Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

760C.61/2187: Telegram

The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State

Moscow , January 21, 1944—7 p.m.
[Received January 22—4:11 p.m.]

213. In thinking over the developments of the past 10 days on the Polish situation, the following points stand out:

1. There is no doubt the Soviets have a fundamental distrust of the Polish Government in London because of their knowledge of the hostile attitude toward the Soviet Union of almost all of its members which has, during the months, been freely and openly expressed in London. They are convinced that no lasting relationship can be established with this group.

2. The Soviets are fearful that representatives of the landowning class and the military officers are so bitter against the Soviet Union that they are capable eventually, after this war, of conspiring with the Germans against Russia.

3. The Soviets have such contempt for the Polish Government in London that they do not believe they have been able to organize an underground movement of any substance. Whatever strength it has, they fear, will be used to establish the Polish Government in power rather than to fight Germans.

4. I believe the Soviets are sincere in their willingness to have a strong and independent Poland emerge providing, of course, that it is well disposed toward the Soviet Union. They seem to feel that the vast majority of the Polish population, particularly the peasants and workers, are so disposed and, if given a chance to express their political views, would elect a democratic government friendly to the Soviet Union. There is no indication as yet that they wish to foster a Bolshevik form of Government in Poland, and some indication to the contrary.

5. The Soviets believe they have made a substantial concession in offering the Curzon line as a basis for negotiation of the settlement of the Eastern boundary with support of compensation in the west.

6. It seems clear that from the standpoint of our own national interest, we should make every effort to avoid the Polish question becoming a definite issue between the Soviet Government and ourselves. On the other hand, it seems also clear that unless the Soviets deal honorably and fairly with the Polish people, the chance to work out over-all world security plans in which the Soviet Union would play such an important role would suffer a serious setback.

7. As a general observation the Soviets have been so successful in making the Russian people believe that anything coming from the Kremlin is the truth, they appear unable to understand why the world will not accept their word with similar credulity. They give evidence frequently that they consider it an insult to the Soviet Union if anyone doubts the accuracy of their pronouncements and they do not appear to understand why it is necessary for them to give any evidence as to the validity of their statements. This is a basic difficulty that we are going to face for some time at best.

8. I believe we should make continuous attempts to get the Soviets to talk over mutual problems currently in the atmosphere that was temporarily created at the Moscow Conference and at Tehran.

9. It would be helpful if I can be informed of the Department’s views on developments in order that I may take advantage of such opportunities as present themselves to advance our viewpoint to Molotov. It is unfortunate that your promptly dispatched cable number 88 of January 15 was so long delayed in transmission that I did not receive it until after the Soviet Government had made its last statement, as I could have at least registered our strong objection to their action prior to its being taken.

10. Against the background of the foregoing, I offer in my immediately succeeding telegram some suggestions.⁴⁸

Harriman

48. In his telegram 214, January 21, 8 p.m., Ambassador Harriman suggested that the Soviet Government would recognize a reconstituted government in London under Mikolajczyk which accepted the Curzon Line; that, failing such development, the Soviet Government would support a new committee government in Poland; and that U.S. policy should aim toward effecting a reconstituted Polish government in London (760C.61/2188).