033.60C11/80a: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman)
1512. For your private and confidential information there is given below a summary of the talks that Premier Mikolajczyk had while in Washington for 9 days.
During his stay Mikolajczyk had four talks with the President and several lengthy discussions with the Acting Secretary, other officials of the Department, and called on the Secretary after the latter’s return from his holiday. Mikolajczyk made a very favorable impression on all who talked with him as being very reasonable, understanding and quite objective in his approach to the many problems facing his country.
He brought no concrete plan for the solution of the Polish-Soviet question and no detailed plans were discussed with him. No binding commitments made.
The following are the principal specific points that he raised:
1. He reiterated his firm desire to establish friendly relations with the Soviet Union on a mutually satisfactory and permanent basis. He felt, however, that this could not be attained if the settlement should leave the people of Poland with a sense of injustice.
The Prime Minister stated that he had the feeling, without being in a position to give positive proofs thereof, that the possibilities of reestablishing relations with the Soviet Government were more propitious today than heretofore. He indicated that his feeling was based upon the fact that the Soviet Government, having tried by various methods to build up, without success, strong pro-Soviet support inside Poland, was more disposed to consider the resumption of relations with the Polish Government-in-Exile as the first step. Mikolajczyk added that while he had this feeling, he did not know what conditions the Soviet Government might make in order to reestablish relations.
In this connection, he gave details of an informal Soviet-Polish contact made in London just before his departure. According to the Prime Minister, the informal Soviet representative, who apparently was not acting on specific instructions from Moscow, broached the question of reestablishment of relations but made the unacceptable conditions that the Polish Government-in-Exile be reorganized by removing the President, Commander-in-Chief, and the Ministers of War and Information.
The Prime Minister insisted that any settlement would have to be based upon as concrete assurances as possible that there would be no [Page 1286] interference in the internal affairs of Poland. He insisted that the so-called National Council of Poland, whose representatives are now in Moscow, has at the most a very small following in the country, and he felt that it represented a new and again unsuccessful effort on the part of the Soviets to build up a rival government organization in Poland.
In regard to the question of the President-designate, the Prime Minister stated in confidence that the Deputy Prime Minister and head of the Polish Underground Government in the country had been asked if he would be willing to take Sosnkowski’s place. If he accepts, he will be brought to London and his appointment will then be announced. If he should not accept, the Polish Underground has been asked to name another prominent person in the country who could be brought to London to fill this post.
2. On the territorial questions, he stated that he felt that no final settlements should be made until after the termination of hostilities. He admitted that in such final settlement territorial adjustments in the East might be made. He again brought up the question of establishing at this time a temporary demarcation line in eastern Poland which would run east of Vilna and Lwow with the territory west of this line to be under the administration of the Polish Government-in-Exile and the territory in the east to be under Soviet administration.
He stated that he felt that, for the future peace of Europe, and not as compensation for lost territory in the East, Poland should acquire East Prussia and Silesia. His basic reasons for desiring East Prussia were to eliminate the question of the Polish Corridor as well as the German springboard on the flank of Poland, and in regard to Silesia, to deprive Germany of an industrial area which she might use as an armament center for any future war. His government has no desire to acquire any other German territories.
3. The Prime Minister expressed a strong desire to reach an agreement for permanent collaboration during the war between the Polish Underground and the Red Army in order that the full weight of the combined forces could be brought to bear against the Germans, and thus assist the Russians as well as be of an indirect assistance to the Anglo-American forces in the West. He described in some detail his version of the successful contact made between these Polish and Soviet forces in eastern Poland and explained that, although these contacts had been broken off by a German counter-attack, he hoped that they could be renewed, not on a local basis, but on the basis of coordinated activities by the central military leaders of both groups. Despite the breaking off of direct contact with the Red Army, Mikolajczyk stated that the Polish Underground was nevertheless collaborating with Soviet Partisan paratroopers in the Lwow area.
[Page 1287]In order to bring the full weight of the Polish Underground to bear against the Nazis, the Premier made a strong plea for American financial and material assistance to them.
The Prime Minister brought with him the second in command of the Polish Underground Army who left Poland about 6 weeks ago. This officer, who is in charge of strategic planning for the Underground Army, discussed with the President and, at the latter’s suggestion, with high ranking military officers all aspects of the activities of the Polish Underground Army and its plans. He apparently gave a convincing picture of the potentialities of this force.
4. The Prime Minister asserted that he favored a general European economic federation in order to raise the standard of living of the people of all countries. He felt that the creation of such a federation is necessary in order that the occupied countries of Europe can start their reconstruction on at least an equal basis with Germany. He indicated that his government was willing to relinquish certain sovereign rights in order to attain the benefits of such a federation and he was particularly insistent that he did not wish in any way to create a cordon sanitaire against the Soviet Union.
He expressed the hope that conversations might be opened as soon as possible with appropriate United States officials in order to draw up plans for the economic reconstruction of Poland.
5. Mikolajczyk discussed at some length the question of sending relief supplies to Polish liberated areas. He was told that in principle we were prepared to make available such supplies during the military period provided arrangements could be made with the Soviet Government for their transit to Poland. It was pointed out that we had been giving consideration to this for some time and we were now discussing the question with the British before taking it up formally with the Soviet authorities. It was also made clear that we hoped that arrangements could be made to have UNRRA31 take over this work as soon as possible. In regard to the distribution of relief during the military period it was made clear that these activities would, in all probability, be handled by the Red Army. While the Prime Minister agreed to this, he suggested that if a satisfactory arrangement for collaboration between the Red Army and the Underground should be worked out, arrangements might be made for the distribution of these supplies by the Underground authorities. Mikolajczyk expressed concern regarding the possible political implications involved in the distribution of relief, and hoped that some satisfactory arrangement could be made which would prevent the Soviet Government from building up its own political machine, such as the so-called National Council of Poland, by using relief supplies for this purpose.
[Page 1288]He was informed that if arrangements could be made to send American supplies to liberated areas, we would make every effort to insure that the people receiving these supplies were informed fully as to their origin.
6. Mikolajczyk also indicated that his Government felt that they, at the present time, are somewhat isolated and that matters which they consider to be of direct concern to Poland were being discussed by “the big three” without Polish participation. He therefore expressed the hope that arrangements could be made for consultation with his Government when matters affecting his country were under consideration.
The President apparently found Mikolajczyk’s approach to the many problems discussed to be objective and indicated to him that he could count upon the moral support of the United States Government in any efforts that the Premier might make to reach a mutually satisfactory understanding with the Soviet authorities. The President explained that he had outlined to Stalin at Tehran the reasons why he could not at this time enter into any detailed discussion on the Polish question. The President apparently intimated to Mikolajczyk that he might be able to be of further assistance later on. Mikolajczyk stated that he understood the President’s position and did not wish to do anything which would be embarrassing to him. The President expressed the hope that Mikolajczyk might be able, as a minimum achievement, to work out a satisfactory arrangement which would bring about full cooperation between the Polish Underground and the Red Army and indicated in this connection that he would be willing to give consideration to furnishing supplies and funds to the Underground Army so that it might effectively carry on the fight against the Germans.
The President, in referring to the plans of the other exiled governments to return to their countries as soon as possible, suggested that it would be advisable for Premier Mikolajczyk to make similar plans but that, in order to assure success of such plans, he felt it was important for Mikolajczyk to bring about the reconstruction of his Government by eliminating the four persons who the Soviet Government felt are not friendly to it. Mikolajczyk indicated that he could not agree with this, stating that it would be misunderstood, particularly since one of them is the President of the Republic. He added that the Polish Government had declared on several occasions that it was their firm intention to hold elections as soon as possible after liberation in order that the people in the country could choose their own government. The President suggested that he publicly reiterate this plan.
[Page 1289]The President expressed the conviction that Stalin did not wish to “Sovietize” Poland and urged Mikolajczyk to have faith in the good intentions of Stalin. In this connection the President suggested that it might be advisable if Mikolajczyk himself should go to Moscow to discuss various problems with Stalin. The President added that, although he did not feel that he could make this direct suggestion, he might be willing to intimate to Stalin that Mikolajczyk was inclined to carry through such a plan. Mikolajczyk, while not committing himself definitely on this point, indicated that he felt that it might be advisable for him to see Stalin provided no prior conditions were laid down for the meeting.
The President indicated he felt that if other matters could be worked out, Stalin would be reasonable in regard to the territorial question. He urged Mikolajczyk to make very effort possible now to reach a mutually satisfactory solution with the Soviets.
The Secretary, in his discussion with Mikolajczyk, urged that an effort be made to establish contact between Polish and Soviet representatives in order to reach a satisfactory friendly solution.
In conformity with his desire to find a solution to the Polish-Soviet difficulties, Mikolajczyk had a long talk with Professor Lange. It is understood that Mikolajczyk found his talk with Lange to be very interesting, particularly in regard to the purely Polish sentiments expressed by the members of Berling’s Army. The Premier is reported to have been non-committal in his talk with Lange.
The press reaction to his visit has been quite favorable.
Repeated to London.32