Moscow Embassy Files, Lot 53: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
3000. For the President and Acting Secretary. I sent Molotov yesterday, August 14, an urgent letter stating that our Air Force Command here had received from USSTAF an urgent directive to obtain immediate approval from the Red Air Force for a shuttle mission of American bombers to drop arms on Warsaw for the resistance forces and then proceed to bases in the Soviet Union. I said that I was taking up this question with him because political considerations were involved and I concluded that my Government was extremely desirous that this attempt be made to get arms to the resistance groups in spite of its risks and difficulties.
I received a note this morning from Vyshinski87 stating that he had been instructed by Molotov to advise me that the Soviet Government “could not go along” with this project and that the “action in Warsaw into which the Warsaw population had been drawn was a purely adventuristic affair and the Soviet Government could not lend its hand to it”. Vyshinski’s letter concluded that Stalin had pointed out to Churchill on August 5 that one could not imagine how a few Polish detachments of the so-called National Army possessing neither artillery, aviation, or tanks could “take” Warsaw at a time when the Nazis had at their disposal four tank divisions for the defense of that city.
[Page 1375]I discussed this matter with Clark Kerr this morning who had talked with Molotov about it last night. At that time no decision had been reached and Molotov explained that an attempt had been made to drop a Red Army liaison officer in Warsaw but that the officer had been lost.88 Clark Kerr had received a communication from Eden this morning to the effect that the question of supplying the resistance groups in Warsaw was the crucial matter in the Soviet-Polish situation. We decided that we jointly should immediately ask to see Molotov and endeavor to prevail upon him to change the decision of the Soviet Government.
In Molotov’s alleged absence Vyshinski received us early this afternoon. We informed him that we believed the decision of the Soviet Government was a grave mistake and that it would have serious repercussions in Washington and London. We pointed out that Vyshinski’s letter did not tally with Stalin’s promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the resistance movement in Warsaw.89 Although admittedly premature, the Warsaw Poles, like the French underground and Tito’s forces, were killing Germans even without tanks and aircraft. It was therefore in the interests of the common cause and of humanity to support them. We emphasized at some length the seriousness of this decision, to prevent our air force from assisting the Poles in Warsaw, and the effect it would have not only on our common cause but also on world opinion when it became publicly known. Vyshinski adhered to the statements made in his letter and to the view that the outbreak in Warsaw was ill-advised, not a serious matter, not worthy of assistance, and that it would have no influence on the future course of the war. There were no reasons to reconsider the Soviet position. He said that the Soviet Government had nothing to fear as to public reaction abroad since the exploits of the Red Army and the Soviet people clearly spoke for themselves. I pointed out that we were not requesting Soviet participation in the operation and stated that I could not understand why the Soviet Government should object to our endeavor to assist the Poles even if our attempt to get arms to them should not bring about the desired results. Vyshinski maintained that the landing of the American planes at the Soviet bases constituted participation and that the Soviet Government did not wish to encourage “adventuristic actions” which might later be turned against the Soviet Union. In reply to my question as to what exactly he meant, he made vague references to hostile press statements in connection with the [Page 1376] Soviet position vis-à-vis the uprising in Warsaw. These statements, he said, demonstrated what kind of an affair the uprising was.
Clark Kerr inquired whether he understood correctly that there had been a change in Soviet policy from Stalin’s promise to Mikolajczyk to assist the Poles in Warsaw. Vyshinski maintained that there had been no change in policy, that it was primarily a matter of the best ways and means of effecting this policy, that the Red Army was helping Poland, and that the question was purely military in character. He was evasive when asked whether the Soviets intended to assist directly the Poles fighting in Warsaw.
I told Vyshinski that under our agreement with the Soviet Union regarding the shuttle operations the Warsaw project would have to be abandoned, but that I understood a shuttle mission would be undertaken shortly in which a German war production target would be attacked. If there were any change in Soviet policy regarding the Warsaw proposal as a result of our conversation, I hoped he would let me know today as there was still time to change our plans. Vyshinski said that he would report our conversation to his Government and let me know if there was any change in Soviet policy.
Sent to the Department. Repeated to London as no. 139.
- Andrey Yanuaryevich Vyshinsky, First Assistant People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.↩
- Konstantin Kalugin, a captain in the Soviet intelligence service, according to a former official of the Polish underground. A different version of how he got “lost” is presented in Stefan Korbonski, Fighting Warsaw (London, George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1956), p. 386.↩
- See telegram 2923, August 10, 2 p.m., from Moscow, p. 1308.↩