Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers, 1944, The British Commonwealth and Europe, Volume III

865.01/5–2544

The British Embassy to the Department of State

Aide-Mémoire

His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have been studying the situation resulting from Marshal Badoglio’s request for allied status for Italy and his forecast that the Italian Government may collapse if concessions are not made in this direction.

2. His Majesty’s Government point out that Marshal Badoglio’s argument that his Government could not last more than a few weeks without some gesture of definite support from the Allies is scarcely consistent with his having informed General MacFarlane as recently as the 6th May that he had revised his intention of resigning when the Allies reached Rome, in view of the fact that he had been successful in reforming the Italian Government on a broad basis and of indications from Rome that political opinion there welcomed the new government. His plea, indeed, appeared to His Majesty’s Government to contain a strong element of blackmail. Nevertheless if the Italian Government did fall, political confusion might result in embarrassment to military operations; the Italian people might become hostile, to the advantage of the neo-Fascists and Communists; and there might be disturbances among the Italian forces.

3. These considerations do not alter the opinion of His Majesty’s Government that it would be premature to give Italy allied status at this stage. Such a move would not be well received by British public opinion and would almost certainly be opposed by the French, Greeks and Yugoslavs who would bitterly resent Italy being placed on a footing similar to theirs. Immediate grant of allied status might make the situation of Italy at the peace settlement very embarrassing to the allies. Moreover, as General MacFarlane has pointed out, the whole basis of the relationship between the allies and the Italian Government cannot well be changed while military operations are in progress.

4. In order, however, not to adopt a completely negative attitude towards repeated Italian requests for an improvement in status, His Majesty’s Government would be prepared to consider abolishing the present armistice regime and concluding a preliminary peace treaty with the Italian Government as soon as it can be demonstrated that the military situation permits of it and that the Italian Government have sufficient authority to speak on behalf of the whole Italian people and without relinquishing their authority over that part of it at present under their administration.

5. His Majesty’s Government also feel that every possibility of improving the economic situation in Italy should at once be explored. They note that the matter has been very much in the mind of the Combined Civil Affairs Committee, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Allied Control Commission and that the inflationary situation is about to be examined by special United States and British experts; but they feel that consideration should also be given to the question of increasing supplies of consumer goods to the Italian people and to other long-term projects which would, if successful, indirectly strengthen the more moderate elements in Italy.

6. It might also be worthwhile to examine what concessions can be made in regard to the repatriation of Italian prisoners-of-war or improvement in their status.

7. There are of course a number of gestures which could be made such as to allow the Italian Government to enjoy the benefits of lend-lease and to participate in United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and in the work of the International Labour Organisation, but in the opinion of His Majesty’s Government to make such gestures piecemeal would only whet the appetite of the Italian Government and it would be preferable that they should accrue automatically to the Italian Government as a result of signature of the peace treaty.

8. If the United States Government agrees that it would be desirable to reach a settlement with the Italian Government along the lines suggested in paragraph 4, it is suggested that the next step would be to approach the Soviet Government and to inform them of the reasons for which His Majesty’s Government and the United States Government do not desire the immediate grant of allied status to Italy, particularly in view of the opposition with which this would meet from British and American public opinion as well as from the French, Greek and Yugoslav allies. It would then be suggested to the Soviet Government that it will clearly be difficult to perpetuate the anomalies of a situation in which Italy is at one and the same time a co-belligerent and a defeated enemy. There would therefore be considerable advantage in concluding a partial peace treaty as soon as conditions permit and, subject to the concurrence of the Soviet Government, His Majesty’s Government would propose that the Italian Government be notified in the sense of paragraph 4 above.

Washington , 25 May, 1944.