740.0011 Stettinius Mission/3–1944

Memorandum by the Division of Southern European Affairs21

The special position of Bulgaria among the Axis satellites derives from the fact that, whereas that country followed the Axis in declaring war on the United States in December 1941, it has not, like Hungary and Rumania, participated in the war against Russia and has in fact, mainly because of the racial tie, rather special sentiments for and relations with “Mother Russia”. Bulgaria and Russia have continued normal and friendly relations throughout the war, maintaining their diplomatic establishments in the respective capitals. While refusing to send soldiers against Russia, Bulgaria has taken part in the war by permitting German troops to pass through the country, as well as to establish garrisons there, and by occupying extensive territories in Macedonia and Thrace formerly belonging to Yugoslavia and Greece.

Our immediate problem with respect to Bulgaria is to find means of expediting its withdrawal from the war. This country may well be the first of the satellites to fall, partly because of its geographical position but largely because of Russian influence and the fact that the Bulgarians do not have the same fear of the Russians as do the Hungarians and the Rumanians. The chief obstacle to withdrawal is, of course, Bulgarian reluctance to accede to the almost inevitable Allied requirement that Bulgarian forces be withdrawn from United Nations territory in Yugoslavia and Greece.

The Slavic tie between Russia and Bulgaria and Russia’s traditional ambition to have a dependable access to the Mediterranean combine to create interesting possibilities as regards the Soviet role in determining the disposition to be made of Bulgaria. Will the Soviet Government, for example, insist on an enlarged and strengthened Bulgaria, reviving Bulgarian claims to Northern Dobruja and championing Bulgaria’s longstanding insistence upon an outlet on the Aegean? With Bessarabia in Soviet possession, this would give Russia and Bulgaria a common frontier at the lower reaches and mouths of the Danube, at the same time giving the Soviet Union, in effect, a practical highway which would by-pass the Straits and carry right on down to the Aegean and the Mediterranean.

It would be useful for us to learn what information the British may have with respect to Russian designs in this direction and to know [Page 305] what the British attitude may be. Our view is that Bulgaria must evacuate all United Nations territory at present occupied by Bulgarian forces and that all boundary questions should be left for postwar settlement. Whereas the Macedonian question will almost inevitably arise at some stage of the peace discussions and the Bulgarian desire for an Aegean outlet will have sufficiently numerous and strong champions to require attention, we believe that the agreement reached between Rumania and Bulgaria at Craiova in the summer of 194022 drew a pretty good line and that the Rumanians and Bulgarians will be content to let it stand. Although this agreement evolved out of conversations undertaken at the instance of the Axis, its provisions were worked out in a reasonably frank and conciliatory manner and may be considered as having been freely negotiated between the two countries. It gave the predominantly Bulgarian area called the quadrilateral (Southern Dobruja) to Bulgaria and left the predominantly Rumanian area to Rumania, at the same time carrying provisions for an exchange of populations which has since taken place. We now see no good reason why this question should be reopened.

  1. Prepared for Under Secretary of State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., in connection with his departure for London for discussions with members of the British Government, held April 7–29, 1944. For report on Mr. Stettinius’ mission to London, see pp. 1 ff.
  2. For the signing of the accord at Craiova on September 7, 1940, see telegram 511, September 8, 1940, 2 p.m., from Bucharest, Foreign Relations, 1940, vol. i, p. 506.