Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III
740.00119 EAC/194
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
The Secretary of State refers to the Department’s telegram No. 4597 (Eacom 21) of June 9, 194479 and encloses herewith a copy of a document entitled “Proposed Terms of Surrender for Bulgaria” (WS–162b). This paper has been cleared by the Working Security Committee and has also been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the Department. It presents, therefore, for the information and guidance of the Embassy, the policy to be followed with regard to the terms of surrender for Bulgaria and supersedes the other documents submitted with the Department’s instruction No. 4057 of May 11, 1944.79
[Page 341](CAC–229b)
Proposed Terms of Surrender for Bulgaria
I. The Problem
In view of the recent statement of the Joint Chiefs of Staff regarding the desirability of the withdrawal of the Axis satellites from the war, and of the advantageous position which will be created for the United Nations by the continued progress of the military campaign in the Eastern Mediterranean and on the Eastern Front, serious consideration should be given to the means available for hastening Bulgarian surrender. Furthermore, the declaration issued by the United States, Great Britain and the Soviet Union on May 12, 1944,80 implied that an early capitulation of the Axis satellites would be rewarded by less severe terms than those which would be imposed if they refused to surrender before the defeat of Germany.
The chief problem is to determine the degree to which this could be accomplished without compromising the war aims of the United Nations. Over-generous terms would not only tend to alienate members of the United Nations which have suffered from Bulgaria’s participation in the war on the side of the Axis, principally Greece and Yugoslavia, but might also appear to justify within Bulgaria the policies of the pro-Axis groups which have guided Bulgaria’s policy since 1940. Unduly stringent terms, on the other hand, would probably fail to win the support of any important section of Bulgarian opinion and might even strengthen the determination of the Bulgarian government to continue resistance.
II. Terms of Surrender
A. Obligations to be Imposed on Bulgaria
- 1.
- The Signatories.—The instrument providing for the termination of hostilities should be signed by the Allied Theater Commander, by the Chief of the High Command of the Bulgarian Armed Forces or his representative and, if possible, by an authorized civilian official representing the Bulgarian Government.
- 2.
- Evacuation of Occupied Territories.—Without prejudice to the ultimate settlement of disputed territorial claims, Bulgarian armed forces should be withdrawn from all areas other than territory held by Bulgaria on January 1, 1940, their withdrawal to be carried out according to a schedule laid down by the occupation authorities. Bulgarian officials in such areas, except those whose continued presence [Page 342] is desired by the occupation authorities, should likewise be withdrawn Individuals or units in such areas may be designated to be held as prisoners of war.
- 3.
- Right-of-Occupation.—The Allied Governments signatory to the instrument of surrender should have the right to occupy with any forces they may designate and in any way they deem necessary, and to utilize in any way they deem appropriate, any or all parts of Bulgarian territory heretofore acknowledged to be under Bulgarian sovereignty or in dispute as to such sovereignty, and to exercise throughout the country the legal rights of an occupying power.
- 4.
- Terms of Occupation.—In case the occupation of all or a part of Bulgaria should be found necessary to the prosecution of the war, Bulgaria should place at the disposal of the occupation authorities such troops, materials of war, public and private archives, and communication, information transportation and power facilities as the occupation authorities may demand. This assistance will be used by the Allied forces in their military operations against Germany. Bulgaria will not, however, be given the status of co-belligerency. The occupation authorities may determine, according to the circumstances, the degree of Bulgarian disarmament, demobilization and demilitarization.
- 5.
- Maintenance of Order.—In case Bulgaria should not be occupied, or in such parts of Bulgaria as may not be occupied, the maintenance of order will be the responsibility of such Bulgarian Government as may be established with the approval of the Allied signatory Governments. In addition to its ordinary responsibilities, the Bulgarian Government will be required to hold and to deliver as directed by the Allied signatory Governments all Axis nationals and persons designated as war criminals who may be found on Bulgarian soil.
- 6.
- Prisoners of War.—Bulgaria should be obligated to release, as directed by the occupation authorities and to protect in their persons and property, pending release, all prisoners of war belonging to the forces of the United Nations, all other nationals of those countries, who are confined, interned or otherwise under restraint, and all other persons who may be similarly confined, interned or otherwise under restraint for political reasons or as a result of Bulgarian or Nazi action, law or regulation which, discriminates on the ground of race, creed, color or political belief.
- 7.
- Reparation and Restitution.—Bulgaria should be obligated to make such reparation and restitution as the United Nations may require. Bulgaria should also be required to take all necessary measures to safeguard all property removed from territory which has been under Bulgarian occupation or control, and all property in Bulgaria belonging to the governments or nationals of the United Nations.
- 8.
- Economic Reconstruction.—Bulgaria should be required to assist and cooperate with the United Nations in such measures for relief, rehabilitation, and economic reconstruction as the United Nations may decide to undertake.
B. Eventual Advantages for Bulgaria
In case the military and political situation obtaining at the time of the negotiations for surrender should warrant it, the United Nations should be prepared to offer positive inducements to Bulgaria in return for its withdrawal from the Axis. The full terms suggested below should be regarded as the maximum concessions to be made in case Bulgaria should disarm the German armed forces within its frontiers and deliver them with their equipment to the Allied forces. If, on the other hand, Bulgaria should delay surrender until the defeat of Germany is imminent, the United Nations should make no concessions to Bulgaria except with respect to the ultimate restoration of its independence.
- 1.
- Independence.—Independence of Bulgaria after the war and its territorial integrity within its 1939 frontiers could be assured. One of the main fears of the Bulgarian people is a partition of the country and the destruction of its independence. The assurance that this is not the intention of the United Nations would facilitate the withdrawal of Bulgaria from the Axis.
- 2.
- Occupation.—Bulgaria might be assured that neither Greek nor Yugoslav troops will participate in the occupation. In view of the deep traditional antagonism which exists between the Bulgarian, Greek and Yugoslav peoples, an attempt to use the troops of the latter on Bulgarian soil would in all likelihood result in widespread disorders and lasting resentments.
- 3.
- Territorial Settlement.—Bulgaria could be assured that at the final settlement it will be permitted to retain Southern Dobruja. This territory, of which two-thirds of the population is Bulgarian and one-third Turkish, was ceded to Bulgaria by Rumania as a result of friendly negotiations in September 1940. While the actual cession was made under Axis auspices, negotiations to that end had been in progress for some time previously. It received the public approval of the British and Soviet Governments.
- Bulgaria also has extensive claims in Yugoslav Macedonia and in Greek Eastern Macedonia and Western Thrace. In these territories, however, the Bulgarian case is by no means convincing. The Bulgarian record has also been marred by its illegal seizure and harsh administration of these territories during the present war. Any attempt on the part of the United Nations to satisfy these Bulgarian claims would therefore be likely to promote disunity among the [Page 344] United Nations and to prejudice an equitable territorial settlement after the war.
- 4.
- Economic Settlement.—In assessing Bulgaria’s reparations obligations, it will not be the intention of the United Nations to impose such an economic burden on the country as to reduce disastrously its standard of living or to endanger permanently its economic independence.