This memorandum, dated April 19, 1944, was prepared by the Political
Section of the Allied Control Commission for Italy.
[Enclosure]
Memorandum Prepared by the Allied Control
Commission
The events of the past month illustrate two things with
remarkable clarity; the strength of the Communist Party in
influencing politics in Allied-occupied Italy and the influence
of the Soviet Union in determining the policy of the Party.
One month ago the Communist Party were, with the Action Party,
the most intransigeant in their attitude
towards the King and Marshal Badoglio. They had been responsible
for the plan to hold a strike on the 4th March as a protest
against the Prime Minister’s speech of the 22nd February. They
had been the most prominent in organising and carrying out the
public meeting held in Naples on Sunday, March 12th. They were
the instigators and prime movers behind the proposal that the
Six Parties should organise a petition in support of the Bari
resolutions for the abdication of the King and the formation
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of a broad based
government. They had even let it be known privately that they
were prepared to pay the total cost of the petition. Up to this
point the Communist Party were driving all other Parties to more
decisive action to gain their ends and the other Parties only
once jibbed, when the three moderate Parties, that is, the
Liberals, Labour Democrats and Christian Democrats refused to
support the proposal for a strike.
On the 14th March the announcement was made of an exchange of
diplomatic representatives between the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics and the Badoglio Government. This was only two days
after the public meeting of the 12th March at which Tedeschi had
been the most prominent and the most violent orator. He
immediately volunteered a statement that the Russian move made
no difference to the Communist Party policy in Italy. In doing
so he was probably speaking “without the book”. In any case,
action is more eloquent than words and on the 16th March, to the
general surprise, the Communist Party at the Junta meeting that
day dropped all further support for the petition and by tacitly
withdrawing their offer to pay for it, killed the proposal stone
dead. This first indication of a change of policy was soon
followed by more definite evidence. On the 26th March the
titular head of the Communist Party in Italy, arrived in Naples
from long exile in Russia and a meeting of Communist
representatives from Allied-occupied Italy was arranged for the
1st April. The result of that meeting was a unanimous resolution
calling for a broad based government, and although it was given
to be understood that this process would be facilitated by the
withdrawal or abdication of the King, it was made clear that the
Communist Party did not wish to insist on either as a necessary
pre-condition. The main reason advanced was the paramount
necessity for a strong government in Italy for the purpose of
fighting the war effectively.
On the 12th April the King announced that he intended to withdraw
from public life when Rome was entered by Allied troops and to
appoint the Crown Prince Lieutenant-General of the Realm. At a
meeting of the Junta on the 15th April all Six Parties decided
to join the Government.
This decision marked the culmination of a progressive reduction
in the Parties’ demands. Before Christmas they had insisted on
the abdication both of the King and the Crown Prince in favour
of a regency for the Prince of Naples and on the understanding
that the Regent should not be chosen from the Royal House. At
Bari on January 28th nothing was said against the Crown Prince
but the King’s abdication was demanded. In the Junta memorandum
of February 16th this demand was again reiterated and the
proposal was made that the Crown Prince on accession should give
up much,
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if not all,
of the royal powers. In the upshot the Parties have neither
obtained the King’s abdication nor any derogation of royal
power. It is obvious to all Italy that it is the Communist Party
which has now induced them to revise so completely their
previous attitude.
Evidence of this is provided by the rapid increase now taking
place in the membership of the Communist Party in South Italy.
In recent weeks many professional men, officials and officers
have joined. The Communist Party executive claim that these new
adherents avow that only in the forthcoming attitude of Russia
can they see any future for Italy and, if in many cases the
effective reason for their joining the Party is “insurance”, the
fact remains that at the moment the Communists have a double
prestige. They assert that they can show a way for Italy out of
her external and even her internal difficulties. Finally, funds
are not lacking. Some are derived from legitimate subscriptions
and in a single day these are known to have amounted to more
than one hundred thousand lire. In addition there have almost
certainly been subsidies from Soviet sources and there is
evidence that by March the Party possessed more than twenty
million lire deposited in various banks in the names of members
of the Party trusted by the party directorate. In consequence,
the Party is the most wealthy as well as the best organized in
South Italy. At the same time all the evidence available shows
that the only strong and well disciplined party in Northern
Italy is the Communist Party and that it plays a dominating role
insofar as active resistance is concerned.
The power of the Communist Party is growing daily. Vyshinski and
Bogomolov have both insisted that Russia wishes to see a “strong
Italy”. Russia has, through the exchange of diplomatic
representatives, been the first to make a gesture towards
removing Italy from the position of a conquered enemy. There are
no Russian troops of occupation and there is consequently none
of the friction between Italians and Russians that inevitably
arises in areas under foreign military control. As the Russian
armies approach the Balkans Italians feel that, through the
strong influence which Russia will have on Yugoslavia, Italy
will be faced in effect by Russia on her Eastern boundary. These
cumulatively powerful influences are superimposed on a country
already ripe for that swing towards extremes which is the
inevitable corollary of a shattered economy and the threat of
inflation.
More than twenty years ago a similar situation provoked the March
on Rome and gave birth to Fascism. We must make up our minds—and
that quickly—whether or not we wish to see this second march
developing into another “ism”.
April. 19, 1944.
