740.0011 European War 1939/8–1744: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman )
1974. Although it is apparent from your 3049, August 17, midnight,97 that at the time of your interview with Molotov you had not yet received our 1962, August 17, 7 p.m. containing the instructions authorized by the President, you presented the position of this Government essentially along the lines of these instructions.98
In view of Molotov’s definite statement that the decision of the Soviet Government in regard to furnishing aid to the Polish Underground would not be reconsidered and also Vyshinski’s statement (your 3031, August 17)99 that the Soviet Government would not object to independent British and American action in furnishing supplies, the question arises whether it is desirable to attempt to press the Soviet Government to change its position on the use of shuttle bombing arrangements. Our chief concern from a political point of [Page 1382] view in regard to the Soviet refusal as first outlined to you by Vyshinski (your 3000, August 15, 8 p.m.) was the strong implication therein that the Soviet Government was attempting to arrogate to itself the right to prevent our actions through threat of Soviet displeasure in regard to the question of furnishing aid to the Polish Underground. We attribute in large measure Vyshinski’s subsequent clarification on this point to your vigorous and timely representations.
While we will leave to your discretion the advisability of pressing further for a reconsideration of the Soviet position on the use of the shuttle bombing arrangements, we know you will bear in mind the importance of not allowing this question in any way to imperil the continuance and smooth function of the shuttle bombing arrangements. This is a consideration of primary importance to our military authorities which for obvious reasons we feel is not to the same degree present in the British approach to the question of aid to the Polish Underground, and we have sensed in the British instructions to Clark Kerr, which we received from their Embassy here, a tendency to go considerably farther than the President is prepared to go in attempting to force Soviet cooperation or participation in sending aid to the Underground.
While we share your views as to the motives and character of the Soviet attitude, we feel that since the Soviets are not attempting to prevent our independent actions in this matter our chief purpose has already been achieved as a result of your representations.1
- Not printed, but see telegram 3108, August 22, from Moscow, p. 1386.↩
- Although the instructions had not arrived before this conversation, Ambassador Harriman advised the Department of State in telegram 3081, August 19: “I have, however, today addressed a letter to Molotov pursuant to your telegram stating in direct terms that it was the earnest hope of my Government that the Soviet Government would cooperate with the British and ourselves in our attempts to give aid to the Poles in Warsaw and would make every effort to render aid itself, but that if this was not forthcoming we would continue to furnish aid as far as feasible, as my Government perceived no grounds for departing from its consistent policy of giving all possible aid to United Nations forces fighting our common enemy. Although I do not believe this letter will produce any change in announced Soviet policy. I feel it important to make the record clear cut.” (740.0011 European War 1939/8–1944)↩
- Not printed.↩
- This sentence caused Ambassador Harriman to comment in telegram 3091, August 21: “While I realize that the peculiar conditions in Moscow do not always lead to clarity of thinking, I do not see how it can be considered that ‘our chief purpose has already been achieved’ and I feel strongly that we should make the Soviets realize our dissatisfaction with their behavior even though this may not bring immediately visible results.” (740.0011 European War 1939/8–2144)↩