the two most awkward questions, that of single or double signature, and the character of the Control Commission. Since so many days of discussion have passed without my being able to present my Government’s views on these two questions, positions of other delegations have naturally hardened and the American view may be much less effective in shaping the final agreement on armistice terms unless I can get an immediate answer. The Commission meets tomorrow at 4 o’clock London time to continue its discussions.