760C.61/2339: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary of State
[Received June 10—3 a.m.]
2064. Personal for the President and the Secretary. In London on May 271 had a 2–hour talk with Beneš alone at luncheon.
Part 1. He described the developments in the Polish Government over their relations with the Soviet Union in the period since I had seen him in Moscow.
[Page 1279]He explained that on his return to London he had reported his conversations with Stalin to Mikolajczyk. He believed Mikolajczyk was impressed and had wanted at that time to work out a settlement. Mikolajczyk was unable however to carry his associates with him and events developed as is known.
He said that recently reports from within Poland have come to the Polish Government that the majority of the Polish people are severely critical of the Government in London for their Soviet policy. On the other hand there appears an unwillingness of the Polish people to give up Lwow and to a lesser extent Vilna. The result of these reports Beneš believes has been to crystallize the division between the two groups within the Government in London. Mikolajczyk and those who follow his view feel that the settlement with the Soviet Union must be made promptly or the Government will lose all standing with the Polish people whereas the opposition has become more firm in opposition to a settlement of the boundary question as proposed. Beneš believes that at some stage there will be a definite break between the two groups.18
Part 2. Beneš explained in great detail his satisfaction with relationship that he had developed for Czechoslovakia with the Soviet Union.19 He outlined also the agreement he had reached with the Czech Communist Party for their joining a national front government when Czechoslovakia was liberated. He does not intend to change his government until he returns to Prague at which time an election will be held.
It is agreed with the leaders of the five parties including the Communists that a national front government will then be organized accepting Benes’ leadership. The policies will include (1) greater authority to the provincial governments; (2) recognition of the principle of private ownership as well as state ownership and cooperative ownership of productive property. The state will own the munitions industries including the Skoda works. Other properties seized by the Germans will be returned gradually to their owners, consumer goods industries will be under private ownership. Large landed [Page 1280] estates will be broken up and sold to peasants. Private ownership of farms will be recognized and no pressure will be exerted to collectivize; (3) the national front government to last for the first election period of 6 years; (4) the government will take responsibility for employment and other social reforms.
Beneš seems confident that this program will get support of the Czechoslovakian people and that he can hold together the national front government for the first phase of the reconstruction period. He is completely satisfied that the Soviet Union is sincere and will be loyal to the undertakings reached.20 He believes the Communist Party in his country will become more and more nationalist in its policies as time goes on.
- In a letter of April 28, 1944, to the Assistant Secretary of State, Adolf A. Berle, Jr., the Director of the Foreign Nationalities Branch of the Office of Strategic Services, DeWitt C. Poole, wrote that he had learned that Jan Masaryk, the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Czechoslovakia, had expressed “complete despair” of the Poles who formed the government in London. “He had never seen a group of politicians, he said, who could by their every act commit suicide with such professional thoroughness.” (740.00119–European War 1939/2659)↩
- Eduard Beneš had succeeded in signing a treaty of Friendship, Mutual Assistance, and Postwar Cooperation on December 12, 1943, in conversations with Stalin in Moscow. In regard to the negotiation of this treaty, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iii, pp. 670–734, passim. For text of the treaty, see Department of State, Documents and State Papers, vol. i, no. 4 (July 1948), p. 228, or British and Foreign State Papers, vol. cxlv, p. 238.↩
- In a letter of April 28, 1944 (cited in footnote 18, p. 1279), DeWitt C. Poole wrote that he had been informed that Jan Masaryk would “jump at it” if he knew of “a practical alternative to Beneš’ Russian policy”. Masaryk disclaimed any “difference between his policy and that of Beneš”, and explained that “Benes and I simply work by different methods”. (740.00119 European War 1939/2659)↩