Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

740.00119 EAC/109a: Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)

Washington, March 4, 1944—midnight.

1666. Eacom²⁷ 10. 1. The following two documents have been approved for transmission to you by the Department and the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

“Provisions for Imposition upon Bulgaria at Time of Surrender—WS–58b”²⁸ and “Aspects of Bulgarian Surrender Requiring Consultation between the British, Soviet, and American Governments—WS–59b”

2. The text of both these documents is being forwarded by air pouch tonight.

WS–58b is substantially identical with the Rumanian document WS–16a²⁹ with the following exceptions:

A. In as much as the Soviet Union is not at war with Bulgaria references to the Governments imposing the terms mention only the United Kingdom and the United States with the addition, in the introductory paragraph, of the words

“Acting after consultation with the Government of the Soviet Union”

B. In numbered paragraphs 1, 4, and 6 references to the Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet forces is omitted.

C. In numbered paragraph 5 the date given is January 1, 1940.³⁰

D. Penultimate sentence in numbered paragraph 8³¹ is omitted.

The text of WS–59b follows:

“The following factors should be taken into account in considering the terms recommended in the accompanying document, WS–58b, for imposition upon Bulgaria at the time of her surrender.

“Comment on Nature of Surrender Document

“It is believed that the capitulation of Bulgaria should be recorded “in a single document of unconditional surrender. The statement of principles embodied in WS–58b would, it is felt, provide an adequate legal basis for the principal security, political and economic controls which the United Nations will need to impose on Bulgaria at the time of surrender and thereafter. The principles listed therein should not, however, be considered as exclusive of such additional conditions which it may be found advisable or necessary to impose. Nor should it be considered that all such terms must necessarily be included in the instrument of surrender so long as the instrument includes the complete and unconditional surrender of Bulgaria and such other broad and general terms as the two Governments may agree, after consultation with the Soviet Government, should be included therein in order to safeguard their rights and powers. In general, it is believed that the document of unconditional surrender should be a relatively brief instrument, with full power reserved to implement it by such proclamations, orders and ordinances as the occupation authorities and the Governments which they represent may deem advisable or necessary.

“United Nations Concerned with the Terms of Bulgarian Surrender

“The following United Nations are at war with Bulgaria: The United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Greece, Haiti, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Union of South Africa, and Yugoslavia. The imposition of surrender terms upon Bulgaria should rest with the American and British Governments, acting after consultation with the Soviet Government, and in the interest of the United Nations, without prejudice to the participation by other United Nations which are at war with Bulgaria in subsequent peace negotiations with Bulgaria.

“Signatory or Signatories to the Surrender Instrument (Article 1)

“The American and British Governments may appoint their several plenipotentiaries, civilian or military or both, to examine jointly the credentials of the Bulgarian plenipotentiary or plenipotentiaries and to present for his or their signature, without discussion or negotiation, the instrument of surrender. On the other hand, having agreed together on the provisions of that instrument, the two Governments may appoint a single plenipotentiary to act in the name of both. If the offer of surrender should be made in the field, the presentation of terms, in the interest of the United Nations, might be made by the Allied Commander-in-Chief in that theater. If the offer should be made elsewhere, for example, in a neutral country, the presentation of terms might be made by representatives of the two Governments.

“Provisional Status of Certain Disputed Territories (Articles 5 and 8)

“The two Governments should agree, after consultation with the Soviet Government and in accordance with the circumstances existing at the time of surrender and occupation, whether the territory acquired by Bulgaria from Rumania since the outbreak of the war should be placed, in whole or in part, under the military government for Bulgaria or under that for Rumania. This decision should be without prejudice to the ultimate disposition of the territory concerned. The territories taken by Bulgaria from Yugoslavia and from Greece since the outbreak of the war also should be placed under Allied occupation authorities and should not be assimilated into the national administrative systems of Yugoslavia and Greece respectively, until the final boundaries have been determined as part of the general peace settlement.

“From What Bulgarian Regime Should Surrender Be Accepted?

“Assuming a Bulgarian offer of surrender prior to the capitulation of Germany, the answer to this question would depend in part on the degree to which a Bulgarian Government desirous of capitulating might be able to escape from German domination. Of particular importance would be the question whether any Bulgarian Government would be in a position to offer more than a token surrender, leaving the territory itself still to be conquered, as in the case of Italy. If there is agreement among the governments of the United States and the United Kingdom that the Bulgarians are in a position to offer unconditional surrender, then these governments should agree without delay as to the Bulgarian regime from which they are willing to accept such surrender. If they desire to saddle the present Filov-Bozhilov³² regime with responsibility for Bulgarian participation in the war, it would be important to secure the submission of the present Bulgarian leaders, and thus to forestall the danger that later generations of Bulgarian nationalists would blame the defeat and the surrender on the moderate and pro-Ally groups.”

In their letter of Clearance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the additional instrument of surrender for Bulgaria should be similar in form to that recommended by them for Germany WS–65 Annex B.³³

Stettinius

27. Designation assigned to a series of telegrams from the Department to the European Advisory Commission.
28. Not printed.
29. See vol. iv , section under Rumania entitled “Negotiations leading to signing of armistice …”
30. Date for Rumania given as June 21, 1941.
31. The sentence is as follows: “For political purposes Bucharest and other principal cities to be designated should be occupied, at least temporarily.”
32. Bogdan Filov, Third Bulgar Regent for minority of King Simeon II, and Dobri Bozhilov, Bulgar Prime Minister until May, 1944.
33. See letter from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of State, February 5, vol. i , section entitled “Participation by the United States in the work of the European Advisory Commission,” part V.