865.01/2336: Telegram
The Chargé at Algiers (Chapin) to the Secretary of State
[Received April 15—9:31 a.m.]
1243. From Murphy. Macmillan and I returned last evening from Naples. I regret the complicated communications arrangements at Naples prevented more detailed and rapid reporting. After Brandt’s28 arrival cipher transmission should improve.
On arrival in Naples April 7 I immediately consulted with British and Soviet representatives and Count Sforza (my April 10, 10 a.m.) and I had a frank discussion privately with Macmillan, Noel Charles, and General MacFarlane to whom I described point of view conveyed to me by Department. They expressed concern over fashion in which Soviet Union is showing a tendency independently to intervene in internal Italian affairs and in strengthening position of Italian Communist Party. Incidentally they seem fully in agreement with [Page 1098] Sforza’s opinion that Soviet Union is striving for “diplomatic Sovietization” of Italy as a focal point in a wider European program. This does not mean however that British have changed their attitude regarding Sforza whom they damn with faint praise at every opportunity.
Macmillan agreed time had arrived when it would be well by an Anglo-American démarche to demonstrate that our respective Governments who had borne and are bearing brunt and burden not only of Italian military campaign but economic supply of liberated Italy as well have gone as far and as fast as situation permits in facilitating democratization of Italy. The British evince greater concern even than do we regarding the Soviet effort, which becomes daily more obvious, to gain political profits at Anglo-American expense.
As it was appropriate that Sir Noel Charles should present his respects to Victor Emmanuel, and also that I do so after an extended absence, we arranged to call on the King at his temporary residence in Ravello on the morning of April 10. It was agreed that I should lead off the discussion regarding the purpose of our visit. In doing so I told the King frankly that it was our considered opinion that he would best serve Italian interests and the Allied cause by retiring from public affairs immediately. I described to him as best I could the state of American public opinion and expressed the opinion that his continued presence obviously was proving an obstacle to the coalition of liberal forces in Italy which might have an adverse effect on the conduct of the war. The King expostulated a number of times during our conversation, describing his accomplishments in favor of the Allied cause, reiterating that his decisions in July, 1943 resulting in the dissolution of the Fascist Party, the expulsion from the government of Mussolini, the negotiations for an armistice, and finally that the transfer to the Allies of the Italian fleet and the Italian declaration of war against Germany could not have happened without his decision. I replied that we gave him full credit for his actions and were deeply grateful for them, and that they partially at least served to counterbalance other features of his record which included close affiliation with and submission to the Fascist program during a period of 22 years leading up to the Italian declaration of war against the United States, to say nothing of the acts which Italy had committed against our Allies, especially France, Greece, and Great Britain. Whether his heart was in such a program or not, he submitted to it and gave his approval by his continued acceptance of the situation. This acceptance had led inevitably to the death of many Americans as well as our Allies, had made the task of the United States in combatting nazism far more prolonged and difficult and had done unlimited harm to the Italian people. We were glad that he should have been able to make a contribution during the past 8 months to redeem himself, but that [Page 1099] the moment seemed to have arrived where it would be in the common interest for him to withdraw. The King grew excited and protested that it had never been possible prior to July 1943 for him to take action breaking with fascism and that throughout the years he had remained on in the hope of finding an opportunity to rectify the misguided Italian trend.
During the course of his remarks he also referred to the bombing by Allied airmen of the Roman population which resulted in the death of several hundred Italians. At this point Macmillan took up the cudgels and vehemently stressed to the King the sufferings of the English population as a result of Italy’s entry into the war, its participation in raids against Britain, and cited the figure used by Mr. Churchill of 230,000 casualties in the Mediterranean campaign which might have been avoided if Italy had remained out of the war. For this, said Macmillan, the King could not hope to escape all responsibility.
The King protested on leaving that we had “placed him up against the wall” and objected that he had no warning of the purpose of our visit and that we had not given him an opportunity to consult with his Ministers. I informed him that our purpose was to save him from embarrassment and for that reason we had desired to talk with him privately inasmuch as we had not up to the present acquainted him with the state of public opinion in the United States of America and Great Britain. I said that we would like a reply by evening if possible.
We, later in the day had several conferences with members of the King’s entourage (Aquarone, Prunas, and Ferraci) who begged that we allow until the following day for final word. On April 11 we also had a long and frank conversation with Marshal Badoglio who called on us at the Villa Cimbrone. He had obviously been primed and he inquired regarding the object we were trying to achieve whether it was the formation of a broad based democratic government or the disappearance of the King from public life. We replied that we had both purposes in mind and felt that they were inextricably bound together. He said that in his opinion the four popular and organized political parties in southern Italy had arrived at point influenced by the attitude of Italian Communist Party where they were willing to accept participation in his Government even though the King remained using the formula that the King would reconsider the position after the capture of Rome. He said he felt sure that the right wing Liberals, the Democratic Christians, the Socialist and Communist Parties were prepared to accept such a situation and that the Labor Party and Party of Action did not represent anything but small and badly organized minorities whose presence in or out of the Government was not of great importance.
[Page 1100]Both Macmillan and I are suspicious that our Communist friends have secretly given to Badoglio much encouragement and assurances of support.
Later on April 11 the King sent Prunas to us several times and it appeared that he was willing to go no further than the formula which was finally published and of which you have the text.
At this point Macmillan emphasized to me that as he had acted without specific instructions from his Government and solely on the basis of his own understanding of the situation and of the Prime Minister’s point of view as gathered by him during his recent visit in England and from Sir Noel Charles who saw the Prime Minister a few days ago he felt unable to go further in forcing the issue of the King’s immediate retirement from public affairs. I concluded that the Department would wish under the circumstances to accept the formula and this was agreed upon with Macmillan.
We also agreed and so informed the Italians that we would regard the action as one arising from spontaneous Italian initiative pointing out that in essence the King had himself suggested such a program on February 21 and that as we understood it the other Allied Governments including the Soviet Union had no objection.
On returning to Naples after having received assurances from the Italians that the King’s announcement would be made at midday April 12 we met the British and American press correspondents and opportunity to note the reaction of certain Italian elements including Count Sforza. These generally are favorable, Sforza expressed to me, and later made a public statement of his approval and satisfaction over the action taken by the King. [Murphy.]
- George L. Brandt, assigned as Consul General at Naples, March 9, 1944.↩