740.0011 E.W./9–744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received 10:15 p.m.]
3361. At the close of the discussion on Rumania yesterday, Clark Kerr said he was instructed to express the astonishment of his Government that the Soviet Government had declared war on Bulgaria without previous consultation and at a time when Bulgaria appeared to be anxious to make peace with the Allies. The Soviet Government having declared war, he was instructed to inquire what the [Page 402] Soviet Government proposed to do. Did it intend to invade Bulgaria or make specific demands of the Bulgarian Government? Was it the intention of the Soviet Government that Great Britain and the United States should not conclude an armistice with Bulgaria because this would violate our undertaking not to conclude a separate peace with our common enemies, or does the Soviet Government intend to join in the armistice which we were about to negotiate?
Molotov first pressed Clark Kerr to admit that the rupture of relations would help rather than hinder the Allies in the struggle against Germany. He then said that Clark Kerr’s questions related to two matters, motive and timing. The reasons for declaring war were set forth in the Soviet note. Molotov explained the timing of the step by giving a review of Soviet démarches to the Bulgarian Government beginning last April and said that as far back as last May the Soviet Government had threatened to break off relations with Bulgaria. The Soviet Government had at first pressed for reestablishment of their consulates but on August 12 the Bulgarian Government was informed that the question was not one of consulates but of the rupture of relations with Germany. The last stage was the declaration of the Muraviev Government which showed that the Bulgarian Government did not dare break relations with Germany but had decided only to declare its neutrality. The rupture of relations and declaration of war by the Soviet Union then became an urgent step. He added that the Soviet Union was anxious to show the Bulgarians that the three Allies were in agreement.
Molotov said the question of invasion and that of armistice negotiations would depend upon the Bulgarians. Perhaps the Bulgarians would come to their senses. The Soviet Government had received “unconfirmed reports that on the night of September 5 Bulgaria had broken relations with Germany. He pointed out that only one day had elapsed since the Soviet rupture of relations and declaration of war and said that it would take a little time to make certain that Bulgaria was ready to adopt a new policy. During the conversation Molotov observed several times that there was no need to hurry and that it would be well if Bulgaria “thought over the situation for a bit.” He concluded by saying that the Soviet Union had for 3 years been urging Bulgaria to break relations with Germany, and it was now necessary to make sure that Bulgaria had abandoned its old policy of making false promises.
It seems clear that the internal political situation in Bulgaria taken together with the arrival of Soviet forces on the Bulgarian border is an important, if not the most important, factor in present Soviet [Page 403] policy, and Molotov appeared to feel that Soviet interests in this respect would best be served by allowing Bulgaria to “stew in its own juice” for the time being. Although Molotov begged the question about Soviet military plans respecting Bulgaria, saying that these matters would be governed by military decisions, political considerations may well impel the Russians in the direction of an entry of Russia’s troops onto Bulgarian soil. The Turkish angle will also play a prominent part in Russian thought on this question.
Sent to Department as No. 3361 and repeated to AmLegation [Embassy] Cairo for MacVeagh.