865.01/11–2844: Telegram
The Acting Secretary of State to the Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Winant)
10051. Following message has been sent to Rome as Department’s 501, November 28, 1 p.m.
Begin paraphrase. We suggest that if a solution has not yet been reached you express to Bonomi our concern over the prolonged crisis in the government, which will inevitably have a deplorable effect on public opinion here especially now when Congress is to consider resumption of full diplomatic relations with Italy. (Your nomination10 will probably go this week to the Senate.) This Government earnestly hopes any solution will preserve the representative character of the preceding Italian Government. Although considering the cabinet composition to be a purely Italian problem, we are naturally interested in the measure of friendliness and cooperation any new Government would show toward the United Nations and prosecution of the war in Italy. Any new Government, moreover, must necessarily confirm all Italian commitments toward the Allies since November 3, 1943.
Before instructing you to present letters accrediting you to the Italian Government, this Government would have to consider all these factors. End paraphrase.
Kirk reported on November 2811 that the Chief Commissioner of the AC had requested instructions of the AFHQ with respect to the following: Should he advise the Lieutenant General of the Realm and the new Prime Minister that the Supreme Allied Commander will [Page 1160] require, in connection with the formulation of the new government, (1) that for military reasons certain officials be reappointed, (2) that before the new cabinet is installed the names of ministers and Under Secretaries must be submitted to SACMED12 through the Allied Commission for the approval of the Allied Governments.
In his capacity as Political Adviser to SACMED, Kirk was instructed that if his advice was requested in formulating a reply to the Chief Commissioner’s inquiry, he should take the following position:
While it is understood that SACMED’s approval must be obtained for military reasons, the Department does not agree that the composition of the entire new government should be submited to SACMED for approval by the Allied governments before the new Italian government may be inaugurated. SACMED may approve or disapprove names to be included in the new government, solely on important military grounds. Once this approval has been given SACMED should not be required to make further reference to allied authorities or governments. It is expected, of course, that any new government must agree to abide by undertakings to the Allies of the previous Italian Government.
The British Embassy has been informed of the substance of the above messages.
A recent report from Kirk indicates that the British will maintain the position that in the event of a change in the presidency of the Council approval of the British Government must be obtained before the new cabinet can take office. We suggest that you bring the Department’s position on the Italian government crisis as outlined in the messages referred to above to the attention of the Foreign Office and express our earnest hope that the British Government will follow a similar course, leaving any objection to personalities in the new government to SACMED for purely military reasons.
You should also express our regret that the Foreign Office felt it necessary to intervene in an internal political crisis in Italy, particularly without prior consultation with us. Not only does it appear to have further complicated the crisis and to have made the task of our people on the Allied Commission relatively more difficult but it has occasioned widespread critical comment in press and radio in this country, where Sforza is generally held in high esteem. This is unfortunate to the extent that it touches Anglo-American solidarity in the public mind. In view of the Allied nature of military control in Italy, both governments bear equal responsibility in the policy toward that country, even though certain steps may be taken in the name of the British government only.
It is difficult for the Department to reconcile the emphasis which the British placed on the need of joint prior consultation in connection [Page 1161] with our recent efforts to eliminate Swedish exports to Germany,13 with the important unilateral British step of officially vetoing a candidate for the post of Italian Foreign Minister (Sforza) and suggesting the inclusion of an individual (Orlando) in any new Italian Government without any prior discussion whatsoever with the American side in an area of combined responsibility.