760C.61/2150: Telegram
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union ( Harriman ) to the Secretary of State
[Received January 12—2:17 p.m.]
91. For the President and the Secretary. Supplementing my 76, January 11, 2 a.m., last night when Molotov handed me the Soviet statement on Poland he showed he was most anxious and hopeful that you would react favorably to it. I feel the door is wide open for me to go to him informally with any comments or reactions you may have. Within certain but important limits I believe he is anxious to conform Soviet foreign policy to accord with your ideas, even more so than with those of the British. For example, as I have explained before I have the impression he acceded to the British request to endorse the Greek Prime Minister’s20 appeal for unity among the partisan groups in Greece21 not so much because of Eden’s personal request as because of the Secretary’s position in the matter.
From, the evidence we have including Beneš’ recent talks with Stalin22 the Soviet Government indicates a desire to deal with the Polish Government in London provided it is reconstituted by eliminating the extreme irreconcilable anti-Soviet elements and provided it would tacitly recognize or at least not make an issue at the present time of the position the Soviets have taken on the boundary question as outlined in today’s public statement.
The first move of course would have to come from the Poles with a convincing and genuine desire to reestablish permanent relations.
The Soviet Government would undoubtedly be ready to give them all the assurances given to Beneš and I believe some additional such as an agreement to allow Polish racial minorities in territory now claimed by the Soviets to move to Poland.
[Page 1224]I recognize that we should not become directly involved in attempting to negotiate this question between the two Governments. On the other hand I cannot help but be impressed by the chaotic conditions adversely affecting our vital war interests that will probably result as Soviet troops penetrate Polish territory unless relations are reestablished promptly between the Governments.
It would seem that the Poles can make a better deal now than if they wait living as they appear to be in the hope that we and the British will eventually pull their chestnuts out of the fire.
If it is clear and I believe it is that we will not be able to aid the Poles substantially more than we already have in the boundary dispute are we not in fairness called upon to make plain the limitations of the help that we can give them and the fact that in their own interest the present moment is propitious for them to negotiate the reestablishment of relations with the Soviets?
If you wish me to do so I can readily have an informal talk with Molotov without commitment and I believe I can obtain from him information on any aspect that you consider might be useful.
- Emmanuel J. Tsouderos, who was also Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of Finance.↩
- For correspondence on this subject, see Foreign Relations, 1943, vol. iv, pp. 124 ff.↩
- Eduard Beneš was President of the Czechoslovak National Committee in London, 1939–45. See particularly telegrams 2264, December 18, 1943; 2284, December 20, 1943; and 2317, December 23, 1943, from Moscow, Ibid., 1943, vol. iii, pp 728, 731, and 734, respectively.↩