740.00119 EW/8–2744: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received August 27—3:54 p.m.]
6972. Department’s 6866, August 26, midnight. Your helpful message is much appreciated. The concept of a gradual withdrawal of Bulgarian forces is a sound one in principle but the British, Greeks and Yugoslavs may feel that the psychological effect of a speedy Bulgarian withdrawal is more valuable than the avoidance of local disorders. However, I much prefer your formula and will advance it as a recommendation following review by our Government of the draft terms recommended by the European Advisory Commission.
The British Government has also reviewed the draft terms and has suggested certain additions, as a result of which I had a 2-hour discussion today with Strang and his experts. The British Treasury feels that the economic and financial provisions of the draft armistice are not adequate to safeguard our position and might result in placing Bulgaria in a more favorable position than some of our Allies. The draft which Strang presented at Friday’s EAC meeting contained in article IV an additional sentence as follows: “The United Nations also to have the right to utilize Bulgarian territory, facilities and resources”. This provision was interpreted by Gousev as conveying to the Allies absolute control over the Bulgarian economy without any limitation as to purpose and Strang agreed rather readily to delete it, assuming that articles VII, X, XI, and XII would give the Allies adequate powers.
After review the British now suggest the insertion of a new provision, to follow present article XI and to read as follows: “Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities as the Allies may require for the use of their forces, missions or agencies, and such local currency as they may require for expenditure within Bulgaria.” This provision would, as they explain it, allow Allied agencies to buy within Bulgaria, with currency provided by the Bulgarian Government, any commodities they may desire for their use within or outside Bulgaria. In view of Gousev’s repeated objections to the transfer of such sweeping powers without limitation as to purpose, I feel sure that this provision would meet with strong Russian resistance. I am inclined to suggest a somewhat more limited but, I believe, adequate formula, as follows: “Bulgaria to furnish such supplies, services and facilities, and such amounts of local currency, as the Allies may require for the use of their forces or missions within Bulgaria or for the prosecution of the war”. I have so informed the British.
[Page 375]This latter formula would, I believe, meet the valid contention that the armistice should specifically empower the Allies to cover the expenses of their missions or forces in Bulgaria with currency provided by the local government and to acquire in Bulgaria those commodities such as mica which we require for the prosecution of the war in Europe and the Far East. The formula which I am putting forward for consideration by the Department in reviewing the British proposals would give us access to Bulgarian resources for purposes of prosecuting the war, controlling transport, securing restitution and reparation, and providing relief and rehabilitation. Above and beyond that, any remaining exportable surplus could presumably be controlled through economic warfare controls and shipping channels, as well as by Bulgaria’s need for outside supplies. At the same time I believe my formula may satisfy the Russians as Gousev has continually laid stress on testing each article of the Armistice in the light of its usefulness in furthering the prosecution of the war, with the special emphasis on getting Bulgaria out of the war as quickly as possible.
The Treasury expert also proposed that Bulgaria be obligated “to redeem and hand over to the Allies any currency which they may issue in Bulgaria”. He agreed to drop this when I pointed out that the proposed new economic clause if adopted would provide us with adequate supplies of local currency, while present article XII provides sanctions in case Bulgaria fails to provide such supplies.
The British also propose to add at the end of article X the following words “and not to dispose of any of her assets without the consent of the Allies”. This seems a reasonable provision for safeguarding assets required for reparation and other purposes.
In order to give greater dignity and authority to Allied missions in Bulgaria, the British propose to insert in present article XII, following the words “to the Armistice”; the following: “to give all facilities to such missions as the Allies may send;” This addition may not be strictly necessary in view of the first part of article XII, but it seems unobjectionable.
If the Department approves any or all of these proposed additions to the armistice instrument, I should like very much to present them in the Commission as coming from our Government, as a result of examination of the draft instrument in Washington. I have suggested to Strang that it would be awkward for him to advance them on his own behalf; his draft of last Friday, which he stated had the support of his Government, was naturally assumed to be based on consultation with all interested British agencies. On the other hand, it is perfectly clear to Gousev that I gave only tentative approval to the draft terms and that the Department may well have amendments to [Page 376] offer. Since the Russians yesterday circulated their draft on control machinery for Germany34 (an English translation will be ready for cabling tomorrow35) I am anxious to move as smoothly as possible into this vital phase of our EAC negotiations on Germany. The Russians have given real demonstration of goodwill in that they have receded from their earlier position and are now willing to discuss German control machinery and to advance other documents.