760C.61/6–2744
Memorandum by the Assistant Chief of the Division of Eastern European Affairs (Durbrow)
The attached comprehensive and interesting report80 by Oscar Lange on his recent trip to the Soviet Union should in fact be read in full in order to appreciate the “atmosphere” which he found in his discussions with various Polish groups as well as Soviet officials.
While there is not a great deal of completely new information in the report, he does confirm information from other sources which tends to show that the time is perhaps now propitious to bring about some sort of reconciliation between the Polish and Soviet Governments.
Besides his interview with Stalin, Lange had two interviews with Molotov, many talks with officials of the Union of Polish Patriots, particularly its head, Wanda Wasilewska, whom he has known since 1923, as well as extended conversations with Polish troops in the Polish Divisions fighting with the Red Army.
[Page 1419]The following is a summary and analysis of the principal points brought out by Dr. Lange in his report:
1. Political. Stalin informed Lange that “the door to an understanding with the Polish Government in London is never closed” and from his general conversation, Stalin gave Lange the impression that he would like to work out a coalition government which would include several members of the present Polish cabinet, and he mentioned Mikolajczyk and Romer81 as being acceptable to him. While Stalin apparently would prefer that a collaboration arrangement between the Polish Government in London and the Polish groups in the country be worked out, he would, in the event that this should prove impossible, permit a provisional government to be formed in Poland composed of members of the so-called National Council of Poland (pro-Soviet) and perhaps certain members of the Union of Polish Patriots (Moscow-sponsored Polish group). Stalin emphasized that he would not establish a Red Army AMG in Poland. Moreover, Stalin indicated that he did not plan to use the Union of Polish Patriots as the provisional government of Poland but did indicate that perhaps some of its members might join in any coalition government which might be formed.
In connection with his expressed desire to reach an agreement with the moderate elements in the Polish Government-in-exile, Stalin suggested that Lange should proceed to London to talk to Premier Mikolajczyk and even suggested that Lange should talk to General Sosnkowski to find out exactly what he wants. Lange has the definite impression that Stalin would prefer to have a new Polish Government which would include moderate elements of the London-exiled Government rather than set up what would appear to be a Soviet puppet organization in Poland.
Dr. Lange, just before his departure, had a long talk with the delegates from the so-called Polish National Council who had just arrived in Moscow from Poland. The delegates, while admitting that their organization was smaller than that of the Polish Government-in-exile, claimed that it was growing rapidly and would eventually surpass the strength of the Polish Government’s underground government apparatus as well as the strength of its underground army. According to the delegates, their organization is composed of members of the Polish socialist party, the peasant party, and the Polish Workers Party (communists). The delegates claimed that, although the Polish underground government plans to take over the administration as soon as the Germans are driven out, the Polish National Council is going to make every effort to prevent this and plans itself to take over the administration of the country as soon as possible.
[Page 1420]Furthermore, they allege that the Polish Government organization refuses to carry on active resistance against the Germans, and in certain instances, collaborates with them, and denounces members of the National Council to the Germans in order that the latter may take reprisals against them. It is interesting to note in this connection that over a year ago a member of the Polish Government’s underground organization came to the United States and was carefully questioned by officials of the Department. At that time he made almost exactly similar accusations against the pro-Soviet organizations in Poland and accused them of denouncing members of his organization to the Germans in order that they could take reprisals against them. In discussing this question with Dr. Lange, he stated that it was difficult to ascertain the truth of the various allegations since each side accused the other of collaborating with the Germans, etc.
2. Polish Divisions in the Red Army. Professor Lange spent considerable time discussing Polish questions with members of the Polish Divisions in the Red Army. According to Dr. Lange, most of these men are Polish citizens who were deported to the Soviet Union in 1939 and 1940 and held in concentration camps until the Polish-Soviet agreement was concluded in July, 1941.82 While the Soviet authorities have indicated in their propaganda that all of these men volunteered for service with the Red Army, Dr. Lange reported that most of them had been conscripted. While most of the Poles were conscripted, Polish Jews were accepted only on a voluntary basis which accounts for the fact that only 6% of these Divisions are Jews. Dr. Lange stated that the explanation given for this was that the Polish Government-in-exile has alleged in its propaganda that the Polish Divisions were not composed of pure Poles but were made up of “Jews and Bolsheviks” and the Soviet Government, in order to counteract these allegations, did not conscript Jews for the Polish Divisions in order to prove to the outside world that they were composed primarily of pure Poles.
In regard to the Poles from eastern Poland who, according to Soviet propaganda, have since the entry of the Red Army into that area joined the Polish Red Army Divisions in great numbers, Dr. Lange indicated that most of them had not joined voluntarily but had been drafted into the Red Army.
Perhaps one of the most interesting things learned by Dr. Lange in talking to the rank and file of the Polish Divisions was their attitude on the various political differences between Poland and the [Page 1421] Soviet Union. While most of them were against the Polish Government-in-exile except for certain members such as Mikolajczyk and Stanczyk, they all expressed strong feelings on the territorial question and insisted that the Curzon Line did not constitute an equitable frontier and all demanded that Lwow should remain in Poland. They also were most emphatic in stating that they did not wish to have Poland “Sovietized”, did not wish to have the land collectivized, and insisted that small industry should remain in private hands but felt that large industries and banking should be nationalized. They all felt, moreover, that there should be no interference in the internal affairs of Poland.
3. Underground Armies. Delegates of the National Council of Poland admitted to Dr. Lange that the Polish Government underground army was stronger than their own. They stated that the Polish Government’s underground army had a strength of approximately 60,000 men, mostly in reserve, while for their own forces, they claimed 15,000 active members and 30,000 reservists.
It is interesting to note that Stalin, despite Molotov’s previous statements to Ambassador Harriman that the Polish Government had no real underground organization in Poland, admitted that the Polish underground had been in touch with the Red Army and had suggested that the two forces collaborate in fighting the Germans. According to Stalin, the Red Army indicated its acceptance of this offer on the one condition that the Polish Underground Army would be under the military control of the Red Army Commander. Stalin added that after this offer had been made and accepted, the Underground Army delegates departed to discuss the question with their superiors but had never returned.
In this connection, it is pertinent to note that Stalin’s version of this Polish offer of collaboration is similar to that given by Premier Mikolajczyk who explained that the reasons why the Polish Underground representatives did not return to work out the details for collaboration was due to the fact that a German counterattack surrounded the Polish forces and annihilated many of them before they were able to extricate themselves. This German maneuver has since prevented the Polish group from making contact with the Red Army.
4. Territorial question. According to Dr. Lange many of the members of the Polish Divisions in the Red Army, apart from insisting that Lwow be Polish, also demanded in conformity with the expressed wishes of the Union of Polish Patriots that German territory as far as the Oder be included in the future Poland.
In discussing the territorial question with Stalin, Dr. Lange made a strong plea for the inclusion of Lwow in Poland. He told Stalin that there is an almost unanimous demand by the Poles in the Soviet Divisions for Lwow and reminded Molotov, who was present at the meeting, that the Soviet censors had prevented the American correspondents, [Page 1422] who had accompanied Lange, from sending this part of his story to the United States. Stalin did not commit himself on this question but stated that “this problem must be studied further” and added that although he knew that the Poles wanted Lwow, he was afraid if he gave it to them he might have to “make war on the Ukrainians” who also wanted Lwow.
Stalin strongly favored giving Poland not only East Prussia and Silesia but also German territory up to the Oder including the city of Stettin. In this connection, he stated that he could understand the position of the Polish Government-in-exile in not wanting to make a settlement regarding the Polish eastern frontier until the frontier in the west was settled. He suggested, therefore, that the Western frontiers of Poland should be settled first which would make it easier to discuss the eastern frontier.
- Not attached to file copy.↩
- Tadeusz Romer, Polish Ambassador to the Soviet Union, 1942–43, and Minister for Foreign Affairs in the Mikolajczyk Cabinet, 1943–4.↩
- Agreement for Mutual Aid, with a Protocol, signed at London on July 30, 1941. For text, see British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxliv, p. 869. See also telegram 3292, July 30, 1941, from London, Foreign Relations, 1941, vol. i, p. 243, and footnote 92, p. 244.↩