Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

760C.61/2215: Telegram

The Ambassador in the United Kingdom ( Winant ) to the Secretary of State

London , February 11, 1944—11 a.m.
[Received 10:05 p.m.]

1177. For the President. Your 952 of February 8, and my 1100 of February 9.⁷⁴ I have just received the following message for the President from the Prime Minister:

“I send you herewith the agreed record of our conversation with the Poles last Sunday. I will shortly send you a report on our further talks with them.”

The record of the conversation mentioned by the Prime Minister in his message is as follows.

Record of a Meeting Held at Chequers ⁷⁵ on Sunday, 6th February 1944 at 3 p.m.

Present:	The Right Honorable Winston S. Churchill, C. H., M. P., Prime Minister, in the chair.
	M. Micolajczyk, Polish Prime Minister.
	The Right Honorable Anthony Eden M.C., M.P., Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
	M. Romer, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs.
	The Lord Cherwell, F.R.S., Paymaster General.
	Count Raczynski, Polish Ambassador to Great Britain.
	Sir Owen O’Malley, British Ambassador to the Polish Government.
	Secretariat: Mr. J. R. Colville.

The Prime Minister read the text of his telegram to Marshal Stalin of the 28 January (No. 227 to Moscow), in which he had said that the Polish Ministers were far from rejecting the proposals put forward, but that after considering them, they had asked a number of questions which he had agreed to pass on to Marshal Stalin.

Mr. Churchill then referred to the American attitude, which he summarized as follows: There could be no legal bond, as far as the U.S. was concerned. This certainly did not mean that American aid would be withheld, and he asked the Poles to work on the basis that the U. S., Britain and the U.S.S.R. would cooperate for many years to come in the task of maintaining world order and unity.

Mr. Eden read out extracts from Sir A. Clark Kerr’s⁷⁶ telegrams numbers 281 and 282 of the 3rd February, in which the Ambassador described his discussion with Marshal Stalin of the Prime Minister’s message of the 28 January. He pointed out that Stalin had, without hesitation, answered the five questions put by the Polish Government and contained in the Prime Minister’s message. Marshal Stalin had said:

(a) That, after the war, Poland would certainly be free and independent, as much so as Czechoslovakia, and he would not try to influence either country’s choice of government.

(b) That, if Poland required a guarantee from Russia, one would be given.

(c) That Poland could count upon all Russian help in expelling the Germans.

(d) That all Poles would be free to move out of the former Polish territory assigned to Russia, and the same facilities should apply to Ukrainians at present west of the Curzon line.

(e) The Polish Government would be allowed to return to Poland and establish a broad based government, which could function administratively in the liberated areas.

The Prime Minister said that, as regards the underground movement, Stalin maintained that the Polish Government has directed it to refuse cooperation with the Russians. If the movement opposed the Russian troops and partisans, it would be attacked; if it did not, it would receive assistance. The matter would all depend on the attitude of the Polish Government.

M. Micolajczyk said he wanted to clarify the Polish Government’s position. He had shown to the British Government the instructions which had originally been sent to the Polish underground movement to the effect that, if relations with Russia were re-established, the movement should come into the open in support of the Soviet troops but that otherwise its members were to remain inactive. Orders to oppose the Russian troops had never been given.

You will now allow me, said M. Micolajczyk, to place before you our information. Our former instructions to the Polish underground movement were to the effect that in case Polish-Soviet relations had not been renewed, at the moment of the entry of Soviet troops into Poland our underground forces should not come into the open.

In the meantime, we acquired the conviction that the reestablishment of mutual relations was most unlikely, and in this situation the Polish Government addressed an enquiry to the country as to the readiness of the underground movement to disclose its identity even in the absence of Polish-Soviet relations and without regard to the dangers which such a step involved.

The answer received (dated the 28th November, 1943) was that the underground army was ready to come into the open and to meet the requirements of the Soviet commanders.

Mr. Eden attached great importance to this information and asked whether it could be conveyed to the Soviet Government.

M. Micolajczyk expressed his agreement with this. He further explained that the local Polish Military Commander, accompanied by the local civilian (underground) authority, would receive orders to meet the commander of the incoming Soviet troops and to declare that following the instructions of the Polish Government, to which they remained faithful, they were ready to join in the fight against the common foe.

The Prime Minister: This is very important. I agree with this line of action.

M. Micolajczyk: There is only one essential reservation. Our underground forces are determined to preserve their own organisation and they are not prepared to join Polish formations created in Russia under the auspices of the so-called Polish Patriots and placed under Berling’s command. On the other hand, in order to secure friendly cooperation, Polish detachments, which had in the past had any friction with local Soviet “partisans” have been ordered to move to other districts and change places with other Polish forces free from such disability.

The country is anxiously expecting to receive an ample supply of arms indispensable in view of a general rising behind the lines of the retreating German armies.

M. Micolajczyk handed to the Prime Minister a copy of the telegram received from Warsaw on the 22 January in reply to M. Micolajczyk’s speech to the country of the 6th January. He pointed out that the country’s willingness to join with the Soviet forces in their fight against Germany was clearly shown in this telegram. But as regards the political aspect it equally clearly showed the country’s determination to maintain Poland’s territorial integrity. The reply was drafted before the country was informed of the last conversation between the Prime Minister and M. Micolajczyk on the 20 January. The Polish Government withheld its publication in order to avoid difficulties, but the British Government must see in it an indication of the country’s opinion.

The Prime Minister: In that case the situation is hopeless. No agreement could be reached on such a basis and the Soviets having occupied the whole of your country will impose their will.

M. Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a copy of a telegram from Poland received in London on the 27th January 1944 announcing the setting up in Warsaw by the “Polish Workers Party” (Communist) of a “National Council”⁷⁷ in opposition to the Polish underground movement. He considered this move as clearly indicating the real intentions of the Soviet Government with regard to Poland.

The Prime Minister: Yes, this danger exists and will only increase if no agreement between Poland and Soviet Russia is reached.

M. Micolajczyk: I am only placing before you the information I possess: For the time being, i.e., before the “Curzon Line” is crossed by Soviet troops, the Soviets have in view the setting up of a “Committee of National Liberation,” composed of Polish pro-Soviet elements in the U.S.S.R., the U.S. and, if possible, also the United Kingdom.

Later, after the Curzon Line is crossed the plan foresees the creation of a “Polish Government” by the “National Council” recently formed in Poland under Moscow’s auspices. This information throws a revealing light on the cryptic sentence of Molotov addressed to Ambassador Harriman that the situation had not yet matured for the resumption of Soviet-Polish relations.

Mr. Eden said that this talk about a committee would automatically cease if agreement were reached on the lines of Stalin’s latest telegram.

The Prime Minister said that if matters were allowed to drift, such a committee would undoubtedly be established and the Polish Government would have no say in the matter.

M. Micolajczyk: The latest changes introduced in the constitution of the U.S.S.R. finally complete the picture.⁷⁸

M. Micolajczyk recalled the reply given by Mr. Eden on the 1st February to a letter which was addressed to him on the 23rd of January by Ambassador Raczynski on instruction of the Polish Government, and also the memorandum of the 1st February⁷⁹ handed to Ambassador Ciechanowski in Washington in reply to the question[s] put by him to the American Government and pointed out that the Polish Government was not offered guarantees which would protect Poland against imminent dangers and safeguard her independence and sovereignty as well as as the life and property of her inhabitants.

He had already stated that he was willing to enter into discussion on all outstanding questions including frontiers. This in itself had caused serious concern in Polish circles. The acceptance of the “Curzon Line” as a starting point of any discussion would, in fact, constitute dictated terms and would preclude any real negotiation. Such a course could only undermine the Polish Government’s authority with the Polish nation and also disrupt the latter’s unique solidarity.

The Prime Minister said the Curzon Line was the best that the Poles could expect and all that he would ask the British people to demand on their behalf.

M. Micolajczyk: The Soviet Government invokes the “Curzon Line of 1919”. This is confusing. The “line” of 1919 did not extend to former Austrian Galicia.

M. Micolajczyk handed over to the Prime Minister a memorandum on the Curzon Line, together with a map illustrating this subject.

The Prime Minister said the Russians must have Lwow. Przemysl and Bialystok would be left inside Poland.

M. Micolajczyk repeated that the Curzon Line did not apply to Galicia. If he were honestly convinced that the Russians were acting in good faith, he would give the matter more serious consideration. But he was not. If the Russians meant to honour their word, it would be simple for them to bring the Polish Government into negotiations, since they had all the trump cards. He suspected that they were purposely trying to make the Polish Government refuse their terms in advance.

The Prime Minister replied that, had not the Russians won great victories, Poland would have no future at all. If necessary, he was prepared to tell the Russians and the British people what conditions His Majesty’s Government would endorse at the peace. He would do his utmost for Poland, but, if he could not reach agreement with the Polish Government, he would have to make his own position clear to the Russians and to come to an understanding with them. For this he would take full responsibility before Parliament and the world.

There were three courses open:—

(1) To make an agreement in which all parties joined.

(2) To make an Anglo-Russian agreement, in which he would endeavour to settle the frontier problem and to procure humane treatment for the Poles.

(3) To do nothing, while the Russian steam roller moved over Poland, a Communist Government was set up in Warsaw and the present Polish Government was left powerless to do anything but make its protests to the world at large.

Mr. Eden pointed out that the second course would be of small value to the Polish Government, as it would preclude their return to Warsaw.

M. Micolajczyk said he must state his case. He was not at all anxious to be left out of the agreement. He had already gone so far as to accept negotiations on all questions, including changes of frontier during the war, and had issued orders to the underground movement to enter into friendly contact with the Russians even though no agreement should be reached. He could not announce that he would accept the Curzon Line and give away Wilno and Lwow.

The Prime Minister said that, in that case, he must look at the matter from the British point of view and make his own agreement with Stalin. He thought that the Polish Government had no grounds for complaint, and he would say so in Parliament. He must frankly say that, while the Polish troops over here, and particularly the air force, had made themselves both loved and respected, the people of Poland had lost their independence more than 150 years ago, and even after its recovery during their short period of freedom had not always had a record of which they could be proud. Now they had a fine opportunity if they were prepared to take it. If they were not, he would certainly make the agreement without them.

Mr. Eden asked whether the Polish Government could not state publicly—

(1) That they would consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga as admitting of alteration.

(2) That they wished to be a homogeneous state.

(3) That they would be prepared to negotiate on the basis of the Curzon Line.

M. Micolajczyk replied that, while it might look as if only the frontier line were in question, he was convinced that his Government were in reality defending the independence of Poland itself.

The Prime Minister said that the Polish Government had no power to defend it. It was arguable whether they had a moral right, since after the last war Poland had occupied Vilna by an act of war against the wishes of the Allied Governments.⁸⁰ On the other hand, the Russians, in view of the blood they had shed, had a moral right to the security of their western frontiers.

M. Micolajczyk: The existence of Lithuanian claims to the Polish city and territory of Wilno is no justification for Russian claims to the city.

Mr. Eden said that, if the Polish Government went back to Warsaw, they would do so under joint Anglo-Russian auspices. The Russian guarantee would be underwritten by His Majesty’s Government. How could this be called sacrificing the independence of Poland?

M. Micolajczyk restated the impossibility of accepting the Curzon Line. Perhaps a solution might be found on the basis of a demarcation line within which the Polish administration would be set up immediately after the liberation of the territory from German occupation. The fixing of the Polish-Soviet frontier would be left over to be decided after the conclusion of hostilities.

The Prime Minister then informed the Polish Government that Marshal Stalin demanded Konigsberg and the part of East Prussia lying to the east of it.

M. Micolajczyk said this showed that the Russian scale of demands was increasing and would increase. They started asking for the Curzon Line, then for a change in the Polish Government, and now for half of East Prussia.

The Prime Minister replied that Poland had taken many wrong turns in her history and that a refusal now might be the most fatal and disastrous of all.

If the Poles turned down this offer, he would certainly explain their views to the Soviet Government but he would also state the British view and would make the separate agreement of which he had spoken. If the Soviet Government should refuse to guarantee Poland her rights, her independence and adequate territory, he would certainly resist. But he would not exert the strength of Britain for Poland’s exact frontiers; he was struggling for the life of the Polish nation and for a home for the Polish people. These were the great objectives.

M. Mikolajczyk said that to adopt a demarcation line for the duration of the war might be a solution justified by circumstances. If this were impracticable and no agreement could be reached, he hoped that Mr. Churchill would do everything in his power to help ameliorate the position of those in Poland.

The Prime Minister read Marshal Stalin’s reply to his message of the 28th January. The following points arose:

(1) Marshal Stalin was incorrect in stating that the Polish Government continued to declare the Riga Treaty frontier unalterable. The Polish Government had agreed to discuss all problems, including that of frontiers.

(2) Mr. Churchill suggested the Polish Government should make a declaration that the Riga Treaty admitted of alteration, and that in principle they agreed the Curzon Line should form the basis of discussion subject to ethnographical modifications.

(3) Mr. Churchill emphasized the advantages which Poland would derive from possessing nearly 250 miles of Baltic seaboard and the town of Danzig. This was a fair healthy and wholesome offer. To refuse it would be a mistake comparable to the use in former times of the “liberum veto” in the Polish Parliament.⁸¹

(4) The demands for a reconstitution of the Polish Government were trifles compared with frontier question, and would fade away if the latter were settled. If M. Mikolajczyk made changes in his Government, they would not be dictated but would be decisions taken in consultation with Poland’s friends and allies.

(5) Poland was to be a strong free independent state. This was a line on which the Prime Minister could bind the Russians down. He could obtain a firm engagement for Poland similar to the Anglo-Russian 20 years treaty.⁸²

The Prime Minister asked the Polish Ministers to think carefully over what had been said. They had these alternatives: A fine land of security and peace, or the certainty either that an Anglo-Russian agreement would be made apart from the Polish Government, or that things would be left to drift into chaos.

M. Mikolajczyk said he understood Marshal Stalin’s conclusions to be that:

(1) The Polish Government must announce that they did not consider the frontier established by the Treaty of Riga to be unalterable.

(2) They must recognize the Curzon Line as Poland’s eastern frontier.

(3) Marshal Stalin did not recognize the present composition of the Polish Government.

He had done [as much as he could?] but he could not go so far as was proposed without abandoning Poland’s moral right and losing the support of his people.

The Prime Minister said that he intended, in consultation with Mr. Eden, to draw up a note stating the kind of proposition to be made to the Soviet Government. He asked the Polish Government to consider this note and, if they wished, to draw up alternative proposals for submission to His Majesty’s Government. If the Polish Government finally refused to join in this approach to Marshal Stalin he would, with Cabinet concurrence, take the necessary action himself.

M. Micolajczyk reminded the Prime Minister of the urgent need of supplying the Polish underground army with arms indispensable in view of the general rising against the Germans, the time of which was approaching.

The Prime Minister replied that the British Government had already decided to treble for the next 3 months the load to be carried to Poland by air in order to hasten the fulfilment of the agreed programme.

M. Micolajczyk expressed his thanks for this decision.

Winant

74. See footnote 67, p. 1245.
75. The country residence of British Prime Ministers.
76. Sir Archibald Clark Kerr, British Ambassador in the Soviet Union.
77. The National People’s Council (National Council of the Homeland, Krajowa Rada Narodowa) was organized in Warsaw during December 1943 and January 1944 “by Democratic partisan groups fighting the German invaders” as a temporary parliament inside the country, the Communist-sponsored rival to the Government-in-Exile at London. Boleslaw Bierut was elected Chairman.
78. By decrees of February 1, 1944, approved by the X Supreme Council of the Soviet Union, the constitution was amended to change the People’s Commissariats of Foreign Affairs and Defence from All-Union to Union-Republican commissariats. On the significance of these changes, see vol. iv , section under Union of Soviet Socialist Republics entitled “Reports on developments of significance …”
79. Not found in Department files. The answers were paraphrased to Ambassador Harriman in telegram 281, February 10, p. 1248.
80. For correspondence concerning the Vilna dispute after World War I, see Foreign Relations, 1920, vol. iii, pp. 401–402, 650, 652, and 653; ibid., 1922, vol. ii, pp. 871–873.
81. The Liberum veto was a parliamentary practice in 17th and 18th century Poland by which unanimity of votes for or against a question was required for decisions of the Polish diet.
82. The Treaty of Alliance in the War against Hitlerite Germany and Her Associates in Europe, and Collaboration and Mutual Assistance Thereafter, between Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Soviet Union was signed at London on May 26, 1942. For text, see League of Nations Treaty Series, vol. cciv, p. 353; for draft of treaty and subsequent changes, see telegrams 2897, May 24, 1942, and 2922, May 26, 1942, from London, Foreign Relations, 1942, vol. iii, pp. 558 and 564, respectively. For correspondence regarding the conversations leading to the conclusion of this treaty, see ibid., pp. 490–566, passim.