841D.01/247: Telegram
The Minister in Ireland (Gray) to the Secretary of State
[Received February 25—1:37 a.m.]
30. Last evening February 23 the Canadian High Commissioner John Kearney and Sir John Maffey called on me. It appears that De Valera yesterday morning had sent for Kearney and informed him of the receipt of the American and British notes. Kearney, though he had not been advised by us, suggested that he knew of the matter in a general way and that he expected instructions from his Government. De Valera in a very exaggerated mood asserting [asserted?] that they interpreted our note as a conspiracy to coerce weak neutrals and as a prelude to invasion. Kearney says he told De Valera that the request to dismiss the Axis representatives was a reasonable one which governments [Page 225] responsible for the safety of their soldiers could not shirk. De Valera said that the effect of these notes was bound to make United Nations relations with Ireland deteriorate and he asked Kearney as the representative of a friendly power to act as intermediary and communicate to Maffey and me the request that the notes be withdrawn. If they were withdrawn he would undertake to do everything in his power to prevent Axis espionage short of dismissing the Axis Missions. Note that he told me Monday17 that he had done everything possible and neither could nor would do more. Kearney pointed out that the sending of parachutists by Germany in defiance of international convention gave De Valera an excellent reason for action but he steadily refused to consider it, the real reason apparently being his pride in taking decisions contrary to our interests.
Maffey has telegraphed his Government recounting this démarche by De Valera advising them to notify Mackenzie King18 with a minimum of delay and to request him to instruct his Minister in Eire to reply to De Valera in the following sense:
- (1)
- That Mr. King had considered the notes in question and was satisfied that they contained nothing in the nature either of menace or of ultimatum but only such a reasonable request as it was the duty of the Governments in question in the circumstances to make.
- (2)
- Would recommend that unless reasons of which I have no knowledge make such a course undesirable you approve this line with the Canadian Government.
Maffey and I feel that thus far no mistake has been made, that appeal to the Canadian Minister gives time for cooling off and consideration and that our best course is to do nothing for the time being. If Canada supports us De Valera will have to accept the situation or begin on some new line.
De Valera had represented to Kearney that his Cabinet was in agreement with him in interpreting our note as an ultimatum and prelude to invasion. Maffey says he dined at the same party with the Vice Premier O’Kelly Tuesday night after delivery of the British note and that O’Kelly apparently took it very calmly and showed neither resentment nor apprehension. Maffey feels certain that the Irish Cabinet does not share De Valera’s view whatever he may say.
Reference your No. 23 of February 23,19 the British note went to you yesterday. I will of course keep you advised of all developments. Would appreciate information regarding the Canadian angle. Assuming Canadian cooperation with United States I am considering procedure in the case that De Valera persists in interpreting our note as an ultimatum and should make a public appeal to the electorate although I think this course unlikely. You will be interested to learn [Page 226] that he had his Defense Council in session all Monday night making plans to resist invasion with the arms we have supplied him. This is characteristic De Valera political dramatics.
Please advise me if you hear of effort through the Irish Minister in Washington to interest American political leaders.
Repeated to London.