841D.01/259
Memorandum of Telephone Conversations, by the Chief of the Division of British Commonwealth Affairs (Hickerson)
On Saturday, February 27, 1 called Ambassador Atherton in Ottawa on the telephone and told him the background of our note to the Irish Government on February 21 requesting that the Irish Government on security grounds take steps to remove the Axis representatives in Ireland. I then told Mr. Atherton that we had received word from our Minister in Dublin to the effect that Mr. de Valera was appealing to the Irish [Canadian] High Commissioner to act as intermediary in persuading the United States and the United Kingdom to withdraw their notes in return for Mr. de Valera’s pledge of redoubled vigilance. I told Mr. Atherton that I assumed that the Canadian Government would not be agreeable to the Irish proposal but that I wished to tell him the background in order that he might be in a position to discuss this matter with officials of the Canadian Government in the event they raised the question. I said that if he felt it desirable to raise the question himself he should feel free to do so. Mr. Atherton said that he would be seeing Mr. Norman Robertson, Canadian Under Secretary of State for External Affairs, Sunday afternoon and that he would probably take occasion to discuss this matter.
[Page 228]This morning, February 28, Ambassador Atherton called me on the telephone and said that he had discussed this matter with Mr. Robertson informally at a social gathering yesterday. He said that Mr. Robertson informed him that the Irish Government’s appeal had been made to Canada and that Canada had turned it down explaining that Canada had not been consulted about this matter and was not familiar with the background and was not therefore in a position to comply with the Irish request.
Mr. Atherton said that he was glad to have our comments on the background since Mr. Robertson seemed a little puzzled and confused as to why we took this attitude. Mr. Atherton said that he explained to Mr. Robertson that if military operations are started on the Continent within the next few months and if large casualty lists result perhaps it would then be clear why the United States Government was especially concerned and taking every precaution to plug every possible leak of military information which might get through to Germany.
Mr. Atherton said that Mr. Robertson stated that it would in his opinion have been preferable if we had not asked the British to send a note supporting our request. I replied that we had not requested the British to send such a note; that we had as a matter of course informed the British Government that we were taking such action unless they disapproved; and that the British Government of its own volition had informed us that it wished to send a supporting note. I added that we did not object to their taking this action.
I told Mr. Atherton of the Irish Minister’s call on me Saturday and of the statement which I had made to him that our note was not an ultimatum which would be followed by the use of force if the Irish declined to carry out our request. I told Mr. Atherton that I had informed Mr. Brennan that the principal sanction which may be expected if the Irish Government refuses our request will be the undying hatred on the part of mothers if they feel that military information was sent by the Axis representatives from Dublin that contributed to the German preparations to repel an allied attack.