Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

740.0011 European War 1939/33940b: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman )

Washington , April 12, 1944—midnight.

890. For your background information, according to a report received by Premier Mikolajczyk⁶¹ the first contacts made between the Polish Underground forces and the Eed Army led to certain difficulties since the Soviet authorities insisted that the Poles in Eastern Poland were on Russian territory and were Russian citizens and, therefore, should serve in the Red Army Divisions of General Berling.⁶² During this period certain friction developed and according to Polish reports the Red Army authorities executed a number of Poles and forced the others to join the Red forces.

A new phase developed on March 26 when the Polish Regional Commander in Volhynia made a successful and more friendly contact with the Soviet Commander. The latter proposed that a Polish Division should be recruited; that it would be permitted to operate under its own commander; that it should maintain allegiance to the Polish Government in London, but that it should be under the tactical command of the Red Army. This proposal was submitted to the Polish authorities in Warsaw who together with the Polish Government in London approved of the arrangement.

Premier Mikolajczyk attributes this change in the Soviet attitude primarily to the following three reasons:

1. That the discipline and strength of the Polish Underground is much greater than Stalin⁶³ at first believed;

2. That the Red Army authorities were desirous as they advanced further that the Underground forces should come to their aid against the Germans rather than remaining dormant or perhaps take a hostile attitude toward them;

3. That on the part of the Soviet authorities anxiety was felt about the feeling of American and British peoples on this subject.

For the first time in several months Mikolajczyk has displayed optimism regarding the prospect for Polish-Soviet relations.

In view of these new developments the Polish Government has revived its proposal to send American and British liaison officers both to the Polish Underground forces operating in German-controlled areas as well as those in areas under Red Army control. The British Government still feels that the time is not ripe for making such appointments and the Department concurs in this view.

On the basis of the earlier reports received by the Poles indicating that friction had developed between the two forces, the Polish Government asked the British and ourselves to use our influence with the Soviet Government in order to prevent possible Soviet repressions and to afford protection to the members of the Polish Underground who disclose themselves to the Red Army. In view of the later encouraging reports it is felt that no good purpose would be served in formally bringing the Polish request to the attention of the Soviet authorities. It is felt, however, that it would be helpful if when a suitable opportunity arises you informally indicate to Molotov⁶⁴ that the United States Government is gratified to learn that the Red Army and the Polish Underground have been able to effect an arrangement for cooperation between the two forces for the purpose of coordinating their efforts in the prosecution of the war against our common enemy.

Hull

61. In his telegram 2901, April 9, 1944, the Ambassador in the United Kingdom informed the Department of Mikolajczyk’s report about contacts between Polish and Soviet military units in eastern Poland (760C.61/2265).
62. Lt. Gen. Zygmunt Berling, organizer of the Soviet-sponsored Polish army, which had entered active service about September 1943.
63. Iosif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People’s Commissars of the Soviet Union.
64. Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People’s Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.