Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/8–2244: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State

Moscow, August 22, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received August 23—10:30 p.m.]

3108. Following is detailed report of conversation with Molotov reported in my 3049, August 17, midnight.⁸ The British Ambassador began by stating that our Governments were gravely concerned at the decision of the Soviet Government concerning dropping supplies to the Poles fighting in Warsaw and the withholding of use of Soviet bases to American aircraft engaged therein. He explained that he had received a letter from Molotov that afternoon which he understood to be a refusal of a request of the British Military Mission that crippled British aircraft returning from Warsaw be allowed to land in Soviet territory. After a lengthy discussion on this latter point, Molotov agreed that British crews could parachute out on Soviet territory but would not give an answer to the question whether the Soviet Government would approve the landing of the crippled planes.

Molotov explained that the Soviet Government considered the Warsaw affair to be a pure adventure involving great and useless sacrifice of life. It had been started by a band of adventurers and certain elements of the Polish Government in London. The Soviet Government did not wish to have any hand in it directly or indirectly or to take any responsibility for it. This had been made clear.

He referred to the slanderous campaign exceeding all bounds which the Polish press and wireless had been carrying on since early August against the Soviet Government, implying that the Red Army Command was to blame for the difficult situation in Warsaw and was letting the Poles down. Such slander was an attempt by these adventurers [and by] Sosnkowski and others to place responsibility upon the Soviet Government for their own guilt. He read Stalin’s messages to the Prime Minister and Mikolajczyk and concluded [contended] that these messages made clear the reasons for the Soviet Government’s decision.

The British Ambassador then presented the views of his Government in accordance with his instructions, summarized as follows:

It was felt that the issues at stake were of vital importance and went far beyond the immediate fate of the Polish population in Warsaw. Deep anxiety was felt regarding the probable effects of the Soviet decision, not only upon the relations between Poland and the Soviet Union but those between the Soviet Union and Great Britain and the United States. The fighting in Warsaw was for the common cause and everything possible should be done by the American, Soviet and British Governments to support it, even though mistakes had possibly been made by the Polish Government in its timing of the uprising and in its failing to consult the Allies. The achievements of the Partisans in the Soviet Union had long been watched with admiration and the high value of their contribution, even in the days when they had no arms, had been recognized. The same has been felt about the Poles, whatever their political persuasion, who are fighting against the common enemy, as are the Yugoslavs and recently the French. For some time past the official Polish underground had been criticized by Soviet public opinion for its apparent inactivity and at the same time the Poles and Poland had been exhorted by the Soviet press and wireless to rise up, just as the French were now being exhorted to rise and attack the Germans. This imposed upon the three Governments a strong moral obligation to render assistance. No attempt had been made to judge the political color or the precise extent of the resistance in Warsaw. Reliable information had indicated however that in fact Poles of all parties have joined in the struggle, and with a deep sense of moral obligation the British were doing their best, at heavy cost, to bring assistance to Warsaw.

Stalin had assured Mikolajczyk that he would assist the Warsaw Poles. According to information received from Eden, Mikolajczyk returned to London with a determination to base his future policy upon faith in the Soviet Government’s good will. He was prepared to go very far with his colleagues to bring about a solution of the Polish problem in the sense desired by the Soviet Government and to invite all Polish political forces to unite behind a policy of friendship toward the Soviet Union. Mikolajczyk’s main trump card was Stalin’s assurance to assist the Warsaw Poles. If the Soviet Government’s present decision were maintained, Mikolajczyk’s personal position would be fatally harmed and the prospect of a solution of the Polish problem made much more difficult. The complete absence of Soviet cooperation would be misinterpreted and would seriously prejudice Soviet-Polish relations.

Much irresponsible and mischievous comment had already been publicly made about the Warsaw uprising. The Soviet Government could of course afford to ignore such comment, but inactivity now would only strengthen the hands of such critics and would also provoke damaging comment amongst those who have so far remained silent. The British Government would do its best to present the facts in the most favorable light. (In referring to these remarks later in the conversation, Molotov stated “We shall judge from these comments who are our friends against the common enemy”.)

Upon the conclusion of the British Ambassador’s remarks I stated that although it was physically possible for American planes to fly small loads of supplies to Warsaw and return to their bases in the United Kingdom or Italy, such missions could not be undertaken with fighter escort because of the length of the flight. I said that Molotov could well understand public opinion in the United States and in the American Air Forces if it became known that we had been obliged to undertake Warsaw missions without fighter protection when fighter security could have been available if the Soviet Government had permitted the missions to land in the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had stated that it did not object to the dropping of arms on Warsaw if Soviet bases were not used. If this were done, our losses would undoubtedly be very heavy—uselessly and without any good reason. I said that I felt confident that when Molotov and Stalin understood these facts they would reconsider their decision and would permit American aircraft to land in the Soviet Union.

I continued that, as Molotov well understood, the whole Polish problem was being watched with the keenest of interest in the United States and was being viewed as the first case of Allied collaboration in dealing with mutual problems. It had been the President’s constant aim to bring the Poles together to fight the common enemy. Now, when the Poles of all political color were fighting the Germans in Warsaw, to deny them aid would not be understood. Under these circumstances the American people would expect their Government to do everything possible to assist them and to prevail upon the Soviet Government to do likewise. If it became known that such aid was denied, or at least made much more difficult to render because of the absence of Soviet cooperation, the question would be raised whether the collaboration established between our countries was as effective as had been hoped.⁹

I recalled that on August 9 Stalin had agreed to Mikolajczyk to aid the Poles, but sometime between the 9th and 14th the position of the Soviet Government had changed, and I was anxious to ascertain what had occurred to cause this change in position. Molotov replied that during this period it had become clear that the Warsaw action was a purely adventuristic light-minded affair which was causing many sacrifices and that the Soviet support of it would only lead to increasing sacrifices. I endeavored to ascertain whether the Soviet Government had any information which had not been made public that had caused it to change its position. Molotov evasively again referred to the adventuristic character of the uprising and to the attempts which had been made to take advantage of it for purposes hostile to the Soviet Union. He said that the information which had been published in the press had reflected the information at the disposal of the Soviet Government and was sufficient in substance to cause the Soviet Government to change its position. In reply to a further question he said that the Warsaw picture had sufficiently clarified itself by August 12 to permit the publication of the Tass¹⁰ statement which had defined the attitude of the Soviet Government. Molotov was also evasive and noncommittal in reply to my question as to whether the Soviet radio had toward the end of July exhorted the Poles to rise up and fight for their liberation. In general he adamantly adhered to the established line.¹¹

Harriman

8. Not printed. This conversation took place on the night of August 17, between Ambassador Harriman and the British Ambassador, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, and Molotov, as Stalin was too busy to attend; it lasted for 3 hours.
9. In an earlier telegram, No. 3081 of August 19, Ambassador Harriman had stated: “From Moscow it is my feeling that if Stalin does not make good on his promise to Mikolajczyk to make every effort to render aid there is little hope of an agreement between the Polish factions, and we will therefore probably be faced with all the complexities arising therefrom. I feel further that when the American public understands fully the facts there will be serious repercussions in public opinion in the United States toward the Soviet Union and even in its confidence and hopes for the success of postwar world collaboration.” (740.0011 EW 1939/8–1944)
10. Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union, official communications organization of the Soviet Union.
11. In his first telegram, No. 3049, August 17, about this meeting, Ambassador Harriman summed up: “As you know, I have been consistently optimistic and patient in dealing with our various difficulties with the Soviet Government. My recent conversations with Vyshinski and particularly with Molotov tonight lead me to the opinion that these men are bloated with power and expect that they can force their will on us and all countries to accept their decisions without question.” (740.0011 European War 1939/8–1744)