The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to President Roosevelt 91
Stalin and Churchill92 met with Mikolajczyk and his associates yesterday afternoon. Molotov and Eden were present. I was invited as an observer and took no part in the discussion. Mikolajczyk was first given the opportunity to outline his position. He presented the memorandum of his proposals of August 30 handed to the Soviet Ambassador in London. With some difficulty Churchill forced Mikolajczyk to allow Grabski to outline the oral statement he had made at that time to the Soviet Ambassador. I understand you have copies of the memorandum and oral statement93 referred to. Stalin stated that there were two great defects in the memorandum which would prevent an understanding on that basis. First it unrealistically ignored the existence of the Polish Committee of National Liberation. Second it failed to accept the Curzon Line as the Soviet-Polish boundary. He said that there were good points in the memorandum especially the emphasis on friendly relations with the Soviet Union in the future. Churchill supported unequivocally Stalin’s position in regard to the Curzon Line as the basis for settlement. Mikolajczyk denied that he intended to ignore the Committee but indicated that in his memorandum it was intended that the settlement should go deeper than one between the members of the Committee and of the Government in London and that the new government should be based on the five democratic parties in Poland. He explained at great length why he could not accept the Curzon Line. The cession of territory must be decided by the Polish people. Churchill told Mikolajczyk that he must accept the Curzop Line as the de facto line of demarcation. He suggested a formula on this basis which would allow the Poles to present their case for adjustment and final settlement at the peace table. He warned Mikolajczyk however that he and the British Government were committed to support the Curzon Line as the [Page 1323] basis for settlement and bluntly told him that this was no time for the Poles in London and the British Government to separate.
Both Churchill and Stalin committed themselves to support the claims of Poland in the west including East Prussia and west of Konigsberg and the line of the Oder including Stettin. Molotov interjected that the Curzon Line had the support of the three major Allies since at Teheran you had indicated that you considered that the Curzon Line was right although you did not consider it advisable to make your position public. He added that he recalled no objection on your part to the Polish claims in the west as outlined. Molotov did not refer to me for confirmation and I decided it would only make matters worse if I being present as an observer had attempted to correct his statement. I talked to Churchill about Molotov’s statement afterwards at dinner. He recalls as clearly as I do that although you showed interest in hearing the views of Stalin and Churchill in the boundary question you had expressed no opinion on it one way or the other at Teheran.94 I intend to tell Molotov privately at the next opportunity that I am sure you will wish that your name not [be] brought into the discussions again in regard to the boundary question.
In reply to these statements Mikolajczyk said that he was not authorized to accept the Curzon Line and that he understood that the members of the Committee even still hoped for Lwow. Stalin said that a major adjustment of this kind could not be possible if the economic systems of the Soviet Union and Poland were different. It would cause great hardship to socialize these areas and then go back to another system. He said that the Curzon Line must be the basis for settlement. He agreed that there could be minor adjustments up to say 7 or 8 kilometers when the boundary was finally fixed.
The meeting broke up with the understanding that Mikolajczyk would consider the situation and have a talk with Eden. Churchill made it very plain that his Government would consider it had fulfilled its obligations to Poland by providing a home for the Poles within the territory that was now proposed and that a strong free independent Poland was the objective not only of the British Government but also the Soviet Government. Stalin unequivocally endorsed this declaration.
- Copy of telegram obtained from the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. A notation on the telegram states that a paraphrased copy was sent to the Secretary of State for information.↩
- Prime Minister Churchill was already in Moscow holding conversations with Premier Stalin; for correspondence concerning these meetings October 9–18, 1944, see vol. iv , section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled “Reports on developments of significance …” See also Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, p. 202, footnote 2.↩
- A notation on the original reads as follows: “Not in Map Room nor Miss Turner’s files.” Copies are in the Moscow Embassy Files, now in the Department.↩
- Prime Minister Mikolajczyk expressed his anxiety over Molotov’s characterization of President Roosevelt’s position toward the Curzon Line at the Tehran Conference in a letter of October 16, 1944, to Ambassador Harriman in Moscow. During a conversation on the same day with the Polish Foreign Minister (Romer), Ambassador Harriman corrected the misstatement of the President’s position. For a memorandum of the conversation and text of Mikolajczyk’s letter of October 16, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, pp. 204–205.↩