860C.01/11–2344: Telegram
The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant) to the Secretary of State
[Received November 23—5:20 p.m.]
10326. For the President and the Secretary from Harriman. I lunched with Mikolajczyk and Romer today. Mikolajczyk told me that since receipt of your letter, he had had discussions with his associates in his Government. He is now convinced that he can not get any support for his program for reconciliation with the Soviets and the Lublin Poles.
He has obtained from the Peasant Party leaders within Poland complete support and authority to act but the leaders of the other [Page 1336] three parties in his Government are all definitely opposed to settlement at the present time. Under the circumstances he cannot now in fairness ask you to intervene with Stalin in an attempt to obtain a more favorable settlement of the boundary to include the Lwow area, since, even if Stalin would agree to inclusion of Lwow within Poland, he could not obtain the consent of his associates to any boundary settlement now. Therefore, unless you instruct me otherwise, I will not discuss the question of Lwow at this time with Stalin.
Mikolajczyk is very grateful to you for your letter and for your sympathetic consideration of the Polish problems. He will so communicate to you direct. He asked me to express to you his apologies for having asked you to intervene at a time when it develops he cannot obtain the support of his associates in attempting to reach a realistic settlement with the Russians.
Mikolajczyk said his associates were convinced what [that] the Soviet policy was to communize Poland, and that they intended to wait until Poland was liberated, to retain within Poland a resistance to Russian domination, and to hope that at some future time the influence of Great Britain and the United States might be brought to bear on Russia to induce her to give the Polish people a free right of choice of their Government. Mikolajczyk personally does not agree with this policy and deeply regrets that he cannot get his associates to join him in making an earnest attempt now to find a solution.
Under these circumstances, it is Mikolajczyk’s intention, after a further talk with Churchill and Eden, to resign. He feels that if he remains Prime Minister, he will be involved in recriminations and counterrecriminations with the Russians, that no good will come from it and that his usefulness in the future to his people will be destroyed.
I am waiting over one more day to see Churchill and Eden and will report to you their reaction to these developments.
Mikolajczyk told me further that the Communist influence in the Lublin Committee was increasing[;] that several of the more independent individuals had been forced out or had resigned; and that he is fearful terrorism and counterterrorism will result. He is very pessimistic over the developments in London and Lublin and feels that his best course is to withdraw, keeping himself available to be of use if the moment arises in the future. He does not believe that the Lublin Committee, even with full Soviet support, can control Polish sentiment and that some day some compromise may be found which will give a chance for expression of Polish nationalism. [Harriman.]