875.01/12–2444: Telegram
Mr. Alexander C. Kirk, Political Adviser, Allied Force Headquarters, to the Secretary of State
[Received 7:08 p.m.]
1897. Lt. Col. Palmer,60 who returned to Albania some days ago, was given following directive by commander of force 399,61 text of which according to BAF message to this HQS had been approved by British Resident Minister’s representative here. Palmer was ordered to return to Hoxha’s HQS and in his talk with latter to indicate [Page 292] to him informally that question of granting recognition to Hoxha’s administration would depend to great extent on his ability to prove he was in effective control of country and that he intended to administer country in just and fair manner. Hoxha was further to be told that importance would be attached to it being made plain to world opinion that Hoxha in fact had support of Albanian people as whole. Palmer was told to stress that events such as unsatisfactory treatment of Allied liaison officers, lack of cooperation in certain military operations and mistreatments of German prisoners would be borne in mind by British in giving consideration to recognition. Palmer was also instructed to say that widening of political basis of FNC, representative of country as whole, would be well viewed and he was told to indicate that inclusion of such a man as Gani Kryseiu and others who have taken active steps to drive out Germans would go far towards convincing Allies that FNC is truly representative of Albanian people. Palmer was to inform Hoxha that with liberation in Albania it would be necessary for British to stop sending in military supplies as of December 31 and he was to make clear that once Germans had withdrawn from country the various British operational missions would be withdrawn. In case Hoxha requested support for FNC formations in Yugoslavia supporting Partisans against Germans, Palmer was to inform him that this was a question which had to be decided between Tito and himself and that he, Palmer, was not authorized to provide any supplies outside 1939 Albanian boundaries.
SAM [Same?] message from BAF quoted directive to Palmer on relief for Albania and stated he was authorized to inform Hoxha that relief would be introduced to Albania by HQS ML62 Albania but that Hoxha’s agreement would have to be obtained for introduction of supplies so he might instruct his representative in Durazzo accordingly. While Palmer was not to negotiate in this matter he was to tell Hoxha of this proposal and ask him to instruct local authority to make necessary arrangements and draw up any agreement which might be necessary. Palmer was, however, authorized to explain extent of proposed relief and basic conditions attached thereto while avoiding definite promises. Immediately on receipt of foregoing December 16 we took this up with Deputy Chief of Staff63 and Office of British Resident Minister pointing out that we did not think it desirable to tie political and relief negotiations together and that it would be unfortunate to have Palmer carry out such discussions simultaneously. After protracted discussion of matter, Deputy Chief of Staff directed that immediate telegram be sent Palmer telling him [Page 293] under no circumstances to discuss political and relief matters with Hoxha simultaneously and further message was sent Balkan Air Force stating it should not involve itself in any way with relief negotiations in Albania.
We are now informed that on December 20 Palmer spoke with Hoxha and outlined relief plan stressing that ML could not make approach to him as a governing organization for whole of Albania and could only deal with him insofar as he is found to be in control of various localities. Hoxha remained noncommittal during Palmer’s entire representation taking copious notes. Later Hoxha remarked that it would be far more satisfactory to deal with him direct than sign agreements with his underlings who look to him for guidance. He agreed entirely with principle of equitable distribution but felt that he and his organization could be best judges as to which areas needed relief most and as to priority of same. He could not see need for observers and felt that a few men attached to his HQS would accomplish same purpose. He pounced on statement that ML Albania was anxious to help Albanians to help themselves and stated that if ML put supplies into Durazzo he and his organization were quite capable of handling from there with just a few people from ML at this HQS. He stressed that this would release about 1200 people to fight war somewhere else. He does not object to financial conditions of agreement and seemed impressed with proposed amount of 8 to 10 thousand tons of supplies per month.
Palmer observes that Hoxha is afraid of another [apparent garble] and that landing of large force as envisaged by ML plan would be disastrous and invitation to attack. He feels that if he could go back with some concession in form of cutting down number of troops, at least in initial stage, he would be able to convince Hoxha to accept. He feels it is essential to have relief supplies on first ship to convince Hoxha of our sincerity. Palmer believes Hoxha to be in rigid control of whole country.
From Broad we hear that Palmer reports that Hoxha seemed greatly interested in securing early recognition.
- Lt. Col. C. A. Palmer, British Liaison Officer in Albania and Chief of the British Military Mission to the Army of National Liberation.↩
- The support unit and planning staff for the various British military missions in the Balkans. Based in Bari, Italy, it acted as a rear link between these units and Balkan Air Force which was responsible for all British operations in the Balkans.↩
- Military Liaison (Albania), British military relief organization for Albania.↩
- Maj. Gen. Lowell W. Rooks, U.S. Army.↩